The daily vehicle rental approach in their eyes has advantages. Number one is zero capex. Number two is predictable, controllable opex. Number three is a hard cap on the number of drivers on the road, meaning they have a good idea of the supply/demand balance. Number four is competition; if they didn't like one cab company, they could switch to a variety of others. And number five is regulation: if they were having issues with a cab company, they could take it up with the taxi commission.
Contrast this with Uber/Lyft, which is a dupoly with almost no regulation, few constraints, and which has shifted core capex and opex onto drivers, as well as most of the risk. With power and incentive to push driver pay well below sustainability. And of course a history of labor exploitation and the willingness to spent approximately infinite money to lock that exploitation into law.
AB5 was written by a union. Not by Uber drivers.
You might consider that an Uber driver is not going to be frank with an Uber customer about how shitty Uber is. Or frank with themselves, honestly.
Not saying 'good' or 'bad', just, you can't blame the city for the price of the medallion; it already had a high one due to the demand outstripping the supply. Makes sense that the government would seek to profit when it supplies them, given that.
I can certainly blame the city for letting the demand exceed the supply. Irrespective of 22 Uber et all was a well deserved comeuppance for the taxi industry.
That's better than most predatory lending around these medallions in other cities.
>The medallion system collapsed and those who took out loans for them did indeed end up getting screwed.
Unless there was some wording in the medallion law that would prohibit competitors from entering the market or set a buy-back value, I don't think anyone was screwed. Risky assets imply... Risks!