Checks and balances essentially don't work in the US. The best bit is simply a decent judiciary, but that was mostly copied from the British. And even that is more poorly executed than elsewhere, due to the political nature of judicial appointees, and esp. due to the tradition of direct elections of some judges. I'd say it's arguably worse than the British model it was copied from, not because the Brits were psychic geniuses, but because of the not entirely unrelated fact that the UK model is much more open to reform; it's aged better because it's less crufty. When lead by a dangerously populist government that might be risk, of course, but so far even populists have turned out not to do too much consitutional harm - might differ in the future.
It's more like: the US constitution was grand it its aims, but pretty v1.0 in its execution. It's full of unintentional (or at least unfortunate) indirect effects that didn't work out too well; such as that congress is likely to deadlock; that the constitution isn't sufficiently amendable; that its form of democracy is subject to unproportional divergence as state population sizes diverge, that by contrast adding new states is way too easy, that elections at all are in no way shape or form necessarily fair (and I don't there there has ever been a particularly free&fair election in the states) due to gerrymandering, state size disparities, imbalanced voting registration requirements, and lack of constitutional protections for elections in general; the presence of systematic biased introduced by winner-takes-all approaches; the lack of a checks on the presidency (clearly not intentional, but impeachment is a purely hypothetical check). I'm sure actual scholars could name a bunch more. Then theres the more general flaws in legal republics, such as that there no systematic mechanism for reform; laws just accumlate leaving extremely outdated wordings on the books forever, and with ever increasingly large rulebooks.
Seriously, name 1 check/balance that's actually particularly good! (I mean, I guess there by sheer scope might be one... but I can't think of one anyhow).
The person in charge with executing the law is different from the people in charge of crafting the laws to be executed.
Deadlock is not the worst thing, and the solution to it is not necessarily to remove as many locks as possible.
The actual problem in the US right now is that checks and balances are strong enough to allow one party to block things, but not strong enough to deter waiting until your party stochastically has enough power to get things done. This is exacerbated by having one party's ideologically committed to having the government do less.
In previous decades, stuff like earmarks greased the wheels enough to get things done (but an effective PR campaign against them got them banned). You could also fix deadlocks by strengthening the checks to force compromise among factions, like by coupling automatically expiring legislation with requirements for big super-majorities.
Since Congress makes its own rules, and 51/49 is enough to change a rule ('the nuclear option'), supermajority would have to be a constitutional amendment... And then 45% would be enough to halt government. I guarantee you this would then happen regularly.
Other systems have mechanisms to force elections if deadlocks are persistent. Of course, you also need mandatory voting, PTO for voting, full franchise, etc and that isn't going to happen in America while this Supreme Court lasts.
That was the problem with the Senate's supermajoriy requirements: basically the only thing holding them in place was convention, so they fall in the face of someone willing and able to make unsentimental tactical power plays.
IMHO, someone like McConnell would have behaved very differently if he knew his opponents could block him just as easily as he has blocked them. His apparent effectiveness is almost entirely a result of his greater willingness to hypocritically use then discard convention when it gets in his way. He'd never have gotten his tax cuts or judges if he wasn't able to bend the rules.
> Other systems have mechanisms to force elections if deadlocks are persistent.
I think something like that could be a genuine improvement.
The real protection here is that a simple majority can't throw out the minorities voice entirely. But that doesn't require the separation of the executive to achieve, it merely requires either a supermajority, and/or a differently composed senate (which doesn't need to be unrepresentative either, the differing election schedule would suffice, and it doesn't even need a veto - an election-cycle delay would be enough).
Incidentally, from memory, all sliding-into-dictatorship democracies I can think of did so behind a strong "executive". Empirically at least that would suggest that simply not having such a strong executive sounds like a sound protection against despotism. Intuitively, that would suggest that it's pretty hard to rally a country behind a dictatorship that originates in congress; a powerful figurehead matters. Finally, I'm not really sure to what extent a constitution really can or should protect against popular despotism - at best it can delay the process; but part of the point of democracy is self-rule; and taking away that rule to avoid despotism also takes it away for other reform - and it's not really going to work anyhow, because if enough people want to dump the laws, they will, even if the letter of the law begs to differ.
Article II Section 1 of the Constitution?
All it will take is a stronger, more popular leader who feels 'bypassing the rules' is ok for 'the greater good' (aka themselves), and we're in deep trouble.
If Trump hadn't spent all 4 years of his tenure actively disparaging, impugning, maligning, and throwing under the bus every military leader or hero he ran across, we could be in a very, very different country today. I'm still amazed how close he came to winning Arizona considering what he said and did to McCain.
A check and balance has been on great display in recent weeks. A President has stated, "the election was a fraud, I should get another term". Congress has stated, "the election was correct. Moreover, we may choose to prevent you from holding office ever again." The judiciary agrees.
That Congress is likely to deadlock is arguably a feature, not a bug. (That voters don't demand better from their congresspeople is, perhaps, a correctable bug.).
There is only one exception to the amendability of the Constitution -- states cannot be deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate. See Article V.
The disproportionate representation is by design. Without it, the country literally would not have formed. I am pleased to see states hacking around it without an amendment, thus, should the prior function be required, the states themselves can revert.
Is adding states too easy? There are three million US citizens in Puerto Rico without representation in Congress.
I am hopeful that we will find ways forward on gerrymandering. The only true beneficiaries of the existing system are the political parties.
Impeachment is not just hypothetical. Though it was not fully realized against Nixon, it would have been had he not resigned.
Regarding the endless accretion of laws: we get the government for which we vote. Speaking up, as you have done here, is the first step toward making it better.
As to congresses deadlock being a feature: it may well have been intentional; but it's pretty plausibly a long term fatal blow. Countries need to be able to evolve, and when small minorities can prevent that (and we're not their yet, but it's moving that way), you're creating really perverse incentives for horse trading, leading to really low quality law making, and thus low respect for congress. It's not out of the question that this might lead to the nation's dissolution in our lifetimes - what happens when elections are legally stolen?
On impeachment: we'll see what happens with trump who happens to be a perfect case to check whether this feature of the constitution is more than hot air; but given how stacked the deck is against conviction, I'm not holding my breath - and if it's not going to happen now, it never will - not only was he utterly shameless in undermining the election (knowing full well that democracy is worth fighting for, i.e. raising tensions dangerously) and addition literally using combative language and calling for as close to a stormin of the capitol as possible while trying to retain plausible deniability, we're also just post election that shifted the balance of the senate against him. This is pretty much the best case scenario for an impeachment, and it's far from a sure thing.
Additionally, the current election was upheld largely because of states still sticking to extra-legal solid traditions. Those however, are not constitutionally protected; i.e. what worked was american culture & tradition (sometimes backed by state law), not really the american constitution. I mean, for scale: it's easier to throw out an election than a president, which is absolutely Not Ok.
Some of your other objections relate to tradition, e.g. such as puerto rico not being a state. This has nothing to do with the constitution; this is purely a political tradition. And indeed; many traditions are fine - while I think there's no question on the specific instance of puerto rico deserving statehood, the point is that the constitutional bar is very low despite the fact that it allows senate packing. A malicious populist could easily abuse that, if convenient, were it not for the real protection: tradition&culture, not the constitution.
The US has a solid set of traditions and an extremely civic culture; and that's why it works - not because of the constitution.
IMO this is something that I wish more citizens understood. They put way too much faith in the Constitution and don't realize that it's the tradition, the mythology of America that really holds this country together. If we lose that, we lose everything, and the Constitution won't save us.
"Statehood is too easy" is probably the wrong critique. The problem is that there is not clear enough guidelines for enforcing some criteria for what constitutes a new state. Thus we have a false positive like Wyoming, which shouldn't be a state with its minuscule population, and we a false negative in Puerto Rico, which is anachronistically governed like a colony .
I don't have the numbers in front of me, but I don't think the original senate had states that had 80X the representation by population, as we have today between CA and WY.
I would argue the "false-positive" state that in this case is California.
Imagine if the entire Eastern seaboard was divided into three States. That would be equally imbalanced.
Practical hacks like that might mitigate the imbalance, but really - the senate needs proportional representation too. It's OK that small states are slightly over-represented, but the current state of affairs is pretty crazy. Also, the amount of people per senator is unbelievably high, making them less approachable than they once were.
If the senate were proportional, we could simply abolish the electoral college with little loss; just let congress elect the president and be done with it.
Each state is supposed to be an equal member of the union, which is why they each get equal voice in the senate. Up until the early 1900s senators were appointed by state governments rather than being popularly elected.
It's sort of fallen out of fashion to identify strongly as a member of your state rather than just as a citizen of the United States, but I think this year has demonstrated that state governments still have a lot of influence and autonomy.
I for one have been very pleased with my state's handling of the situation and have been glad to live here rather than somewhere else.
No, the Seventeenth Amendment should be repealed and state legislatures should be required to appoint senators. The United States form a federal government, not a unitary state; that means the several states should be represented.
> If the senate were proportional, we could simply abolish the electoral college with little loss; just let congress elect the president and be done with it.
Alternatively, state legislatures could appoint electors. Or maybe they could appoint two electors, and the people of the state could vote for the rest.
But personally, I don't think appointed senators would practically help much.
The point of federalism isn't to achieve some ivory tower ideal of centuries past, but to have real value today. Some of the value we can still retain is flexibility: essentially letting states go their own way for many laws and regulations. That benefit of federalism is quite real, and imposes no requirements that the senate needs to have appointed senators vs. elected, nor that the number of senators be fixed (vs. scale with population size). I'm pretty sure we can mitigate the deadlock, lack of accountability, and undemocratic representation issues with today's congress+executive while also eating our federalist cake.
To be clear: I don't think of this is worth pursuing as political reform; it's entirely unachievable due to the US's virtually unamendable constitution (basically only populist amendments are ever achievable, never this stuff; states need to large agree, after all - and pure political power play makes that utterly impossible).
The whole point of having two separate bodies is that it requires two groups that are chosen in a different manner to both agree that a piece of legislation is acceptable.
If anything, I would push the principle downwards further, and argue that state senators should represent counties. Indeed, this was the case until the execrably unconstitutional Reynolds v. Sims decision in 1964, which forced states to apportion state senate seats by population.
We would probably be a much happier union if our politics were mostly about those things most of us can agree on, rather that all about the things that we disagree on. Our politics is all scissor statements, now.
Also: just because the senate should be proportionally scaled doesn't mean that proportionality needs to follow the same rules as the house's: e.g. one of them might use winner-takes-all per district approach, another a ranked choice, or one might use districts, and another be a proportional representation of the whole state.
Finally, while a slight variation in the representation is likely "nice to have" I don't actually think it's all that critical. The idea makes sense: you want a check on power, but in practice it fails at that goal today, because power is not wielded by senate vs. house, but instead by republicans vs. democrats (sure, in the exceptional curent case of a precisely divided senate where every vote counts there's a slight possibility that intra-party disagreements mean that some senators sometimes switch sides, but even now it's going to be rare). But it's really important to realize that the senate does not exercise any kind of legislative check on the house in the normal case that congress is either clearly divided or clearly in the same hands. When house and senate are in the same hands, it's the political party that makes the decisions and members generally stay in line; and conversely when it's divided it's the political parties that do the horse-trading. There's no protection or moderation offered by the current system; if anything it makes for even more extreme legislation - because now it's either deadlock or go!-go!-go! - and when congress is in gung-ho mode, they don't have the luxury of careful consideration, and so likely produce less moderate legislation.
The current split is a failure; not a feature.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleiv#section3
As to what you consider a "false positive" state, that's a political question, and apportionment is not the only political consideration. Congress is just about the best option we have for settling such complex, interstate questions.
Moreover, the US has always had lopsided state populations. The 65:1 apportionment population ratio between California and Wyoming (https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2010/data...) is definitely big, but it's still within an order of magnitude of where we started in 1789.
The first (pre-Census) apportionment, hard-coded in Article 1, Section 2, had a 10:1 Virginia:Rhode Island ratio in the House:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlei#section2
After the first Census, the largest difference ratio of apportionment population (i.e. population after implementing the 3/5 compromise, excluding "Indians not taxed", etc.) was about 11:1, between Virginia and Rhode Island:
https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/ApportionmentInformation-...
If you were to undo that 3/5ths slavery effect, the Virginia:Delaware ratio becomes closer to 12.5:1.
FWIW I agree Puerto Rico ought to be admitted, just as the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Mariana Islanders ought to be as well. France's DOM-TOM system seems like a better model to follow than America's, and it could still happen within our lifetimes; France made major reforms here within the last few decades:
Wyoming met the requirements when it was admitted, but its population hasn't grown as much as other states (e.g. no gold rush, etc). If you think this is somehow an incorrect result, what you're really arguing for is the abolishment of established states or periodically "redistricting" them in a way that would do more harm than good (given that states are more than just subdivisions for representative purposes).
> and we a false negative in Puerto Rico, which is anachronistically governed like a colony.
They've had many referendums on that question, and I think they voted against statehood until recently.
In any case - your points against redistricting are good. But even a "temporary" solution might have centuries of value, so I don't think it's entirely unreasonable to make a pragmatic push for limited redistricting, specifically only splitting large states - fusing states is much harder (because which laws apply?), and given population growth, it's pretty reasonable to have more states. Judging by the size of the house - which is probably too small, not too large - the senate has a lot of room to grow. We could certainly afford splitting all of the large states without causing huge issues - if people actually want that.
But a more long term solution without redistricting is to give up on the notion that states are equal. Just give more senators to larger states, and fewer to small states, and the current system mostly works; certainly better than now, and without the need for as radical an imposition as state-level redistricting.
Virginia: 447,016
Georgia: 23,375
About 19x.
No, it voted for becoming a state, under the terms set for the 2-question referendum.
Question 1: Should Puerto Rico continue its current territorial status?
Yes: 46%
No: 54% (Wins)
Question 2: Which non-territorial option do you prefer?
61.2% for statehood (Wins)
33.3% for free association
5.5% for independence
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Puerto_Rican_status_ref...
> and in 2017 a vote on the issue was scotched because of anti-statehood boycotters.
No, the vote was held, statehood won overwhelmingly, but the boycott by opponents was cited (by opponents!) as a reason to disregard the results.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Puerto_Rican_status_ref...
Criticism Edit Critics said that voters who favor a developed version of the current status of Puerto Rico (a commonwealth which is part of the United States with internal self-government) had no alternatives on the ballot. As a result, leaders of the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) instructed such voters to leave the second portion of the ballot blank, or to invalidate the ballot.[27]
Because there were almost 500,000 blank ballots, creating confusion as to the voters' true desire, it provided Congress an opportunity to ignore the vote, which it did.[28]
History professor Luis Agrait explained the result in this manner to CNN: "If you assume those blank votes are anti-statehood votes, the true result for the statehood option would be less than 50%."[29] Considered as a percentage of the total number of votes cast in the first ballot, 44% voted in favor of statehood on the second ballot.
—-
“Scotched” was the wrong word, implying not held, I apologize. Interpreting the vote got destroyed, was what I meant.
It’s clear that the folks who run PR see their jobs in danger if the island becomes a state. Hurricanes have now made it clear what second-class status means to the average person.
It surely worked, but with the majority of the Republicans in Congress objecting. And one can't help but wonder what would have happened if the election had been closer (you'd just need to ramp up the voter suppression a bit more). We had a taste of it in Bush v. Gore, where the judiciary decided to stop a recount with a very poor justification. Now imagine it in the much more polarized environment of today. Or with someone actually competent, who managed to solidify power over 4 years rather than doing opposition to his own government half the time.
That risk has been realized. Aren't the parliamentary governments of Hungary and Poland falling into "democratic" authoritarianism?
I'm pretty sure the US system was mainly designed to prevent that kind of thing, and put up democratically-derived barriers against it. The Trump presidency would have been way worse without them. Trump has been very effective at keeping his party in line behind him (even to the anti-democratic extremes). The things you complain about are mainly tradeoffs of that design.
The US works; and has excellent governance; that's not really in question (IMHO). The question is whether that's due to the constitution, or despite it.
If the US were as uninterested in democracy and as accepting of an autocratic leadership as hungary (and as small as hungary) - do you think the constitution of the US would have made anything better?
In many countries he could have just insisted (or tell a crony he insists) and that would have been that.
I agree. The checks and balances worked as they were supposed to.
Note that if there was evidence of widespread election fraud, the checks and balances on display here would (hopefully) provide a check on that.
The US Constitution would have really been 2.0 as the Articles of Confederation preceded it: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Articles_of_Confederation
The bicameral requirement for a concurrent majority is entirely by design and has plenty of supporters. It's pretty egregious to cite this first on the list of supposedly crucial flaws.
>that its form of democracy is subject to unproportional divergence as state population sizes diverge, that by contrast adding new states is way too easy
The one fixes the other, but adding new states turns out not to be that easy. From a political standpoint, larger states have an outsize cultural and regulatory influence (which is known to the state of California to cause cancer, but which cannot be mentioned in textbooks used in Texas schools) so compensating smaller states makes sense; voters in large states who feel their votes are diluted should, in principle, be able to correct this with a split. Is it a perfect balance? Not at all, but it's something.
But in practice, adding new states has become too hard and this may be a source of recent political problems! Puerto Rico should have been a state in the '90s. Movements to split large states may not be such a bad idea.
>that elections at all are in no way shape or form necessarily fair
A cultural and political flaw, not a Constitutional flaw. Maybe an omission, but you can't write all of the laws and practices necessary for a fair election into the Constitution; it would take up most of the document!
>that the constitution isn't sufficiently amendable
A risk-averse and historically motivated bias; we had one bad Amendment (the 18th) and the fallout really put a damper on amendment movements.
>the lack of a checks on the presidency (clearly not intentional, but impeachment is a purely hypothetical check)
Trump's impeachment trial was heavily impacted by the Democrats' primary season and not-so-subtle party establishment hopes that Warren would somehow pull out a win, so everything had to be rushed in order to avoid distracting her (and she lost badly anyway).
The issue isn't the bifurcation of congress by itself, it's that in addition the electoral system for both sides differs so greatly, and simultaneously that the US uses a winner take-all approach to assigning seats which converges to partisanship. Fix any one of those issues and the deadlock issue is reduced. It's the current bicameral nature that the problem, not the abstract notion. However, I also think that bicameralism is oversold - sure, made a lot of sense to try that, but the protections it supposedly provides are extremely slim in a partisan electorate. Part of the time there's deadlock, part of the time it's close (best case, but very rare and growing ever more rare as more congressmen toe the party line), and part of the time there's a trifecta, and there is in essence no bicameral congress, nor even really a separation of powers. The whole thing makes sense only if political parties either don't exist, or are constantly in some kind of coalition. But as in the US? There are only downsides, and virtually no upsides to a bicameral congress. Also, we know more now; other democracies don't have such strongly independant arms and if anything appear more stable.
> The one fixes the other, but adding new states turns out not to be that easy. From a political standpoint, larger states have an outsize cultural and regulatory influence (which is known to the state of California to cause cancer, but which cannot be mentioned in textbooks used in Texas schools) so compensating smaller states makes sense; voters in large states who feel their votes are diluted should, in principle, be able to correct this with a split. Is it a perfect balance? Not at all, but it's something.
Personally: I don't believe this problem is anything near as bad as the current problem (and it's likely overstated anyhow; even large states aren't that large). But yeah, splitting large states would be a good idea, even with proportional representation. But even if there it's worth boosting small states' influence, the current system is excessive. Fundamentally, I'm a little skeptical than non-proportionality is ever a great way to redress that sort of imbalance, but we could easily have a compromise system, e.g. N+1 senators (a kind of smoothing that boosts smaller states). Another thing we could do is limit large states' influence, e.g. by banning stuff like winner-takes-all solutions to the electoral college.
>> that elections at all are in no way shape or form necessarily fair
> A cultural and political flaw, not a Constitutional flaw. Maybe an omission, but you can't write all of the laws and practices necessary for a fair election into the Constitution; it would take up most of the document!
On the one hand: fair enough. On the other: that something so fundamental to a form of government isn't specified is a problem. This isn't black and white; the constitution doesn't and shouldn't include "all of the laws and practices". But the almost complete lack of ground rules - while very federal in spirit - also means that it's a race to the bottom, and what makes sense locally (gerrymandering, winner takes all, etc) isn't good for the whole. The ground rules here are lacking, and that makes sense historically - but then again, that's exacty my point: the constitution is a product of its time, and not a good fit today.
>> that the constitution isn't sufficiently amendable
> A risk-averse and historically motivated bias; we had one bad Amendment (the 18th) and the fallout really put a damper on amendment movements.
It's not just cultural, it's part of the rules too - it's way too easy for a tiny number of voters to essentially veto a change. Also, again, look around the rest of the world (here britain really stands out) - those protections don't seem to help in practice. Britain has no protections whatsoever on constitutional change, yet it hasn't collapsed after centuries. Again, I think that intuitively the idea of setting a high bar for amendments makes sense, but empyrically it does not appear to be borne out. Other protections might be to instead of raising a high bar, create a huge drag - make the process take a long time, and thus require multiple congresses to approve. Have veto-like capabilities, but ones that delay yet further, not prevent reform wholesale.
>> the lack of a checks on the presidency (clearly not intentional, but impeachment is a purely hypothetical check)
> Trump's impeachment trial was heavily impacted by the Democrats' primary season and not-so-subtle party establishment hopes that Warren would somehow pull out a win, so everything had to be rushed in order to avoid distracting her (and she lost badly anyway).
I think you're really focusing on the details here. Set aside whatever political agreements or disagreements you have; the fact is that today's impeachment is a political process that requires going against the grain of partisanship. It's way to attractive to reject impeachment for partisan reasons; because after all - a flawed president one agrees with is still better than giving the other side a win, and it gets worse given the senate's extremely unproportional nature. This causes real problems too; it's not just a question of who wins or who loses - what you see in other countries that have an easier time ejecting leaders is that they try to mitigate damage a lot early, and are a lot more careful to avoid the kind of transgressions that have plagued quite a few US presidents in living memory. And when they do engage in dubious behavior they often seek approval by others at least in their own congressional majorities beforehand, because they know they risk getting hung out to dry otherwise - and that itself is a valuable check on excesses. Alternatively, impeachment itself should have much more teeth.
Maybe trump is too recent a memory, but consider Clinton's impeachment. Sure, I think most people agree questioning a president about his sex life under oath was not reasonable - but lying under oath, really? The only reason that was OK was because the whole thing had the whiff of partisan witch-hunt, and that's a problem, because it'll always be spun to that. I'd rather have a system where everybody knows that if you pull a stunt like that you're liable to get removed. I don't mind if some other leader from the same party takes their place - in fact, that's a good idea, because it makes the process less about partisan rejection of the other side's election win, and more about personal responsibility - but leaders should not be even close to above the law; and right now they are - how bad does behavior need to get before they're actually punished?
How do you pick judges if you don't appoint them or elect them?
In Texas, Justices of the Peace have no particular requirements, and are (IIRC) the equivalent of small-claims courts in the rural counties, but have had some special powers, like acting as coroner in counties without access to one. I had a government teacher with a long list of amusing anecdotes---like the JP that determined that a body with like, 27 bullet wounds had committed suicide. Judge Roy Bean was a JP; at one point someone brought in a dead cowboy who had fallen down a cliff. The body was carrying $25 and a pistol. Bean found the cowboy to be carrying a concealed weapon, confiscated the pistol, and fined the body $25.
One method that I've heard of is to have a committee (/"commission"/"council") select judges. The committee composition can draw from multiple branches of government (e.g. some members are existing judges and others are appointed/elected by the executive and/or legislative branches) and from civil society (e.g. appointed/elected by bar associations; in some implementations a majority of the committee is from civil society). The terms of members of the committee can be staggered.
The idea is to make it difficult for any one controversial person or party or movement to consistently dominate the committee, because in order to do so they would need to consistently dominate multiple branches of government and civil society (because the different members of the committee are selected by these different institutions) over a long period of time (because of the staggered terms).
The overarching one is the government being a triumvirate. If one branch overreaches, the other two can keep it in check. Triumvirates have historically been stable governments. Even in the Soviet Union - the Party, the Army, the Police.
Though I agree calling it a "check & balance" is pretentious.
It's at best an instrument for mercy. Of course it can be abused, but if you have a bad president, that's not on the top 10 list of problems.
Of course. If the laws are rotten it's the court's job to tell the legislature don't do that.
I dont understand your comment. Are you thinking that acts of justice, by definition, cannot also be the product of a person becoming an arbiter of law? That you perceive a decision as just doesn't change whether a person might or might not be acting as an arbiter of law.
I mean, I suppose its one of a near-infinite number of possible alternatives, but I don’t see how its an even relevant one. The discussion wasn’t about someone pardoning only black people, it was about pardoning all people convicted under a particular set of laws.
That power can then be used justly or unjustly. The constitutional balance for this is impeachment, but it's not clear that would work in practice or theory.
Typos happen (and this is an international community including people unfamiliar with some idioms). Obviously the alternative presented isn't THE alternative.
No, the Constitutional pardon power (in one direction, for criminal law only) does that already. The question is about how that position of arbiter will be used, not whether the President has it.