Protocol for a U.S. Nuclear Strike
wagingpeace.org
wagingpeace.org
Daniel Ellsberg's recent book The Doomsday Machine supports a lot of this, but adds that historically, theater military commanders have also had independent launch authority, and as far as he can tell, they still do.
(Ellsberg is best known for the Pentagon Papers but his job was actually nuclear strategy. He'd intended to publish documentation on that as well, but thought if he did that first, nobody would even care about the Vietnam stuff. The nuclear papers were lost before he published them.)
While the US certainly maintains the technical ability to have launch on warning, it seems that it might not be the policy.
Clinton Issues New Guidelines on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-11/news/clinton-issues-...
> ... while the United States has always had the "technical capability" to implement a policy of launch on warning, it has chosen not to do so. "Our policy is to confirm that we are under nuclear attack with actual detonations before retaliating," he said.
If you get confirmation that Russia launched 1-10 ICBMs, well maybe you are reading it wrong, and the loss of 100-200 missiles silos if you are wrong won't make much difference.
But if you get confirmation Russia is launching 100 ICBMs, its bombers are in the air, and its subs are rising to launch depth, well lets just hope that's hard to fuck up that confirmation.
The real winners will be the ones who never saw it coming.
Will nuking Russia in that situation prevent the US from being nuked? Will it help any American citizen anywhere in the world?
If we had a policy to wait a long time, the Russians could strike our missile bases, large military bases, aircraft carriers, naval bases. But unless we acted fast, our military forces would be in shambles even though the eastern seaboard, Chicago, SOCAL, the major texas cities, etc. are all still standing. We'd still have second strike weapons but they are unusable if we still had domestic civilian targets to worry about. No sane President or General would order a coutervalue strike when faced with a counterforce strike from an enemy.
If we let the enemy successfully first strike the United States, Mutual Assured Destruction goes out the window.
TL;DR; the Russians could "win" a nuclear war unless we shoot back soon.
And if the Russians were total psychopaths who target our cities in a first strike? We have to be prepared to respond in kind or else we incentivize a one sided attack.
We know from a few previous close calls that the Russians didn’t launch when they erroneously detected launches.
Quite likely any nuclear engagement would be preceded by an adversary trying to destroy or minimize your second strike capabilities first.
The US keeps its SLBM fleet in a rotation that would always be optimal for a second strike against Russia.
Russia increasing its anti submarine activity or even destroying US subs would likely be seen as a prelude to a first strike.
So Russia spending 3 months pushing US subs into a kill box further and further form optimal launch positions and then the US detects a ground based launch no matter how small would likely invoke a ground based launch from the US before anything actually hits.
I'm asking because AFAIK they don't need that anymore, at least not up to periscope depth. (Unsure here, something like 30 to 20meters in my mind)
edit: By that I mean I'm seriously doubting the capability of anyone to have sufficient coverage by whichever means to detect that in realtime.
SLBMs also need to withstand water pressure, increasing with depth. Withstanding pressure requires reinforcement, which means weight, which... see above.
So while there are no "official" numbers as to what constitutes launch depth, physics dictates there is a maximum practical number.
So what to do about it?
Well, nuclear attack submarines generally exist to try and follow nuclear ballistic missile submarines.
Any any given point in time, >0 and <all ballistic missile submarines are being shadowed, likely without knowing it.
Consequently, were a substantial launch order given... a lot of those missile subs would start a very synchronized and quick rise to shallower depths, as well as possibly creating mechanical noise related to launch preparations.
After that, well, that's what preset plans of action in different threat scenarios are for...
I assume they are fully aware of the threat level and aren't going to level London on a Tuesday afternoon for no reason.
I also find it an odd standard to treat nukes differently than any other military action. You think we don’t have enough traditional options to level London on a Tuesday afternoon? It seems like the President is either the CinC or he isn’t...
I actually don't think there are any that are feasible. Leveling a city the size of London is no small feat, and amassing the troops and weaponry required to carry it out seems like a complicated enough exercise that it would take longer than "Tuesday afternoon".
Not that I don't think it can be done, but just that moving a large traditional military apparatus, or even mustering enough conventional missiles to flatten an area that large seems like it would take far longer than that.
The "shock and awe" campaign waged on Baghdad might be similar in scale within about an order of magnitude, and it certainly took a heck of a lot longer than an afternoon, although the goal was never to level the city in its entirety.
That's not enough time for the VP and cabinet to 25th amendment and cancel the orders.
I don't know much about nuclear policy myself, but I know this guy @DavidSantoro1 in Oahu who works on that, and recommend following him if you are interested in nuclear issues.
This is especially relevant to people in Hawaii, which is the only state, as far as I know, to have sent all its residents an emergency warning that a missile was about to hit (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Hawaii_false_missile_aler...). Luckily it was a mistake and the only affect was a million funny stories about how everyone reacted (btw: someone should write a book cataloging the best reactions!).
If the president (Biden or Trump) ordered a first strike nuke against Toronto or London there is a 0% chance it would happen. I personally doubt that an order against Moscow or Pyongyang would be followed either, but I wouldn’t argue with someone who wanted to take a position that those first strike orders would be followed.
My point is just that there is obvious a lot more...”human nuance” in the situation that the author is describing.
So, yes, the military does train for a degree of independent, critical thinking.
Retaliation is another matter, but we at least need more safeguards against a president launching first. A good argument can be made that we shouldn't allow first strikes at all.
That is not my understanding from talking with people in the army. What I understand is that anyone in the armed forced is not only allowed, but required, to refuse a unlawful order given by anyone, even the president. Executing on a unlawful order is a crime and you can end up court marshalled or even executed if the outcome is bad enough. The Nuremberg defense ("I was just following orders") does not fly in the US military.
That said Congress is supposed to declare war so most of the wars we have been fighting for the past two decades are likely unlawful. I doubt you would be successful refusing to execute a drone strike on that basis. However if the president called up drunk one night and ordered your to bomb London, I suspect you'd be safe in that refusal.
For a use of nuclear force to be legal, it must satisfy customary requirements of necessity, distinction, proportionality, and avoidance of unnecessary suffering.
Retaliating doesn't actually do any good. It increases the body count on the other side, but does nothing to help those in the US about to be atomized. It's not like the missiles will collide in mid-air.
What matters is the believed threat of retaliation because that may prevent an attack in the first place. The optimal system in terms of human life and safety is:
1. All foreign governments 100% believe that the US has complete capability to retaliate with devastating force at a moment's notice and will do so with zero hesitation.
2. But the US actually has no such capability so that an accidental first strike on a false alarm is impossible.
The tension between those two is the hard part. :)
But I’m not sure we can take your position as true, anyway:
First, the historic lack of accountability for illegal Presidential orders or obedience to them both reduces the clarity (through absence of case examples) of the legality of such orders and reduces, due to incentive structures, the probability of any person choosing to be the one that takes a stand on the perceived illegality of such an order even were the legality relatively clear.
Also, given the War Powers Act, its not clear how any order to employ the military by the President (except domestically in a manner violating the Posse Comitatus Act) would be illegal under domestic law initially (which, for a nuclear attack, is all that is going to matter.) It might violate norms of international law like waging a war of aggression, but I think recent history shows that even if maybe you can trust the US military to resist some set of illegal orders, “orders to wage of war of aggression that is, nonetheless, authorized by US domestic law” is pretty clearly not within the scope of “illegal orders” for which that is true.
An order is presumed to be lawful under military law. The burden of proving it unlawful rests on the person receiving the order. The default is to execute the orders given.
In the absence of some direct reason that it would be unlawful, a military person must carry out the order they are given.
Now of course, as you say, it is the duty of the one ordered to do something that is unlawful to refuse to carry out that order.
The only tricky bit is if the President wanted to execute a nuclear plan that hadn't been devised yet. But if there's an existing one (attacking NK, Russia, Iran) then ordering a first strike is really straightforward with an absolute minimum of people in a position to refuse.
I don’t think that’s the purpose. It’s describing features of the protocol, which are the defined rules. Yes, humans deciding not to follow the rules can result in different results, but when we are discussing what the rules for use of nuclear weapons use ought to be, you probably don’t want to avoid considering improvements on the basis that that status quo is acceptable because, in the event that the rules currently in place would result in an outcome viewed as undesirable by certain key actors, there are points in the process where they would be able and likely to execute an unconstitutional coup d’état.
But even a full Russian strike probably wouldn't 100% destroy the United States (and a full Chinese strike probably wouldn't even kill half of us unless society totally collapsed afterwards).
The presidential football is basically a menu of strike options that are ready to execute. To launch a strike all the president needs to do is call the number in the book, authenticate himself using the a two letter challenge code, and tell them which strike from the menu to order. Targeting is preprogrammed and designed to eliminate any delay or nuance in the process.
The US has spent billions (trillions?) of dollars on its nuclear strike capabilities and the systems that order its use. To presume that these systems will fail precisely when they are called upon seems short sighted.