I must admit I'm very confused by this. I really thought you were talking about the problem of ordering three strings by length. What problem where you talking about, if not that?
I must admit I'm very confused by this. I really thought you were talking about the problem of ordering three strings by length. What problem where you talking about, if not that?
What you are doing is categorically different, because you are manually guiding the search process by telling it which interim lines to generate. This ignores all the interesting parts of the challenge.
For instance, I did not direct Louise to define shorter/2 by means of length/2. In order to do this I would have to specify length/2 as BK for shorter/2, but I didn't. Note the BK declarations in the experiment file I put on pastebin:
background_knowledge(llength/2, [tail/2,p/2]).
background_knowledge(shorter/2, [s/2]).
% ground_peano/1 is added here so it's reported by list_mil_problem/1
background_knowledge(ordered/3, [ground_peano/1]).
background_knowledge(ordered_leq/3, [leq/2,ground_peano/1]).
Remember how in an erarlier comment I pointed out that the definition of
shorter/2 changed to use leq/2, instead of s/2, when the examples of
ordered_leq/3 where in the BK? Again, Louise figured that on its own.In fact, this ability of Louise (actually, its learning procedure, Top Program Construction, or TPC) is kind of native, in the sense that TPC was originally conceived as an algorithm to select relevant background knowledge for a different learning system ("Thelma" for "Theory Learning Machine"; hence "Louise"). So it can figure out what BK it needs on its own. Automatic selection of relevant background knowledge in ILP was the original subject of my PhD research. Interestingly, it turns out that once we had a system that could perform this task, it could also learn its own programs.
No, I get this, it's just not really more than a surface level pretense of choice. The hard thing about generating programs is that there are many possible programs; something like m^n, where ’m’ is the number of functions you have available to use (say, ~1000) and `n` is the number of steps the program needs to take (say, ~5 in this case), and there's another factor for where to put the parameters which here is low enough to be mostly negligible. It turns out even 1000^5 is really big, so this problem is hard if you don't do it smart.
The ‘choice’ you are offering Louise is something like, idk, m=5, n=2. 5^2 is not big. You argue about the terminology, but whatever you call it, it's still exponentially less interesting than the problem first posed. All the interesting work has been done for it, by you.
With the way you first laid out the question, there's a good chance (>1%) I could have gotten the answer mostly right (up to parameter order) without looking at the examples, just the background knowledge and the target type.
>> The hard thing about generating programs is that there are many possible programs; something like m^n, where ’m’ is the number of functions you have available to use (say, ~1000) and `n` is the number of steps the program needs to take (say, ~5 in this case), and there's another factor for where to put the parameters which here is low enough to be mostly negligible. It turns out even 1000^5 is really big, so this problem is hard if you don't do it smart.
Indeed, the complexity of the raw, combinatorial problem is the greatest hurdle in solving it in the general sense, however this time complexity is calculated somewhat differently than in your comment. Let me show you.
First, in terms of ILP, the "number of functions you have available to use" is the number of predicate symbols defined in the BK, which I'll notate as p. "Where to put the parameters" is the number of body literals (similar to function calls) in each metarule, which I'll notate as k. I'll notate the number of metarules as m.
"The number of steps the program needs to take" is not relevant to the calculation: we are trying to calculate the complexity of constructing the program by blindly combining a set of building blocks (BK predicates and metarules)- not the complexity of executing the program. What is relevant is the size of the target theory, i.e. its number of clauses (program lines), because of course a larger program means a larger number of combinations of our building blocks. I'll notate the size of the target theory as n.
Putting it all together, the time complexity of constructing a program of n clauses from p predicate symbols with m metarules with at most k body literals (of any arity) is O(pmᵏ⁺¹)ⁿ [1]. This is an exponential time complexity that corresponds to the size of the search space for programs that can be constructed from these components, i.e. that's the number of constructible programs. The time complexity of the problem is such that even n = 5 is sufficient to completely bog down a powerful modern computer.
Louise can manage it because it doesn't conduct a search of that space, instead it only constructs a unique object in that space, the Top program, that can be constructed in polynomial time O(pmᵏ⁺¹) [2], i.e. the number of constructible clauses. Indeed, Louise is capable of learning large programs, of a few thousand clauses in a few minutes. In other words, the problem is manageable because of the advances encapsulated by Louise's learning procedure, Top Program Construction, not because the problem is trivial, as you portray it - and not because I'm leading Louise by the hand, as you suggest. Even if I was leading Louise by the hand, the combinatorial space of constructible programs would still grow exponentially.
Regarding learning "only from examples" as I understand you to mean it, there is some literature on that, of the kind you say is not "AI" (i.e. it predates 2012's deep learning boom). To my knowledge, this was first discussed in the following:
1. Introduction
This paper addresses a deep difficulty with the generalization problem as
defined above: If consistency with the training instances is taken as the sole
determiner of appropriate generalizations, then a program can never make the
inductive leap necessary to classify instances beyond those it has observed.
Only if the program has other sources of information, or biases for choosing
one generalization over the other, can it non-arbitrarily classify instances
beyond those in the training set. In this paper, we use the term bias to
refer to any basis for choosing one generalization over another, other than
strict consistency with the observed training instances.
(...)
3. The Futility of Removing Biases
(...)
Although removing all biases from a generalization system may seem to be a
desirable goal, in fact the result is nearly useless. An unbiased learning
system’s ability to classify new instances is no better than if it simply
stored all the training instances and performed a lookup when asked to
classify a subsequent instance.
Ref: *"The Need for Biases in Learning Generalizations", T.M. Mitchell,
Rutgers Computer Science Department Technical Report CBM-TR-117, May, 1980.
Reprinted in Readings in Machine Learning, J. Shavlik and T. Dietterich,
eds., Morgan Kaufmann, 1990.*
http://www.cs.nott.ac.uk/~pszbsl/G52HPA/articles/Mitchell:80a.pdf
But this is another reason to read old AI papers: to avoid falling down the
same holes people have already thoroughly explored in years gone by.>> With the way you first laid out the question, there's a good chance (>1%) I could have gotten the answer mostly right (up to parameter order) without looking at the examples, just the background knowledge and the target type.
Have you tried doing that? I suggest you do- if only to get a feel for the true difficulty of the problem.
________________
[1] https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~shm/Papers/ECAI-546.pdf
See section 2.1. Language classes, expressivity and complexity for a sketch proof.
[2] Upcoming work, currently in review.
As I say above, Louise's TPC procedure avoids searching this space and so effectively ignores the exponential term, reducing the complexity of the problem to that of, in the worst case, enumerating (pm^(k+1)) = 1,280 clauses.
In other words, the problem is easy for Louise, not because the problem itself is trivial, but because Louise's learning procedure, TPC, is efficient.
For a further example, in the upcoming publication I mention above, Louise is shown to learn a 2,567 clause theory in under 220 seconds with perfect accuracy after training on 20% of all training examples. The hypothesis space for this problem (grid world navigation) is in the order of 2*10^4944 but Louise shrinks it to the problem of enumerating, at worst, a little over 81 million clauses.
I meant in the sense of denotational semantics, so looping (or rather, finding a fixed point of a loop) is one ‘step’.
> Have you tried doing that? I suggest you do- if only to get a feel for the true difficulty of the problem.
How exactly would you suggest? By the nature of my criticism, I can't construct the Louise BK blind.
If anything you agree here; you say there are only 1,280 clauses it could construct, so I only need discriminatory power of 1-in-13 to have a >1% chance of getting the answer right.
> Regarding learning "only from examples" as I understand you to mean it, there is some literature on that, of the kind you say is not "AI" (i.e. it predates 2012's deep learning boom).
Yes, and as usual for GOFAI it doesn't solve the problem.
I understand, but we don't need to take that term into account. We're only interested in the cost of a blind combinatorial search. Even if we added that term in, we'd just get a higher complexity.
>> How exactly would you suggest? By the nature of my criticism, I can't construct the Louise BK blind.
I mean, try to define some BK and generate combinations of it until you solve the problem. You say that I made the problem easy because I defined some BK by hand. I suggested you try doing that to see whether the problem is as easy as you think.
>> If anything you agree here; you say there are only 1,280 clauses it could construct, so I only need discriminatory power of 1-in-13 to have a >1% chance of getting the answer right.
There are only 1280 clauses, but there are about 2 billion programs of size n = 3 that can be constructed with those clauses, one of which is the target program. The challenge is to find the target program in that 2 billion.
The advantage of Louise is that it only needs to look at the 1280 clauses, not the 2 billion programs. The trick is to find how to do that. It's like the difference between sorting a list with bubblesort and quicksort. Quicksort has to do a lot less work, but the trick is figuring out quicksort.
>> Yes, and as usual for GOFAI it doesn't solve the problem.
Deep learning doesn't "solve" that problem either- the point is that you can't learn only from examples.
I genuinely don't understand what you expect me to do here. How can I possibly define BK for a problem I have zero information about beyond the type signature?
> There are only 1280 clauses, but there are about 2 billion programs
Doesn't matter, since the programmer gives that information. As you admit, Louise cannot check for arbitrary programs.
> Deep learning doesn't "solve" that problem either- the point is that you can't learn only from examples.
That's literally what DL is.
You can also learn programs from examples. People do it all the time. What else would you call the Abstraction and Reasoning Challenge, https://www.kaggle.com/boliu0/visualizing-all-task-pairs-wit...?
The biggest advances in deep neural nets have come from the discovery and use of good inductive biases: training with gradient descent, backpropagation, more hidden layers, the "constant error carousel", convolutional layers, ReLu over sigmoid, attention, etc, etc. One could say that deep neural nets are all about good inductive bias.
It's interesting that you bring up the ARC dataset. The paper that introduced it (also from Chollet) [2] makes a strong claim about the necessity of "knowledge priors" for a system to be considered intelligent. These are described at length in section III.1.2 "Core knowledge priors" and are exactly a set of strong inductive biases that the author of the paper considers necessary for a machine learning system to solve the ARC tasks and that consist of such problem-specific biases as object cohesion, object persistence, object influence via contact, etc. It is exactly such "knowledge priors" that are encoded as background knowledge in ILP systems.
Indeed, in the ARC challenge on Kaggle, the best-performing systems (i.e. the ones that solved the most tasks) were crude approximations of the ILP approach: a library of hand-crafted functions and a brute-force search procedure to combine them. I note also that attempts to use deep learning to solve the challenge didn't go anywhere.
Humans also have strong inductive biases that help us solve such problems. But I'm not the best placed to discuss all this - I'm not a cognitive scientist.
In the end, what you are asking for is magick: a learner that learns only from examples, without any preconceived notions about how to learn from those examples, or what to learn from them. There is no such machine learning system.
>> Doesn't matter, since the programmer gives that information. As you admit, Louise cannot check for arbitrary programs.
I don't understand what you mean "check for arbitrary programs". I can give Louise zero BK and metarules and ask it to generate all Prolog programs, say. Prolog is a Turing complete language so that would give me the set of all programs computable by a Universal Turing Machine (it would take a while). But what would that achieve?
At this point I'm not sure I understand what your remaining objections are against the approach I showed you. For the purpose of learning arbitrary programs it works better than anything else. Of course it's not magick. Perhaps you should take my suggestion to think about the problem a bit more carefully, if you're really intersted in it. Or are you? I mean, if you consider AI solved, e.g. by GPT-3, then I can see how you wouldn't be interested in thinking any further about the issue.
_________________
[1] https://blog.keras.io/the-limitations-of-deep-learning.html
[2] https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547
P.S. To clarify, I'm keeping this discussion up for your sake, albeit eagerly. You have expressed some strongly held, but incorrect opinions that it seems to me you have acquired by consulting inexpert sources, probably because you have a day job that has nothing to do with AI and doesn't leave you enough time to study the matter properly. My day job is to study AI and I feel that such a privilege is only justified if I spend time and effort to help others improve their knowledge on the subject. I'm guessing that on your part, you're more interested in "winning" the conversation, but please try to gain something from our interaction, otherwise all the time we both spent at it would be to waste. When this is over, try to dig out and read some authoritative sources. I would advise you on which ones - but you'd probably resist my recommendation anyway, so you're on your own there.
> Deep neural nets do not learn only from examples! They encode strong inductive biases in their carefully hand-engineered and hand-tuned architectures
“Solomonoff Induction does not learn only from evidence! It encodes strong inductive biases in its construction and choice of Turing machine...”
but it doesn't matter. Our universe is not a random soup of maximal entropy.
The tasks I am talking about solving are overtly not impossible.
You talk about ML methods like the success of, say, image recognition comes from image-recognition-specific architectures. You mention ‘hand-engineered’ or ‘hand-tuned’. And yet, to throw your snark back at you, if you were up to date with the literature, you would know this is not true.
Consider ViT as an example. The same Transformer, the same minimal inductive biases, work as well for language modelling as for image segmentation as for proof search—the only difference perhaps that ViT works on patches for efficiency, though the paper shows that probably hurts performance in the limit. All it takes is an appropriate quantity of data to learn the appropriate task-specific adaptations the network needs. Heck, even cross-domain works; it's all one architecture, so it's all one inductive bias.
To my mind, this is what it means to learn from examples. There is no way that an architecture designed for language translation could also encode task-specific priors for these different tasks.
For sure, one might call this ‘strong inductive biases’, in that the program is not random bytes (as a truly bias-free algorithm must be), but please at least admit that this is a complete different conceptual plane to the sort of biases you give Louise. Louise's biases aren't merely task specific, they're problem-specific. It would be one thing if Louise's biases were a handwritten web of a million BK rules: fine, whatever, as long as it solves the task that is obviously possible to solve. But they're not, they're tuned per example.
ML people call that data leakage.
> I don't understand what you mean. Yes, Louise can check for arbitrary programs. I can give it zero BK and metarules and ask it to generate all Prolog programs, say.
Louise can perhaps generate all Prolog programs. Louise cannot search the space of Prolog programs.
Take for instance your example of ViT. This is a transformer, so it's clearly not an unbiased generaliser that learns only from examples. You say so yourself: "it's all one inductive bias". Yes, that's how machine learning works and deep neural nets don't do anything different, neither do they learn only from examples, as you seemed to suggest in your previous comment (you replied "That's literally what DL is" to my comment that "you can't learn only from examples").
But I think you misunderstood my comment about how the biggest advances in deep neural nets have come from purpose-built architectures. That is not to say that the same architectures cannot be applied to different domains- but the state of the art systems are always fine-tuned for specific tasks or datasets. This hasn't changed recently and it hasn't changed in the last 30 years.
>> For sure, one might call this ‘strong inductive biases’, in that the program is not random bytes (as a truly bias-free algorithm must be), but please at least admit that this is a complete different conceptual plane to the sort of biases you give Louise. Louise's biases aren't merely task specific, they're problem-specific. It would be one thing if Louise's biases were a handwritten web of a million BK rules: fine, whatever, as long as it solves the task that is obviously possible to solve. But they're not, they're tuned per example.
A truly bias-free algorithm is not "random bytes". It's a learner that memorises its training examples and can only recognise its training examples. Hence why it can't generalise. This is in Mitchell's paper which I suggested you read.
Louise's biases are not problem-specific in the short example I showed you. I defined BK predicates with wide applicability in programs processing lists and numbers. There is no such limitation, theoretical or practical, in the general sense, either. You can give Louise a million irrelevant BK predicates, if you like, and it will still find the ones it needs to complete the learning task assuming they're in there somewhere. In fact, it will find all of the relevant ones - and return the superset of all programs that solve the task (so you can use it for example to identify interesting relations in your dataset). Like I say in a previous comment, Louise's learning algorithm was originally designed to select relevant BK. Additionally, like I said in an earlier comment, Louise can learn its own bias, both the BK and the metarules, so it is not only not limited to task-specific bias, it is not even limited to user-provided bias. Under some circumstances it can even invent new examples. And then use them to learn a hypothesis that generalises better to unseen examples. *
>> Louise can perhaps generate all Prolog programs. Louise cannot search the space of Prolog programs.
I don't follow. What do you mean?