Not CRLs, or rather, not directly.
Mozilla and Chrome have schemes to send a subset of revocations from the browser vendor to the user, Mozilla's is named OneCRL, the Chrome one is CRLSets.
For most websites if your end entity leaf certificate is revoked for some mundane reason Chrome likely simply won't know or care and it'll still work, because you aren't covered by CRLSets as the data would be too huge.
The long term fix, which site owners can implement, is OCSP Must Staple. What happens there is, when you request a certificate you insist on this "extension" and the extension tells client software "This certificate is only valid if accompanied by an up-to-date OCSP response". Then you set your server software to fetch OCSP responses for its own certificate and serve those to visitors.
This means excellent privacy (PornHub's certificate issuer still knows that PornHub is PornHub, not an invasion of privacy, and PornHub still knows that PornHub visitors visited PornHub, but the issuer doesn't learn who the visitors are) while being revocable (if the issuer provides REVOKED OCSP answers then you can't show that revoked certificate to a client once the last not-REVOKED OCSP answer expires)
Unfortunately, and this is a huge shame most especially for Apache, there are a lot of HTTPS servers that got OCSP Stapling badly wrong, meaning you need newer versions of software or have to install complicated workarounds because the early implementations were so stupid.