The Dunning-Kruger Effect Is Probably Not Real
mcgill.ca
mcgill.ca
This seems like too obvious a mistake to not have been noticed for this long though.
Lowest test scores come from low ability plus bad luck and as such are lower than just low ability and highest test scores come from high ability and great luck and as such are higher than just high ability.
Unless the test is biased which means we're back to square one - discerning bias of the test from bias of respondent.
To do that you'd have to produce a specifically biased test in a different way, see how the noises add.
Maybe I don't know how to read with understanding, but to me this article makes only two points:
1. The effect was about all people, not just dumb people.
2. The same graph can be obtained "by random".
Point 1. makes sense, but 2. is left unexplained. There is a lot of words, but no content. Almost as if GPT-3 was writing it :) .
This is a non-trivial simulation so the details are really important! Shame they are nowhere to be found.
[0]: https://ibi.gmu.edu/faculty-directory/patrick-mcknight/ [1]:https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=sH44LC4AAAAJ...
This is the only substantial claim the author makes, yet the result is delivered in two measly sentences.
I feel snookered.
1. the DK-effect supposedly increases the noisier subjects estimates of their abilities are, 2. the graph relies on breaking the data into quartiles 3. experts are less noisy in their estimates of their abilities than are non-experts.
There is also the paper: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1...
Still I think the article does a disservice in not laying out the argument in plain language. I don't particularly feel like puzzling it out
If the two metrics (confidence and ability) were independent in a simulation, you'd expect to see a more-or-less flat line on confidence if you sorted by ability. So the model clearly insists on some sort of association between them, no? If the association is weak, you get a cross-over. Big deal.
Also, the graphs don't really look all that similar - especially when you consider the fact that the line on which the associated variable have been sorted by quantile is always going to be ascending (duh).
Tufte says "to clarify, add data" - one thing that neither the chart from the original study nor the simulated one respects. Surely we'd learn more from also being able to eyeball a scatterplot.
(Regarding that example, a person may even withstand the confrontation with the test score, like, "I guess, even a native speaker doesn't get more than 65% on average", or, "99% is surely not that unusual, everybody with a decent understanding should get a score like this".)
(...I like both, merry Christmas)
They say these anti social personality disorders only represent 1-2% of society, but I always try to look at the results of a society to infer the true percentage.
I’d say Nazi Germany had a particular anti social personality disorder at scale, over 50%.
I’ll let you guys infer where everyone else is at now days.
"Researchers identify a new personality construct that describes the tendency to see oneself as a victim"
https://www.psypost.org/2020/12/researchers-identify-a-new-p...
“Dumb” is the wrong descriptor. If you’ve ever worked in a politicized environment, it’s easy to observe spectacularly talented people who are uniquely unqualified to do whatever they are doing. Those are usually good at something else, and those skills generally allow them to avoid consequences for their incompetence, unless they get unlucky.
Another common scenario you see in business is when attorneys get put in charge of things, or talented salesmen get put into non-sales executive jobs.
"It's not my fault for losing this; I am clearly better than the team/oponents if it weren't for bad teammates/cheese tactics/meta abuse/lags/etc" is a mindset a lot of players have even if all evidence points to the contrary (~50% winrate in average in matches with players of similar ranking etc.).
In fact, I struggled quite some time with this myself - acknowledging and understanding one's own shittiness is one of the very first steps of actual improvement, and that's usually easier said than done, at least for me personally.
And then there is also the reaction in the moment vs the reaction after sometime of thinking about it.
Then there are like 10 paragraphs on either side of these two pictures, which don't do a lot to support these critical plots. I am left unsatisfied!
> "The above Dunning-Kruger graph was created by Patrick McKnight using computer-generated results for both self-assessment and performance. The numbers were random. There was no bias in the coding that would lead these fictitious students to guess they had done really well when their actual score was very low. And yet we can see that the two lines look eerily similar to those of Dunning and Kruger’s seminal experiment. A similar simulation was done by Dr. Phillip Ackerman and colleagues three years after the original Dunning-Kruger paper, and the results were similar."
OK, so you removed the brain, and made some models that produce somewhat similar results. What if your models just modeled the brain? How does this refute the original?
It seems a crucial piece of context is that there is some correlation between perceived and actual performance. There also is a global optimistic bias, apparently across experiments people perceive their rank is in the 66th percentile, so this universal effect leaves more room for error on the under-performing people while the highly-performing people are going to end up closer to that 66th percentile tautologically, and bounded above by smaller amount of space.
import random
import numpy as np
np.random.seed(seed=12345)
from scipy.linalg import eigh, cholesky
from scipy.stats import norm
from matplotlib import pyplot as plt
#Draw correlated random variables
#Ref here: https://scipy-cookbook.readthedocs.io/items/CorrelatedRandomSamples.html
num_samples = 125 * 4 #
x = norm.rvs(size=(2, num_samples)) # uncorrelated random normal variables
expected_correlation = np.array([[1.0, 0.19], [0.19, 1.0]])
c = cholesky(expected_correlation, lower=True) #there's a slight correlation of R = 0.19 between actual and perceived scores (according to Ackerman, 2002)
trans_x = np.dot(c, x)
#perceived / actual readings with R=0.19
perceived = trans_x[0, :]
actual = trans_x[1, :]
#Sort both variables by actual scores.
sort_by_actual = sorted(range(num_samples), key = lambda idx: actual[idx])
perceived_by_actual = [perceived[i] for i in sort_by_actual]
actual_by_actual = [actual[i] for i in sort_by_actual]
quartile_indices = [i * (num_samples // 4) for i in range(5)] #note: depends on divisiblity by four
x_coords = [xx // 2 for xx in quartile_indices[1:]] #mid-points just for plotting
perceived_means = [np.mean(perceived_by_actual[start:end]) for (start, end) in zip(quartile_indices[:-1], quartile_indices[1:])]
actual_means = [np.mean(actual_by_actual[start:end]) for (start, end) in zip(quartile_indices[:-1], quartile_indices[1:])]
#Plot
fig = plt.figure()
ax1 = fig.add_subplot(111)
plt.title("Dunning-Kruger")
ax1.scatter(x_coords, perceived_means, marker="s", label="perceived")
ax1.scatter(x_coords, actual_means, marker="o", label="true")
ax1.legend()
plt.show()I know this is off-topic, if it annoys anyone, I could take it somewhere else, but thought people interested in this article might have experimented or self-reflected.
Looking at these graphs there is maybe some curious conclusion to be made about the symmetry with imposter syndrome.
If we believe to have 'average' (2nd/3d quartile) knowledge about a subject, there are three possibilities:
1. We are correct in this assumption.
2. We are victims of Dunning-Kruger and know less than we believe we do.
3. We are victims of imposter syndrome and know more than we believe we do.
This makes sense, in the narrow definition they use for the effect, that is students estimating their exam score.
It doesn’t necessarily disprove other interpretations that people are casually using, such as imposter syndrome, which are related but pedantically not the same effect.
One is that university students often talk about how suddenly ignorant they feel once they start taking classes with depth of content — and the Ph.D. students who say the feeling only increases the deeper you go.
Uh, no.
Either way, what you said is something Bertrand Russel (certainly not best known for being a dumb man) once worded like this:
"The fundamental cause of the trouble is that in the modern world the stupid are cocksure while the intelligent are full of doubt."
.. and just for good measure, here is another one of his quotes, which is hardly well know to those who would probably be better off if they did:
"Our great democracies still tend to think that a stupid man is more likely to be honest than a clever man, and our politicians take advantage of this prejudice by pretending to be even more stupid than nature made them."
In summary: ignorant people do appear to often be more confident than they deserve to be. Whether that is actually because they are truly unaware of their ignorance, that could certainly be a good question to ask oneself. For there are plenty who deliberately abuse both faked ignorance and confidence just to bamboozle and deceive others.
It is like that brain melting sentence "If I say that I am lying, am I lying?"
If I claim that Dunning-Kruger Effect is 100% real is it really real? :)
Marry Christmas and Happy Holidays everyone!
Well, that's not a Dunning-Kruger Effect either, but maybe a confirmation bias mixed with survivorship bias.
Not being aware of things that you don't know gives you confidence.
I don't see how you make the leap from there to saying that the Dunning-Kruger effect is probably not real. The headline is totally overblown if you ask me.
This doesn't strike me as true. Or rather, I don't think that it's a significant observation that some people may want to try to explain why some people are incompetent. In my experience, people don't try to "explain" incompetence in general. They will rather talk about specifics - e.g. "Some people believe this because of the misconception that X implies Y". Even if their own rationale is incorrect.
This is very different to saying that "They are stupid because they don't know that they are stupid".
Yeah it may come up as a flippant comment about an individual (or "fringe" group like the Flat Earth Society) in casual conversation, but when I consider how much I've read about and discussed the DK effect, I can't say that the implications as stated in that the quoted piece actually has a significant basis in reality. In other words, DK may be the "darling" of said group, but the self-same group is not very significant in any way in my experience.
YMMV.
I don't know what to do about it, but its use by lay people bothers me. It's ironically Dunning-Kruger.
Will your comment change anything? Of course not, both people arguing will just assume that the other one is the stupid person.
It shows 2 charts, one that was used by Dunning Kruger and the other generated by random noise.
Both look similar, but in the random noise chart the 2 lines intersect midway along the x-axis, where the 2nd and 3quartiles meet, while the dinning Kruger chart has the line intersecting where the 3rd and 4th quartiles meet.
Isn’t that a significant difference between the 2 results?