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Comment by slx26 | Hacker News Reader

> it seems to me there's usually a way to handle that without invading the user's privacy or wasting their time

As much as I agree with your dislike of captchas, I don't think this is true at scale (unless universal online identities existed, which could and should include anonymous identifiers by design). When you need to accept information from anonymous users (comments, votes, forms, registrations), there's no way to not invade users privacy and not waste their time, unless you are manually filtering / moderating all the input data, in which case you can't really say it scales. You might say emails can solve the problem. Well, they don't really solve the problem against dedicated attackers / spammers, and they do invade privacy for the average user. You can use statistical approaches to try to reduce privacy invasion or others, but I don't know of anything that really solves the problem without manual identity verification at some point.

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I built an alternative[0] that takes a proof of work approach. As a site owner you set the difficulty that makes sense for you: so perhaps you would want 20 seconds of computation before you can submit. The nice thing is that this can happen entirely in the background while the user fills in the form.

Also with multiple requests from the same IP in a short timespan, the difficulty increases.

There are downsides to to any captcha, but in my opinion make a much better tradeoff. Accessibility and privacy are respected, and there are no annoying tasks.

[0]: https://friendlycaptcha.com

> FriendlyCaptcha will prevent 99.9% of spam

For someone who has little expertise in this specific field, how are you calculating this?

Admittedly it's not calculated so it may be a stretch, it's based on the assumption that the vast majority of spam out there just looks for forms to submit without smarts (which is also why honeypots can be pretty effective, especially if you have a small website that nobody will take the effort to work around it.)

I've seen people report that they have reduced spam to near nothing already with just a honeypot, but of course I can't verify those claims.

Judging by the downvotes (despite answering the question truthfully), I see it's not a good way to present ourselves, and frankly we don't have to make that claim. It's hard to estimate the real percentage, our customers are happy but measuring what is no longer there is tricky in the real world.

I will change the wording on the website and remove the percentage.

People take quantitative claims seriously. I wouldn't make them without being able to defend them in an intellectually rigorous way.

It should be fairly easy to set up two open wordpress blogs, one with the captcha and one without.

After a few months you check how much spam arrived at either and get your number?

> I've seen people report that they have reduced spam to near nothing already with just a honeypot, but of course I can't verify those claims.

Can verify from personal experience. I once implemented a simple honeypot approach on a small blog site. It immediately cut down automated "drive by" comment spam to almost nothing. I never tried to quantify it, but it was the difference between dozens of spam comments a day and maybe one or two a week (which I assumed were probably manual submissions).

Most spam bots are pretty unsophisticated it seems, and do not pay any attention to a honeypot field being hidden either by CSS or JS.

As a counter-point, the uncaptcha[0] research project used Google's free Speech-to-Text service to solve reCAPTCHA at a reported 85% success rate.

I'm convinced CAPTCHA are no better than fake/dummy security cameras.

[0] https://github.com/ecthros/uncaptcha

How do handle low-end devices? Do you reduce the difficulty for them and can this be abused by pretending to be a low-end device that really isn't?

Everybody gets the same difficulty initially which you determine as a site admin, so one should base this on their audience (e.g. Gitlab would have a different device profile from a government website).

The solving can be a few times slower on a low end device which you should keep in mind. To aid with this when setting the difficulty for your website it shows you an estimate for various device types. This is indeed a downside of PoW approaches.

There is one factor that helps: you can start solving as soon as the form loads, so as the user enters their details/comment it can start solving - I have a hunch that people on mobile devices are inherently slower at entering their data which should help a bit..

Anyway - if you set the difficulty quite high and the solving takes 30 seconds, it takes the user 15 seconds to enter the form - the user would still have to wait 15 seconds. That's not very different from the time to solve image captchas (it's actually lower and doesn't come with a 2MB payload download which isn't great on phones either, and they can keep their privacy + sanity). You could give the user something to do that makes sense for your website (ask them for feedback?).

Why bother with a proof of work scheme when you can just rate-limit directly? It accomplishes the same thing, while eating way fewer CPU cycles, doesn’t require JavaScript, and guarantees uniform cost between all client types.

This sibling comment was responding to you: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25215024

So, if your app takes off on a college campus, you’d block them?

> I have a hunch that people on mobile devices are inherently slower at entering their data.

In general, I use form autocomplete to fill this quickly. And on the contrary, my mobile signups are faster than desktop because the lastpass firefox extension on desktop takes longer to detect the form before the autocomplete can begin than my phone does.

> Why bother with a proof of work scheme when you can just rate-limit directly?

Tad amusing after all this time people still don't understand why proof-of-work schemes exist.

Rate limiting has zero cost to an adversary. PoW has physical costs. It's in the name :)

Do you collect metrics on how many people end up waiting for the PoW and share that with the admins?

In all, this sounds really promising though. I’d venture that most spammers already have higher end machines than end-users to solve existing captchas.

I’d probably approach this with a different strategy. I’d send an encrypted time stamp as the nonce. On the client, I’d first do a few easy PoW tasks and estimate the PoW difficulty for the given machine that would take at least X seconds to do. Then, send the PoW, the encrypted time stamp, and difficulty to the backend. If it’s been shorter than X (with a margin of error), or the PoW is wrong, it’s not valid.

In this scheme, it doesn’t matter how powerful the device is, a core is going to do some work for X seconds or at least be throttled by time.

It doesn't work for me, comes back with the error: Verification failed: Background worker error undefined

I'm using latest Firefox on GNU/Linux. Admittedly I've got a lot stuff blocking all sorts of things, and I'm not really sure what's kicking to block background workers, but I'm glad it's blocked. Anyway, after disabled literally all blocking tools that I have, it still refuses to load.

That's not good, could you maybe provide more details in the Github repo [0]? The widget is open source, hopefully we can figure out what is blocking it here.

We test the captcha in browsers up to 8 years old and on many devices, do you perhaps have background workers disabled entirely? Here is a link to the widget on its own [1], does that have the same behavior? How about a minimal worker example [2]?

[0]: https://github.com/FriendlyCaptcha/friendly-challenge [1]: https://unpkg.com/friendly-challenge@0.6.1/index.html [2]: https://jsfiddle.net/christopheviau/90syrp0q/

Didn't try the other links but the jsfiddle link just says Preparing worker in Firefox here and neither button ever does anything.

Curious why it wouldn't start 'verifying' immediately on load? The fact that it runs in the background is really key--I'd hate to fill out an entire form, click the button at the end, and still have to wait around to submit.

You can change this behavior of the widget (data-start="auto" instead of default data-start="focus"), or you can start it programmatically.

The reason you wouldn't always want to start it in the background is if the user may not intend to submit the form (perhaps it's a form that is in your footer of every page and only a small percentage of users intend on sending it). Starting it on focus of the form is a good default.

First one to make this mine an altcoin for proof-of-work wins.

But seriously I like the idea, although it seems trivial for someone to attack a protected site by exhausting its subscription level? Are there any protections against that?

We don't disable the service if a protected site goes over their limit.

Right now we manually look at the limits and are reasonable with overages - also we can see how many captchas were unsolved.

Wow, this is an awesome idea. I can imagine this could be extended to solve tasks to mine cryptocurrency. If you get attacked by a botnet, you would actually make a profit!

proof of work really doesn't work well in practice. spammers have huge farms of compute, often on residential ips, and legit users are accessing the service from a device that is often power-constrained (like a phone). you end up either hugely penalizing legitimate users, or having to employ many of the standard antispam techniques (IP/ISP reputation, captcha, rate limiting etc) on top, so the proof of work adds a lot less incremental value.

It's not perfect, and you are right about the downsides. These resources that spammers have can be applied as easily to re/hcaptcha (either through ML or clickfarms). No CAPTCHA will actually lock out targeted attacks.

The difficulty increase per IP can be seen as a form of soft rate limiting, it's shared between all websites (which is where it's different from ordinary rate limiting). In the future we may use IP reputation lists to guide the initial difficulty too - but we haven't implemented that yet.

I think that no perfect captcha can exist, which is inherent to the problem. Proof of work makes different fradeoffs, and perhaps it is cheaper to attack still - I think it's a much more friendly solution for users though (accessibility, privacy, simplicity, fairness, UX).

Maybe in the future the solution would be something like this: a long PoW-based captcha that runs in the background as well as a vision task for the user, whichever gets solved first.

I get re-captcha'ed all the time from the same IP. And if I don't use Chrome, the captcha count is like 4x-5x higher just for using Firefox.

That's why I have even stopped using google services. If I literally have to get another browser to use your snowflake site, then why would I use your service anyway?

This reminds me of a similar solution I saw on PH last year, I think it's a great alternative for smaller websites that are less likely to be targets for spams/bots

But say, there's a website and it's a likely target, you implement IP protection, fine, the user uses residential proxies. Now your best bet is to go off fingerprinting, but there are marketplaces which sell those too in bulk.

Maybe I'm wrong, but wouldn't the best approach be to stick to human interaction puzzles, which are hard and don't have a set way to solve by a machine(for now)?

bangladeshi click farms[0] are cheaper to use to bypass captcha than renting residential proxies to solve PoW. Also image captcha cannot scale automatally in difficulty (as an incident response) but PoW can (see how bitcoin adjusts with the miners)

[0] https://2captcha.com/

Just did the math from the numbers on their site and on average a "worker" doing captchas for them gets paid 0.2$/hour.

Adjusting based on average monthly salary in Bangladesh (157$) [1] and the US (4056$) [2] that would be similar to an American making 5.2$/hour which is surprisingly close to the current minimum wage in the US (7.25$/hour) [3]

So I guess this must be a fairly decent way to earn money if you're young/poor in Bangladesh...

[1] https://tradingeconomics.com/bangladesh/wages#:~:text=Wages%.... [2] https://www.thestreet.com/personal-finance/average-income-in... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_wage_in_the_United_Sta...

5.2 is not close to 7.25. That's like 30% less than the minimum wage. Minimum wage itself is a massive struggle but 30% less is just plain offensive and dehumanising.

> So I guess this must be a fairly decent way to earn money if you're young/poor in Bangladesh...

Solving dumb captchas is never a fair or decent way to earn money, not when you are poor and definitely not when you are young. Creating living conditions for other human beings where they can be easily exploited and used for mindless degrading work such as solving dumb captchas is one of the most grotesque things of the 21st century.

It's a bit like locking your bike. That doesn't work against targeted attacks, but the presumptive thief is more likely to choose another bike that has a smaller or no lock.

The arms race is bad for everyone, in both examples, but the underlying problem is a fundamental one of misaligned incentives.

So your solution is to technically waste electricity to replace captcha? It's for sure an interesting concept, the first point and low-end devices requiring 20+ seconds to pass are not a very good points to sell your service.

You're right that there is an electricity cost to solving this type of captcha - the same as there is an electricity cost to loading 2MB of JS+images and clicking the pictures with the fire hydrants (and the infrastructure behind that). It's hard to estimate how they compare (and what value you assign to the human labor performed and privacy loss).

20 seconds would be a fairly high difficulty. It's up to the site owner to decide what makes sense for them.

If anybody comes up with a useful computational task with a small bundle size that can be verified cheaply that would be the holy grail - until then the computation is only there as a form of hashcash.

20s doesn’t matter when it’s someone else’s hardware (eg spammers using malware installed on victim machines).

It’s also nonsense to compare the computational cost of N seconds of sustained, maxed out useless computation to the milliseconds of compute time needed to decode an image, or the minimal power usage of waiting on network data.

Right? I think they’re describing those crypto mining scripts people were being inflicted with a while back :)

Electricity is a lot cheaper than my time.

And Cloudflare already does that—that's what the "Checking your browser before accessing xyz—Please allow up to 5 seconds" message means. It's clearly not enough for them though, because they then go to also require CAPTCHAs.

This is very interesting. Can you change the questions in the form? Those questions seem too personal and are offputting.

Proof of work by itself is nearly useless, unfortunately. Compute is cheaper than people. This is one reason why CAPTCHA services will likely be with us always.

As someone working in the field, I also doubt your claim "will prevent 99.9% of spam" is based on real data. Modern headless browser spambots are not deterred by this kind of approach.

(Edit: looks like the poster admitted this number was entirely made up later in the thread.)

This looks very interesting and clean. Well done!

Ignoring the other criticisms because they generally seem valid, to everyone saying that proof of work doesn't matter because bots can just use more machines, that depends a lot on the economics of any specific automation project. I scrape a little data here and there, and a reliable proof of work system costing ~20s on a commodity core would make some of my personal projects cost tens of thousands of dollars monthly. Maybe that's worth it to someone (e.g. if they have an army of hacked machines without anything better to do), but I think it'd keep a lot of the riffraff out.

I just tried loading the demo of Friendly Captcha in 8 browser windows, and click the verify button, refresh the window and on repeat for about 3 minutes. Not once did it tell me that I'm a robot so seems your alternative fails the most basic of captcha functionality, limiting people/machines to spam functionality that the website owner wants to be limited.

Maybe not everyone but a lot of people use captcha services to prevent automation from being used to extract/insert data. I know as a developer that there is always a chance of bypassing this, even with Google's reCaptcha, but your service seems to make this trivial, so many won't even go beyond your demo.

>Not once did it tell me that I'm a robot

Right, unfortunately you've completely misunderstood the point of Friendly Captcha, a question which is answered right there on its main page.

>>How does FriendlyCaptcha tell apart bots from humans?

>>It doesn't, FriendlyCaptcha adds a small cost and complexity for spammers that becomes large at scale.

Right, I guess it's time for you to upgrade the UI of your tool then, as when it's inactive it says "Anti-Robot Verification" and once the challenge is done it says "I'm not a robot", while in reality, none of those things are true, as you said yourself.

You might also want to rebrand to use a different word than "Captcha" as you're not actually telling robots and humans apart, you're simply adding PoW to an action, nevermind if they are robots or humans.

So instead of blaming users for misunderstanding your message, maybe try working on making your messaging a bit clearer so for the people who know what captcha is, don't get confused by your own definition of it.

Actually the user you're replying to is not the author of the service, from what I can tell.

Oh dear, it seems so. Thanks for letting me know, I guess I just assumed it would be the creator of the service who would defend it, not someone else, but seems you're right.

CAPTCHA does not scale. CAPTCHA spams real people with requests and wastes my VALUABLE time, and still labels disabled people as subhuman. It's offensive. It's ineffective. It's outdated.

It's reaching a point where encapsulating a VPN with anti-captcha is something I'd pay for.

> CAPTCHA is the worst option, except for all the others that have been tried.

I would happily pay 15¢ or so per site to bypass captchas if it were done in a way that would preserve my privacy. Has something like this ever been offered?

> unless universal online identities existed, which could and should include anonymous identifiers by design

Yes but no. Anonymized identifiers can be deanonymized. They should utilize zero-knowledge proofs in such a way that they can prove "yes, I have an identity verified by entity X (and Y and Z) (based on passport/phone number/...)", without disclosing any of those details.

It could, optionally, yield an identifier unique to each requester and unlinkable to others unless an explicit proof of the link is provided. Though if this is included, there has to be some mechanism to avoid huge ad networks sharing the same "requester entity".

This is a solved problem. All that's left is politics, implementation and alignment.

>"yes, I have an identity verified by entity X (and Y and Z) (based on passport/phone number/...)", without disclosing any of those details.

Actually, I would prefer: "Yey, this one-use temporary ID is tied to an identity which is known to behave on public websites." Or "... is tied to an identity which is known to be knowledgeable on topic X". Or whatever information is needed at the time.

Next time a new ID will be generated and the identity provider will vouch for it. No passport or phone number should be required.

Edit: fixed spelling.

Maybe "anonymous identifiers" has some very technical and exact meaning that I didn't know, but when I said "anonymous identifiers" I did it very abstractly, no need to assume a specific underlying implementation from those two words.

I have actually discussed the concept in the past [0], and I exchanged some emails with the guy in that thread to talk more about technical details. We all seem to agree that design and political will are the problems, not technology.

What I was basically saying in the comments, in general terms, is that you might have one primary identifier, and then somehow you can get more identifiers that are tied to your main one, but that might have different expiration periods, might grant access to different levels of information about you, and might be limited to a certain number for each service you use. Of course, there are quite a few ways to implement such a system. And that's precisely why I'm more focused on the design, usability and characteristics than the underlying technical implementation; I think the best we can do if we ever want to see this happen is to spread the idea in terms that anyone can understand [1]. I mean, I'm interested in the technical details too, so I'm just complementing and contextualizing a bit here.

[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22180120

[1] ...or discuss more the idea among those that are interested and setup a demo website to make it easier to spread the word, even if there's no actual implementation behind it and it's just a mock-up. I'm quite busy at the moment, but I'll definitely do something along those lines when I have some time.

One such solution would be a small payment, something like 1 cent for access. That's not too much, because I am already paying 3 cents to a service solving captchas for me.

Please, what is the service? I want to pay someone to solve Captchas for me.

https://anti-captcha.com/ is one such service. There are others, but this one that has browser plugins for visually impaired people in addition to APIs.

I've used the service in the past, though it's far enough in the past all I can say is it worked once upon a time, no clue if it's still reliable.

Interestingly, it takes them under 20 seconds to solve a recaptcha and 70 for hCaptcha.

I wonder if they’ve partially automated recaptcha, or if hCaptcha is just a bigger pain in the neck. (I usually can’t solve a reCaptcha in 15 seconds...)

WTF Did you see the super man like guy shooting at the sweatshop workers? This looks pretty bad...

https://imgur.com/a/CvYyBQH

Holy crap that's terrible and offensive.

Websites spamming me with captchas is terrible and offensive.

"Because scaling. It is our God-given right."

It is possible to solve captchas without glorifying violence against workers.

I use Buster browser extension with free IBM Watson speech to text node, free limitation is 500minutes of speech per month, which is plenty for solving captchas. The crux of all this privacy (blocked 3rd party cookies) is that i need to solve 3 ReCaptchas every time.

Maybe but how would you transfer 1 cent in a way that's fast enough not to impair UX and cheap (where the transfer doesn't cost more than the validation fee)? Additionally (as with all online payments) there are privacy concerns.

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