The Safecracker of Last Resort (2018)
theatlantic.com
theatlantic.com
Presumably the contents of various safes similarly survived.
Figure the typical sporting-goods store gun safe weighs about 350 lbs (159 kg) and isn't really all that secure (a sawzall with a metal blade can open them). They don't do much better if you drop them from "only" 200 feet up (61 meters):
Immediately after the attack, exchanges moved their datacenter operations to sites in NJ about 80 miles apart and both exchanges and large brokerages setup backup datacenters in Delaware, far enough away to be unaffected by a thermonuclear blast hitting New York.
I believe, prior to 2001 only JP Morgan (pre-Chase acquisition JP Morgan) had backup datacenters in Delaware but there may have been one or two others.
To help in this task, they had to call the family members of still-missing employees and ask for personal information that might be included in passwords:
"What is your wedding anniversary? Tell me again where he
went for undergrad? You guys have a dog, don’t you? What’s
her name? You have two children. Can you give me their birth
dates?”
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/magazine/the-secret-life-...When my cousin passed very unexpectedly, this is exactly what I got called in to do... was easy enough for me to take some educated guesses and figure it out, I can't imagine that being suitable for a large firm to handle their password issues.
But the reality is that if you NEED what is in a safe--you drill it.
A safe isn't some magical device that somehow stops all access. The goal of a safe is to slow down an attack sufficiently that humans will notice that the safe is being attacked and do something about it.
The article does mention he does a lot of drilling.
This seems like one of those things that exists only in movies. What value would I gain from having my valuables destroyed?
I've worked in the civilian wing of a company that did this stuff. What I dealt with just enough power to wipe crypto keys if they sensed things like a tilt, air pressure change, or power loss. I'm sure the military side of the company had fun things to deal with.
Designers of such mechanisms intend those criteria to be met a certain way, but that isn't required. Like standard locks, which are intended to open with a key, but the design simply requires the pins to form a certain configuration-- key optional.
I agree entirely, reads suspiciously like a New Yorker article, they should read such, out loud to the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, they'll soon crack.