> I'm wondering, given how threat actors normally behave when intruding into networks, do you also have honey user credentials in the network?
Yes, for some types of honeypots credentials can be useful. Although it bears to keep in mind that the more accessible you make your honeypots, credentials, and other "detection elements", to more you open yourself to false alarms. Some vendors in our space plant credentials to every endpoint and I've heard mostly negative results (legitimate users clicking stuff out of curiousity, which completely destroys the key benefit of using honey/deception things.)
> I don't imagine you're catching many serious attackers just by exposing fake servers vulnerable to MS17 for example.Could you explain more about your strategies and which types of attackers you can say you'd catch with surety?
One use case we suggest is tying your honeypot strategy with your existing internal vulnerability & threat management, in practice for example circulating the types of honeypots you have to reflect acute, high-value vulnerabilities - or for slightly more advanced orgs who are on top of their threat intelligence, they could actively plant honeypots that match asset types threat actors in their industry space have been known to target.
Tie that with creds, integrations and such where applicable and you have a pretty decent palette for catching events that also bear useful and timely security telemetry.