Edit: Drocer88 correctly points out below that reverse takeovers have always been legal!
Edit: Drocer88 correctly points out below that reverse takeovers have always been legal!
If net benefit increases, we should celebrate when middlemen are disintermediated. If there's evidence this causes harm to non-accredited investors (any investors of significant amount really), we can strengthen regulator resources (and for likely a lower cost than continuing to shovel money to IBs for these deals).
There is a certain effectiveness for some kinds of problems that being financially interested in truth brings which is harder to do consistently with regulation.
I am not trying to suggest a specific course is better, but pointing out that there is value in aligning doing the right thing with profit motive.
lock picking lawyer had a great video on that topic recently https://youtu.be/DykUXXcJGIw
Writing regulations is hard to achieve the intended effect. Complying with regulators frequently involves a mindset of checking boxes instead of trying to accomplish something.
If, however, an investment bank essentially buys a large chunk of your company, if only temporarily, they have a real motivation to figure out if it is legitimate, and there are real consequences if you screw up, not just legislated consequences but real financial bag holding ones.
You have to think of the everything-is-a-game mindset to help you evaluate situations. The game of being a regulator is different than the game of being an investor. There is value in both.
Right, but what I'm saying here is, a bank can still choose to be an arms-length investor. My hypothesis is the market gets as much positive signal from that as it would a traditional underwriting syndicate, without the upside bleed-off.
> You have to think of the everything-is-a-game mindset to help you evaluate situations. The game of being a regulator is different than the game of being an investor. There is value in both.
I'm not conflating the two. I'm suggesting the investor signal doesn't require a traditional underwriting syndicate.
Phrased another way, how many IPOs have canceled due to a failure to form an underwriting syndicate, or because of the due diligence performed by the same? WeWork comes to mind, but I don't think we needed the bank to tell us it was problematic - reading the S-1 would have been sufficient.
Too often regulators only come in (decades) after frauds started (Enron, WorldCom, Wirecard). And frauds fall through cracks between regulators too as it isn't clear who is responsible for what.
I'd actually like to see more of this sort of role elsewhere in finance: having your accounts signed off by a big 4 firm would mean a lot more if they had to payout in the case of fraud. But that's a somewhat different issue I just thought I'd add...
Partly this is countered by the competition between banks, if Morgan Stanley tell you they can IPO you at 50usd but Jefferies say 55usd, you go with Jefferies.
It's also good news for anyone who continues to hold equity (CEOs, founders, early/angle investors etc). Only the initial equity sold goes at this discount. For this reason many companies will start by offering small amounts of equity and later issuing more at the market price.
Of course, its also a very hard question to answer: how much is a share of company X worth? When there is no market to reference. So the discount is also a risk premium both for fraud and for mis-valuation.
I actually think IPOs are one of the hardest parts of finance to fully understand and to do and so are one of the most interesting. That's not to say that there aren't conflicts of interest and dodgy activity. Just that there are 101 moving parts.
Do you mean issuing more as in diluting the number of shares or by early stakeholders selling off their shares? The reason I ask is because on the public markets diluting shares usually pushes the shares price down, because it means they are in need of capital no? So that implies you mean early stakeholders selling their stakes?
Pricing an IPO (or any asset for that matter) is a fascinating topic, at least to a layman like me. It sounds like this should be a perfect fit for some sort of auction, yet that doesn't really seem to be a common strategy. I guess a direct listing is more of an auction type of pricing mechanism.
Or, from another point of view. If you own shares in a company, you want that company to do well. Having the company raise more money (for the same dilution) is going to help the company do well.
Or, from yet another point of view, all these new shareholders are going to be taking a share of your dividend. You'd like the company to be able to use the new assets to grow quickly so they can pay out more dividend in total.
My point is, shareholders have reason to care about more than just the share price of a company.
The Wikipedia entry on "reverse takeovers" ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_takeover ) cites the 1955 deal between REO and Nuclear Consultants, Inc. The company eventually became Nucor ( https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/NUE ).
Be careful just dismissing the current system. Being complex isn't always bad...