Boeing’s 737 Max Is a Saga of Capitalism Gone Awry
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
Wait a minute:
"When Mr. Stonecipher became chief executive of Boeing in 2003, he brought G.E.'s model with him: He slashed costs, reduced head count, ramped up outsourcing and increased Boeing's share buyback program and shareholder dividends.
"'When people say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent, so that it’s run like a business rather than a great engineering firm,' Mr. Stonecipher said in 2004."
live in a town that supports the aerospace industry... big companies are surviving, little ones getting destroyed
One thing I don't see talked about much is that the expense of retraining was going to be incurred if the manual was expanded, so this incentivized them to minimize any documentation of the new system. This is a clear failure of regulatory incentives, and I hope the FAA considers ways to improve the incentive structure so this doesn't happen again.
Although the FAA and EASA have certified the Max as safe to fly again, it will only be for airframes that have had the required modifications to prevent the runway trim and only once operation instead of continuous. They have also allowed the pilots to override by the stick which they weren’t able to do before.
Statistically it’s highly likely that there won’t be any further occurrences of this issue with the 737 Max again.
Depending on when you are doing it may be that the airline won’t have time to train the pilots in which case they won’t be flying it at the start of next year. However I expect that to change over the year and that most 737 Max flights are back in operation by the end of the year, or at least as many as are needed to fly in the reduced circumstances of today’s pandemic.
I wouldn't hold my breath. MCAS may have been fixed although I am even unsure about that. The regulatory capture problem hasn't been solved and I didn't hear that the FAA widened its capabilities. EASA will follow FAA as they don't want to risk Airbus certifications as a retaliation.
What concerns me even more: MCAS has been unknown to pilots and maybe the FAA. What about other unknowns Boeing didn't reveal? I don't believe that they came forward voluntarily with unrelated concerns. I don't believe that the FAA did look thoroughly into other corners (they lack the capability anyways). I don't think that EASA did an independent vetting either.
I am sure that Boeing did change the least they could get away with. And that proper independent oversight is lacking. The only safety net the public has is that maybe, maybe someone high up at Boeing wouldn't want the risk of more failures as this may destroy Boeing. But I don't hold my breath for that either. There is no honor among thieves and no personal incentive for executives.
FAA should have been dropped as trustworthy authority worldwide. Only in that event I would have trusted a 737 Max. But there's too much money at stake on all sides.
Did they even physically modify the plane, by adding additional redundant sensors?
The problem is that the plane suffers from a design defect. Which Boeing tried to fix with software, by using a faulty sensor, that had no redundancy. Which then got certified as safe by the FAA, because they are corrupt and in collusion with Boeing.
Fly the plane at your own risk. Make sure to buy a spare coffin on Black Friday specials.
If the market demands a square peg, but regulators have already approved a round hole... You get forced, arbitrary, and technically questionable solutions to -force- that square peg fit the existing (round hole) regulatory market.
Want Boeing to not use "loopholes" to get new plane models approved? Make it as easy or easier to approve new models as it is to approve modified/derivative models.
That capitalism responds to regulations in such a way should surprise no one. Except people who don't fundamentally understand it.