What I'm getting at is that the horse-trading in American government, that is essential in producing a passing vote amongst a large number, produces low-quality legislation after a lot of time-consuming process more fit for media posturing than having actual effect. "Checks and balances", rather than fostering compromise and comity, creates game theoretic outcomes antithetical to effective governance. By comparison, Canadian gov't lets the ruling party actually pass the legislation they want in the form they want, which produces clearer, more direct, more effective legislation that's more directly rewarded or punished at the polls.
The Canadian Senate is a rubber stamp. It does have party affiliation. The Senate threatened to reject a bill that had passed the House of Commons in the 70s; Pierre Trudeau said "pass it or I'll appoint as many Senators as I need to for it to pass". They did. The uselessness of the Canadian Senate is a perpetual and low priority topic of reform in Canadian gov't. It's a house of sinecure, at this point and an occasional source of special committees.
Elected members of the House of Commons vote along party lines or they're ejected from the party, which cuts them off from party resources and essentially prevents re-election. It's an electoral death sentence. No one votes against the party unless the head of the party declares a "conscience vote", freeing the members to vote as they will. In Canadian politics it's viewed as an act of governmental cowardice, allowing a bill the governing majority could pass to fail along "conscience" lines. It rarely happens; the last time was allowing gay marriage, when the Conservative Party allowed itself to lose the vote so it had an excuse for allowing it to be legislated.
Yes, there are multiple readings and such, which takes time. The only effective check at this point is if a sufficiently negative public reaction takes hold, at which point the gov't may reconsider. Unlike U.S. politics, amendments are always "friendly", and not used to buy support from individuals; instead, they're the ruling majority's mechanism to modify the bill in response to public pressure.
The big difference between Canadian and American politics, aside from party line voting, is that there are more than two effective parties. A party that wins with a plurality but not a majority of seats (a "minority gov't") has to have the support of one of the other parties to pass legislation.
A vote of no confidence can only succeed if the party doesn't hold a majority; with a majority and normal party discipline, or a strong coalition, it always fails. Its only impact is in minority gov'ts, when it indicates that no other party will partner with it.
Effectively, at the provincial and federal levels, there are 3-4 players, all of whom have a viable shot at forming a government, and who, historically, produce more sane, less complicated legislation than is passed in the U.S. The current U.S. system, besides creating poor quality legislation, full of loopholes and special interest riders, effectively prevents more than two parties from being actual players because to have influence you need to have party seniority, and no minority parties like the Reform Party ever gain enough traction.
Under the Westminster System in Canada, the average voter has more viable choices to represent them because there are 3-5 parties, rather than 2.