> Entity like China are willing to block entire subnets if the subnet owner doesn't coooperate and doesn't separate the traffic. That would make the subnet owner's customer nervous, thus them pushing for cooperation in the first place.
Once eSNI is widely deployed, in addition to CloudFlare, DoH could also be ran from anywhere in Azure, AWS, or GCP. At that point, China will have to choose between breaking all TLS, blocking almost all traffic to the US, or accepting DoH leaking.
> The thing is, I don't want to pick one single DoH server. I want to use the resolver that knows the local network, i.e. exactly how DHCP works today. I would be fine if there was a way to announce DoH/DoT via DHCP[1] and all the systems and apps would respect it.
But the network is the main adversary. It would just advertise a DoH server that does censorship or surveillance, and then we're back where we started.
> > Firefox will fall back to the local resolver for domains that fail to resolve with DoH.
> Just wait until ignorant people will start screaming about "DNS leaks" -- just like they do today with VPNs.
That feature is optional. It's easy to turn that off if you don't want it to happen. And even if that weren't the case, isn't most of your DNS requests being safe better than none of them being safe?
> BYODs. There are organizations (both for and non-profit), that have external co-workers, working with their own devices, that are not managed by GPO or MDM.
So just add one step to onboarding: after "here's the Wi-Fi password", it's "here's the subnet to add to the DoH exclusion list".
> Centralized service, preconfigured by default, used by many people, capable of discerning browsing habits per device even behind NAT. What could possibly go wrong.
A lot less that could go wrong with the current state of ISPs.