I will never understand what his line of thinking (and argumentation towards the board) was to go Windows-exclusively on phones.
Back then, Windows had about 2% share in the mobile phone market. Betting literally Nokia's entire future on Windows Phone seemed reckless, given that the competition (most notably Samsung) was being so successful with Android.
And this exclusivity was one-way: Nokia would commit to Windows Phone (or death), but Microsoft would continue to happily supply Windows Phone to Nokia's competitors, like Samsung.
So while Samsung, HTC, and the others were building both Android and Windows Phone devices, Nokia was going to go down the Windows path exclusively. How was that ever supposed to work out?
I look forward to reading this book, because Elop's decision bet Nokia's future on 2%-market-share-Microsoft is something that I have never understood. And I may be arm-chairing, but Nokia's demise went exactly as I expected it to go from day 1 of this announcement.