Apple’s Secureboot private key leaked | Hacker News Reader

Apple’s Secureboot private key leaked

twitter.com

I downloaded the package and there's no private keys in here. I have no idea why they're posting the public key as "proof" because private keys in PEM format start with -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----, not -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----. The rest of it is firmware dumps for Mac SMC, the SSD controller, and various copies of iBoot.

Yap. To be fair, the original person who posted this didn't mention anything about private keys, someone else just didn't know what they were seeing and jumped the gun.

yapp i also jumped the gun. thought that the PEM file might contain the whole shebang but nada

The download is a .7z file, with one of the files called AppleSecureBootRootCA-G2.pem containing the following:

I don't know enough about certificates to do anything with it...

openssl x509 -noout -text < cert.pem

   $ keytool -printcert -file AppleSecureBootCA-G2.der
   Owner: C=US, O=Apple Inc., CN=Apple Secure Boot Root CA - G2
   Issuer: C=US, O=Apple Inc., CN=Apple Secure Boot Root CA - G2
   Serial number: 521563f9fdf7d0c6
   Valid from: Fri Dec 19 20:13:10 GMT 2014 until: Thu Dec 14 20:13:10 GMT 2034
   Certificate fingerprints:
        MD5:  8D:C7:F2:A5:BF:FF:FE:19:EE:FA:49:02:91:1C:34:DE
        SHA1: 02:60:CA:4D:08:6E:7C:CB:C2:7B:32:24:6B:22:21:6B:55:B3:D4:C2
        SHA256: 64:28:66:5D:0B:97:C1:EC:B8:76:D2:D5:A9:32:57:D4:67:FF:C1:88:DF:66:30:5D:FD:21:F4:88:E7:9C:94:EC
   Signature algorithm name: SHA384withRSA
   Subject Public Key Algorithm: 4096-bit RSA key
   Version: 3

   Extensions:

   #1: ObjectId: 2.5.29.19 Criticality=true
   BasicConstraints:[
     CA:true
     PathLen:2147483647
   ]

   #2: ObjectId: 2.5.29.15 Criticality=true
   KeyUsage [
     Key_CertSign
     Crl_Sign
   ]

   #3: ObjectId: 2.5.29.14 Criticality=false
   SubjectKeyIdentifier [
   KeyIdentifier [
   0000: 68 E9 59 50 45 F1 5D 07   F9 3F C4 26 FC 1C 27 62  h.YPE.]..?.&..'b
   0010: 7D 9E 13 94                                        ....
   ]
   ]

So the tweet contents are the beginning of a public part of the certificate. Maybe there are private keys in the link down the thread, but that's a multi-megabyte package, while the key would be just ~1kB normally.

If this is real, it's a really weird way to share it.

the link to the full key is in one of the replies (on mega)

  d4x
  ├── d431ap
  │   ├── AppleSecureBootCA-G2.der
  │   ├── AppleSecureBootRootCA-G2.pem
  │   ├── AppleSMCFirmware-2317.60.63.0.1.d43_avus.REL.dump
  │   ├── AppleSMCFirmware-2317.60.63.0.1.d43_whitney.REL.dump
  │   ├── AppleStorageProcessorANS2-1161.60.1.122.1~1.dump
  │   ├── iBoot-6723.60.60.0.2-iOS-14.3b2
  │   ├── _iBoot-6723.60.60.0.2-iOS-14.3b2-0.extracted.zip
  │   ├── _iBoot-6723.60.60.0.2-iOS-14.3b2-1.extracted.zip
  │   ├── _iBoot-6723.60.60.0.2-iOS-14.3b2.extracted 2.zip
  │   ├── _iBoot-6723.60.60.0.2-iOS-14.3b2.extracted.zip
  │   └── LLB.i64
  └── __MACOSX
      └── d431ap

  3 directories, 11 files

Anyone loaded the pem to test if it matches?

yes, it is just the certificate. no private key. (i fired to quick with this post - too good to be true lol)

  Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number: 5914743610979897542 (0x521563f9fdf7d0c6)
        Signature Algorithm: sha384WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: CN = Apple Secure Boot Root CA - G2, O = Apple Inc., C = US
        Validity
            Not Before: Dec 19 20:13:10 2014 GMT
            Not After : Dec 14 20:13:10 2034 GMT
        Subject: CN = Apple Secure Boot Root CA - G2, O = Apple Inc., C = US
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                RSA Public-Key: (4096 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:d3:bb:1e:c2:f4:ad:f1:6d:ee:8f:12:e4:e2:4f:
                    ce:15:5a:a7:0b:7c:12:21:09:4e:0d:32:6a:c7:c9:
                    5d:ea:f6:d1:80:94:7f:a5:37:13:1a:c7:39:f4:b3:
                    0f:97:dc:7b:06:52:c3:25:ee:96:4a:14:b7:0b:ba:
                    3f:9c:30:63:fa:4e:38:f6:01:5b:ec:0b:9d:e2:44:
                    a5:c5:49:2d:69:78:5f:27:b4:a8:a4:3a:8d:a9:7d:
                    e3:cd:a3:ec:ca:d5:f6:82:76:7d:75:be:27:a3:1b:
                    f3:a2:5f:6c:60:2e:71:5f:c1:b4:dd:61:8b:ab:13:
                    a9:64:79:e4:9c:3c:a5:3c:00:02:48:d4:53:10:8a:
                    16:66:5b:b0:a9:67:ff:a8:e3:ea:b9:b3:8e:e9:d7:
                    df:f7:3a:61:0c:52:11:96:71:8e:89:89:9b:7b:8f:
                    26:14:39:81:42:e9:9e:4b:5e:42:a2:6a:9b:78:e3:
                    2c:a9:b9:ed:3c:e6:77:5b:5c:4a:1c:36:7b:2d:02:
                    23:38:ab:d2:cc:3c:b8:5f:a9:fb:1e:5d:94:49:ac:
                    7b:1c:ea:46:03:86:ae:fd:db:8c:a4:e1:a3:9a:c4:
                    f4:d3:39:0e:4a:4b:db:b3:68:14:9b:d8:4f:a3:fd:
                    d1:ba:cf:74:88:c5:12:b3:1c:22:46:9b:0a:b0:aa:
                    62:3a:6e:17:76:10:38:34:8a:b2:db:23:84:5d:98:
                    c0:e9:cc:d8:12:da:92:fd:40:2e:83:6b:bc:2b:ef:
                    d2:2f:5c:f9:89:3f:e7:ae:5a:f7:64:6e:82:83:62:
                    17:e4:b4:fb:e9:15:01:42:57:3d:42:a8:f0:b9:7f:
                    88:ed:0e:6e:7a:cc:fb:37:2d:57:d9:d7:d5:a3:64:
                    16:35:6a:16:68:65:e7:f0:77:45:bb:bb:e6:d4:79:
                    87:23:5d:95:40:da:06:be:d2:de:b7:9f:39:b0:14:
                    83:3b:55:2c:9d:70:14:b0:e7:ca:ee:35:2f:18:c7:
                    70:13:70:2b:a4:11:be:1d:ba:94:65:a6:8b:a7:af:
                    c9:65:5c:79:34:ae:13:9a:2f:0a:e3:59:16:f8:75:
                    9f:d5:51:f4:92:af:18:7c:7a:25:96:81:3e:24:ae:
                    19:f9:f7:5d:76:df:b7:41:0d:29:18:01:cf:ef:47:
                    67:48:96:7c:f9:2f:b7:2d:86:b1:22:c9:6d:ac:ba:
                    5c:c3:f9:1f:cb:32:c1:42:9b:34:20:03:c9:11:cc:
                    0e:47:0d:6a:3a:9c:d0:f9:35:d0:fa:d8:dd:50:89:
                    8d:a9:8d:f1:81:a6:d5:fb:c2:d8:52:10:f9:2b:3f:
                    56:68:81:c9:66:ce:df:b3:8c:b4:b7:e1:d1:9b:96:
                    85:31:8f
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
                68:E9:59:50:45:F1:5D:07:F9:3F:C4:26:FC:1C:27:62:7D:9E:13:94
            X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
                CA:TRUE
            X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
    Signature Algorithm: sha384WithRSAEncryption
         86:7e:b5:1e:3a:d3:a9:f3:3c:4d:43:12:d3:9d:42:64:ae:d3:
         25:8d:0e:18:84:52:f5:62:24:08:df:d0:a1:4c:2f:7f:09:66:
         97:ee:3a:1c:e8:30:65:08:0c:50:28:65:07:2c:bf:22:02:e8:
         99:2f:b2:20:bc:47:ca:2a:1a:41:98:2d:b4:cd:e0:f1:ca:a2:
         68:dd:44:86:9f:1e:e4:64:74:bb:4a:93:f1:b6:0f:f2:36:bb:
         08:de:a9:09:cb:9b:78:51:17:a2:43:e4:cb:60:52:09:c6:02:
         e8:56:f5:be:cc:a1:ed:2e:e8:87:73:33:8e:20:2f:33:b2:51:
         56:32:9f:08:b1:9a:4e:ac:f4:a7:07:f8:8c:c8:80:fa:ba:34:
         1a:eb:fb:81:8c:64:2c:d4:15:58:9d:fa:b9:7b:0d:8d:61:19:
         87:e0:7f:2a:50:00:9e:44:13:94:62:73:fd:b1:d7:f1:ce:82:
         e1:a5:c0:fd:ac:99:75:f6:f9:18:c3:8d:aa:6a:19:4d:b3:78:
         55:8d:87:0f:c6:ea:83:79:eb:52:73:ba:d7:f1:76:5d:71:03:
         91:95:3c:ea:25:d5:b7:9a:ab:e8:67:c4:dd:ba:b1:93:2a:cf:
         8d:d5:fe:b9:a6:e4:6c:f2:b7:ca:14:fa:56:05:8d:34:f9:f1:
         ee:3d:b2:b2:74:86:45:85:ef:d0:cf:c1:81:78:96:ce:93:93:
         e0:e1:b7:62:2c:66:dc:31:62:8a:ac:f8:30:82:29:d6:73:b9:
         c1:c9:f3:01:e9:2f:26:ff:e6:d7:7d:c9:38:52:48:c8:8d:77:
         c9:a4:32:eb:d7:a7:f3:78:55:a4:ab:d9:4d:97:4d:cf:c7:14:
         11:43:11:bb:91:ef:e1:61:18:69:c6:4e:e0:94:ec:66:28:87:
         30:26:87:b5:4b:f4:7f:90:c3:9e:17:2f:6c:b5:86:25:0a:ce:
         cf:65:ee:82:11:cb:5c:58:dc:c8:79:7f:19:3b:2b:3a:81:fb:
         3d:90:35:03:03:b5:88:c7:a1:bd:41:35:cd:f9:72:2b:df:bd:
         b1:5c:37:48:ff:ab:1e:8c:75:e7:74:5d:9f:8e:d0:e4:96:93:
         50:32:66:66:3f:c7:f9:75:c2:63:f7:35:15:8a:39:1f:66:df:
         f0:75:96:ba:51:1a:99:f1:ea:2f:ae:c6:98:c6:ff:37:16:da:
         19:a6:32:f3:c0:8d:6e:a2:78:49:da:44:a4:2f:0a:39:cc:24:
         74:a8:1f:8a:aa:c9:f0:9e:c5:8f:07:f1:ca:01:7d:5e:c8:fe:
         a5:84:be:90:99:84:32:48:54:eb:60:d1:12:11:55:a5:ff:c0:
         ab:9f:6c:92:30:02:a2:d7

  00000000  30 82 05 5a 30 82 03 42  a0 03 02 01 02 02 08 52  |0..Z0..B.......R|
  00000010  15 63 f9 fd f7 d0 c6 30  0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7  |.c.....0...*.H..|
  00000020  0d 01 01 0c 05 00 30 4b  31 27 30 25 06 03 55 04  |......0K1'0%..U.|
  00000030  03 0c 1e 41 70 70 6c 65  20 53 65 63 75 72 65 20  |...Apple Secure |
  00000040  42 6f 6f 74 20 52 6f 6f  74 20 43 41 20 2d 20 47  |Boot Root CA - G|
  00000050  32 31 13 30 11 06 03 55  04 0a 0c 0a 41 70 70 6c  |21.0...U....Appl|
  00000060  65 20 49 6e 63 2e 31 0b  30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13  |e Inc.1.0...U...|
  00000070  02 55 53 30 1e 17 0d 31  34 31 32 31 39 32 30 31  |.US0...141219201|
  00000080  33 31 30 5a 17 0d 33 34  31 32 31 34 32 30 31 33  |310Z..3412142013|
  00000090  31 30 5a 30 4b 31 27 30  25 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1e  |10Z0K1'0%..U....|
  000000a0  41 70 70 6c 65 20 53 65  63 75 72 65 20 42 6f 6f  |Apple Secure Boo|
  000000b0  74 20 52 6f 6f 74 20 43  41 20                    |t Root CA |

Which matches d431ap/AppleSecureBootRootCA-G2.pem and/or d431ap/AppleSecureBootCA-G2.der from the 7z bundle.

I'd expect that there will be multiple private keys and that a future FW update will revoke the corresponding public key of the leaked private key from being usable.

What are the implications?

Everything will be different now

I think we all have to agree, we couldn't keep doing the same old things, we need to change.

Microsoft can now reverse engineer Apple's product and attempt a better ARM story now

If it were real: Secure boot is broken, attackers or homebrewers can boot arbitrary software that isn't signed by Apple, while still appearing to be running genuine Apple software.

As is: Nothing, since no key was leaked.

What does this mean?

Apparently not much and the title seems to be wrong (unless there’s more the I didn’t see). According to people in that Twitter thread it’s the public part that’s just extracted from iBoot which ships on every iOS device [1]. It doesn’t let you sign your own boot loaders.

[0] https://twitter.com/aydenpanhuyzen/status/133208435103988941...

[1] https://twitter.com/matteyeux/status/1332083960172703750?s=2...

The pem does not have -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----.

Reply on news.ycombinator.com