Sure, the same way you get the teachers union to help fire bad teachers or the police union to punish bad apple officers.
Which is to say: not gonna happen.
Sure, the same way you get the teachers union to help fire bad teachers or the police union to punish bad apple officers.
Which is to say: not gonna happen.
Onus is really on the clients bringing the suit. Anti-SLAPP laws have at least been somewhat effective on an individual level in states that enacted them, so laws can disincentivize client intentions in some cases at least. I have no idea what would actually work in the case at hand though.
I’m trying to think of an incentive to counteract the viscious cycle of frivolous lawsuits providing benefits for “good” lawyers. I think it’s hard to fix a problem if the problem makes money for the good guys.
So optimally good lawyers wouldn’t make money but wouldn’t want to avoid defending people against these suits. Maybe the Bar can have all firms contribute time from their best performers to serve and not bill, but I can expect that frivolous lawsuits aren’t apparent until after the suit is complete.