Though, of course, neither are perfect, we're going to keep finding attacks on these things for a while: https://crypto.stanford.edu/timings/
Here is an active deanonymization attack [1]:
> We show how an attacker can take advantage of Monero’s Bulletproof protocol, which reduces transaction fees, to flood the network with his own transactions and, consequently, remove mixins from transaction inputs. Assuming an attack timeframe of 12 months, our findings show that an attacker can trace up to 47.63% of the transaction inputs at a cost of just 1,746.53 USD.
Sounds pretty bad to me.
Here's another attack [2]:
> First, about 62% of transaction inputs with one or more mixins are vulnerable to “chain-reaction” analysis — that is, the real input can be deduced by elimination. Second, Monero mixins are sampled in such away that they can be easily distinguished from the real coins by their age distribution; in short, the real input is usually the “newest” input. We estimate that this heuristic can be used to guess the real input with 80 %accuracy over all transactions with 1 or more mixins.
I don't care what "calculations" say, if so many transactions can be deanonymized then those calculations were calculating the wrong thing.
[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/455 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.04299/
Though, if there are only a few transactions each day that's not as large of an issue as it sounds; the blockchain still has no linkability between transactions. Active attacks might work but few attackers can pull those off, and no attacker is able to go back in time to deanonymize older transactions (assuming the cryptography holds).