Radar altimeters use vastly more power than anyone would waste on mere communication. They also don't depend on subtle variations in the signal to communicate. It's basically just listening for a return and measuring time-of-flight. Timing measure is more complicated, but doesn't depend on subtleties of the signal that could be easily interfered with. (Full disclosure: I've worked on Herc terrain-avoidance radar, but that was forty years ago.)
Note also that commercial aviation pilots don't use terrain avoidance radar in normal flight operations. It's an emergency system. If you're low enough to need it, you're supposed to have an airport in sight. If you start getting the "Terrain. Pull Up" warning, several things have already been going wrong for a while. If you blocked the TAWS system of a commercial airline in normal flight, it's unlikely they'd even know it. You'd have to wait around for a lost or damaged aircraft that was already about to crash, which is a pretty unrewarding hobby.
To be honest, I'd be surprised if the military didn't already have a pretty good idea how to spoof terrain avoidance radar, it would be the kind of thing that might be nice to have in a special operations toolkit. But I doubt it looks like sitting on the end of a runway with a cell phone. More like humping several car batteries, a dish antenna and a Halliburton case full of electronics to the top of a ridge. (Which, another thing: terrain avoidance radar is the opposite of stealthy, you wouldn't use it for special operations, especially when you have access to GPS, satellite maps and inertial navigation systems).
Even a 5G transmission from ground to geosynchronous orbit would be columnated by a dish, so would only interfere with a moving altimeter for a fraction of a second, and those systems are designed to handle transients. I'm not saying there isn't a potential issue, I'm saying you're not going to find out if you limit yourself to interviewing bureaucrats.