1. https://www.npr.org/2015/07/31/427990392/remembering-when-dr...
2. https://www.amazon.com/Ascending-Rooms-Express-Elevators-Pas...
1. https://www.npr.org/2015/07/31/427990392/remembering-when-dr...
2. https://www.amazon.com/Ascending-Rooms-Express-Elevators-Pas...
These sorts of things look like promising primary sources, but I can't access the full text. https://www.nytimes.com/1949/01/12/archives/city-gets-elevat... https://www.nytimes.com/1949/02/03/archives/tenants-want-a-d... https://www.nytimes.com/1928/11/11/archives/elevator-law-cha...
So this would likely be in the category of cases that would probably never happen with a manual operator. Two solutions were proposed: keep manual operators, or improve the safety of the automatic system.
After Southall [1] the drivers union felt the correct approach was to double man trains. It is surely not a coincidence this would also have meant more members and thus more power and income for the union.
That accident would have been prevented by ATP (fitted to the train but disabled because the driver had not been trained) or AWS (fitted to all British trains but disabled by the driver due to a fault).
The ATP system would have braked to a halt to avoid entering an occupied track section. AWS would have audibly alerted the driver to the signals (showing a Preliminary Caution, an ordinary Caution and then Danger) and if the driver did not react, braked to a halt. With neither it appears the driver simply did not see the signals because they weren't looking and so did not react until far too late.
The correct fix of course is to require trains to have working AWS/ ATP and use it. Operating trains with more humans is a worthwhile work around to get a faulty train back to a repair yard as empty stock, but makes no sense in passenger service.