I don't recall details, but IIRC, there are (or were) a few popular VPNs in China that were used to circumvent the firewall that functioned fast and reliability despite the anti-VPN crackdowns. I've read speculation that they were likely collaborating with Chinese police/security forces to help them keep tabs on the VPN-using community in order to better anticipate threats to their power.
Facebook ran similar free VPNs for a similar reason: to gather intelligence on users to anticipate competitive threats: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onavo.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing#Development_and_...
Then as for VPNs, they're again a very different thing. Funding research or a non-profit is very different from operating a commercial entity under a guise while abusing the trust anyone places in it. The comparison seems to me like comparing funding for general car safety or emission research with suggestions that the government operates one or multiple taxi services in order to learn who goes where. It's not that governments don't setup fronts or operate commercial entities under a guise ever, but rather that I have yet to hear of doing it for the purpose of surveilling random people (you have to get lucky in that anyone of interest signs up for yours, targeted marketing or no) that are not suspected of anything. Aren't fronts usually to enable targeted investigations or do specific actions unnoticed? Like, they might operate a VPN so it doesn't look weird if their secret operators use those IP ranges as well, but the main goal wouldn't be to spy on users (not saying they wouldn't do that on the side, of course, but it's getting more far-fetched).
https://surveillancevalley.com/blog/fact-checking-the-tor-pr...
The author of this book did FOIA requests to various entities but most of them got predictably shot down for national security concerns. This one obscure government agency, Broadcasting Board of Governors, wasn't covered by these exemptions.
So the author read the emails between BBG and the Tor Project maintainers and found that when they received a bug report, rather than fixing it they reported it to their sponsors. The government would then exploit the bug for years before the Tor guys got around to fixing it.
The content is worth following up on, though. Those emails are as if written in an alternate reality, where Roger Dingledine is a government agent. They seem hard to believe, but scrolling down there is a PGP signature with the right key ID. I can't verify the sig, the email that I'd have to type over is many pages long and I'd be fighting line endings and it might never match and I'd not know if it's due to a mistake on my part or because the message doesn't match the sig so it wouldn't prove anything anyway. The signing key ID is also a short one (64 bits) so it could also be forged with some effort. I've reached out on IRC some hours ago to see if they deny it, as there is nothing on the Tor Project's blog, but have yet to get a response.
But it depends on what you're trying to do. If it's something like get access to shows on Netflix or the BBC iPlayer, then this is a good technique. I think for privacy, it might be OK; while the German or Australian govts. might share data with the US, probably Singapore, Korea, Japan or India doesn't. if you're up to something more nefarious then maybe you need something stronger like Tor.
Want to get a data center account that takes crypto only? They are often shady, bad, unreliable and expensive, probably run by another gang that have their own issues.
If, and only if, the provider isn't lying
Not very true anymore, at least Netflix outright blocks streaming to most ip blocks owned by VPS providers/datacenters.