To quote: ""Boeing “inappropriately coached” some FAA test pilots to reach a desired outcome during the re-certification tests, and some were even performed on simulators that weren’t equipped to re-create the same conditions as the crashes. ""
To quote: ""Boeing “inappropriately coached” some FAA test pilots to reach a desired outcome during the re-certification tests, and some were even performed on simulators that weren’t equipped to re-create the same conditions as the crashes. ""
When these actions were reported by whistleblowers, they were often ignored or retaliated against, according to the report.”
Boeing can’t seem to help itself from disaster
It obviously can. As long as it has regulators and legislators on a leash all this will always just be the cost of doing business.
Reading the Verge article and the senate report findings (linked in laydn's comment) just confirms that there is still cause for caution.
Boeing cares, first and foremost, about the bottom line. It doesn't surprise me that money beats safety for them.
The fact is, however, that everyone going into the test was aware of what the issue was, so it could only give information about best-case response times (which is not useless information, at least if done on suitable simulators.) For a while, every Max pilot is also going to be primed about this issue.
It's certainly true today, but I suspect it was also true on 2019-03-10 and being primed wasn't enough.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/12/06/2018-26...
Here, looks like the legal minimum is 1500:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pilot_certification_in_the_Uni...
Even prior to 2013, you could be an SIC ("first officer") for a US operator with just 250 hour minimums required then by the ATP certificate. Colgan Air 3407 ended that.
Again IIRC, and reading between the lines, I think the Boeing/FAA response to LNI610 was to remind pilots of the existing trim runaway procedure, in keeping with the story that no significant change had been made to the aircraft handling. They were still being cagey about the existence of MCAS, let alone its power and its dependence on a single sensor on any given flight, and the people writing the airworthiness directive were apparently unaware that the power of MCAS had been increased after initial flight testing. Did the directive even mention that, unlike the behavior in previous versions, using the yoke switches to countermand a system-driven trim change did not stop it, if that system was MCAS? It would seem to have worked, but then MCAS would do it again.
I believe the crew had trouble manually re-trimming on account of the load on the stabilizer jackscrew, which in turn was due to how far MCAS had driven it out of trim. I think someone (Blancolirio on Youtube?) said that training rarely, if ever, got that deep into the issue.
At least two things have changed since then: the power of MCAS has been reduced, and pilots have been fully primed about it.
The issue of the second pilot's inexperience in some countries is an issue that goes beyond the Max, as it means that the captain effectively has to deal with emergencies single-handedly, at least if they go 'out-of-book' like this.
Your question is more appropriately directed at us, air travel consumers. Are we still going to board Boeing planes, knowing what we now know?
But not only the FAA recertified the plane and the MCAS cutoff seems to be more robust regardless
> So the findings in this Senate report are just going to be ignored?
They certainly are relevant for litigations and judgements against Boeing relating to the accidents.