More information on the plant disturbance at Olkiluoto 2
tvo.fi
tvo.fi
> When the pump of the cooling system was stopped, one of the valves was broken. For this reason, the repair work took longer than planned, about two hours. During the prolonged repair work, hot process water was able to enter backwards longer than planned into the filters of the cleaning system of the reactor due to a difference in pressure.
> the heated up water dissolved substances from the filter into the reactor water. The substances were activated as they passed through the reactor core. Consequently, the activity levels (radiation levels) of the steam moving through the main steam lines momentarily rose to about 3 to 4 times higher compared with the normal activity level.
Elevated radiation levels require an explanation and this clear and timely communication fits the bill. Three Mile Island [2] has taught us that the pipes, pumps, valves, and gauges making up the mundane plumbing in the system can fail and have cascading effects. Kudos to the operator for their transparency.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olkiluoto_Nuclear_Power_Plant
[2] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Mile_Island_accident
Distributed systems are complicated beasts too, and have fascinating failure modes, but they get no press, because there are so many incidents and so many installations.
Centralized systems make a better scapegoat regardless of probabilities.
It reminds me of something Georges Charpak mentioned, paraphrasing: we can detect tiny particles, and now we are scared, but we cannot detect economic crashes, and we should be more scared of that.
The Finnish nuclear unit-nuclear watchdog had found that radiation levels had risen [1], the public does deserve to know and make up its own opinion about it.
Also, centralized systems are a lot more vulnerable and high-risk compared to distributed systems.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/article/finland-nuclear-incident/rad...
In particular, no change of radiation levels whatsoever outside the reactor building was ever detected. But initial reports did not make this quite clear.
On the other hand, they're very interested in things that can kill them.
I also wonder if there's more public attention paid to nuclear incidents in the region because of the proximity of a player who does not disclose or cooperate in nuclear incidents.
This would positively affect my perception of the plant's operators. They handled the crisis, and now are laying out the post-mortem for the public in a transparent manner. A culture of secrecy conceals incompetence, and that can lead to disaster. See: Chernobyl
Perhaps I am being pedantic, but this strikes me as a strange position to announce. Nuclear power is a broad category of things which includes fission, decay and fusion, all of the above can be used to generate heat.
If you look at a pie chart of how the electric power is generated in your country, and you see "nuclear power", which of "fission", "decay" and "fusion" are you going to think about?
In the meantime there are new types of fission reactors being developed (small modular such as Nuscale, advanced fission deployed in China) and they aim the address shortcomings of older designs.
The problem with current generation of fission plants is that they were primarily designed to be integrated into military-industrial complex that produces fuel for nuclear weapons. You can have safer fission plants by focusing on power generation only.
P.S. Not sure what's up with downvotes, but whatever.
I would argue that it is precisely this type of incident that should be well publicized to demonstrate how things work when they're working correctly.
What was the impact of the nuclear reactor there?
For example:
> “With hindsight, we can say the evacuation was a mistake,” says Philip Thomas, a professor of risk management at the University of Bristol and leader of a recent research project on nuclear accidents. “We would have recommended that nobody be evacuated.”
https://www.ft.com/content/000f864e-22ba-11e8-add1-0e8958b18...
I can't find a good reference in English, but here (towards the end) they mention how it took several hours before the local authorities were informed: https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/1...
Some more details of the physics and chemistry in the disturbance can be found in this memo of the authorities (in Finnish): https://www.stuk.fi/documents/12547/1285302/Esittelymuistio_...
The way I read this is--there was a very brief rise in the radioactivity of the steam in the pipeline, which kicked off the shut down of the plant. There was no indication of a larger issue, no indication that lives were in danger. In other words, the professionals on the scene had reason to believe it was nothing--and they were correct.
While the public certainly have a right to know if they are at risk, plant operators in this situation have an obligation to communicate in very careful manner. After all, in the era of social media, one hysterical politician could set off a mass panic via twitter. Far better, if the situation is in hand, to get things into an easily explainable safe state before communicating with the excitable non-experts.
I also wonder if particles of dissolved filter can be filtered out or got stuck onto the walls of the plumbing system and could cause issues at later time with sensors or cause another radiation spike.
It took several hours for some local authorities (the local city is the one named in article). National radiation safety authority received the notification in about half an hour (12.22 situation happened, 12.32 company initiated their emergency procedures, STUK received the information around 13.00, first public notice went out at 13.28).
https://www.stuk.fi/-/olkiluodon-hairiotilanne-laitos-on-vak... https://www.stuk.fi/-/hairiotilanne-olkiluodon-ydinvoimalait...
It's also not very clear who was responsible for notifying other authorities. If it was operator, STUK should probably also add a confirmation step on their process ("Have you informed X, Y, Z?").