Logs, Tails, Long Tails (2013)
moultano.wordpress.com
moultano.wordpress.com
> Probabilities are very rarely added together, and probability distributions even more rarely.
Umm, we _often_ add probabilities when we want to know the probability that any of a number of finite but mutually exclusive outcomes will happen.
We often add distributions (perhaps with weights) when we think about mixture models, or when there are multiple mechanisms which can both give rise to the same outcomes.
A point the author didn't make about log probabilities which likely relevant to this audience is that we often think about the product of many probability terms when modeling a complex outcome of many steps (e.g. a language model where words are 'drawn' from a distribution, and so the probability of a sentence is a product of many terms corresponding to many generative steps). In these cases log probabilities are often also important for computations to avoid underflow issues. I.e. when you have to reason about large, complex, composed structures generated from stochastic processes, _everything_ can be astoundingly unlikely in absolute terms, and log probabilities let us keep track of the important differences between astoundingly unlikely things.
Summation is so fundamental to probabilities that it is how probabilities are even defined axiomatically in the Kolmogorov system. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sigma_additivity
I think what you meant was that in computation one often needs to multiply probabilities and in such cases it is helpful to work in the log semiring https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Log_semiring
Maybe you don’t but it’s hardly unusual. Integrating out nuisance parameters from a posterior distribution is adding probabilities. Monte Carlo methods are based on adding probabilities.
What do you mean by this? A mixture model is just a model.
Also, how can you do absolutely anything without "working with mutually exclusive events"? You need mutual exclusivity to support the concept of a decision or a hypothesis.
- Easy weighting for observations (just put a weight in front of the corresponding term in the sum)
- Identify and isolate sufficient statistics (by breaking up the summation until you've got terms that only contain data, no parameters)
- Just add a quadratic term and pretend it's kinda Gaussian now (esp. fun if you pretend one of your parameters is generated with a Gaussian process).
- Take the expected value of it w.r.t. some other distribution (Cross entropy / Variational Bayes)
- Pretend the negative log probability is a Hamiltonian and add some momentum + kinetic energy terms (Hamiltonian MC)
- Same but skip the kinetic bit and pretend it's a thermodynamic ensemble (information field theory)
- Same but perform a Legendre transformation to get the Effective action / Free energy (ends up being the same as the KL-divergence)
Feedback is much appreciated.
Quantum field theory is just thermodynamics in imaginary time, not sure why you object to calling it a thermodynamic ensemble. Besides, I could hardly introduce a subject as 'quantum field theory in imaginary time' now could I?
The first two are just tricks really. For the weighted estimates you just go from:
log(P) = \sum log(P_i)
to log(P) = \sum w_i log(P_i)
and for the sufficient statistics you get derivations like: log(P) = \sum_i (1/2) (x_i - m)^2
= \sum_i (1/2) x_i^2 - x_i m - (1/2)m^2
= (\sum_i (1/2) x_i^2) - (\sum_i x_i) m - (1/2)m^2
to show that (\sum_i (1/2) x_i^2) and (\sum_i x_i) fully determine the posterior distribution.If I want to learn more about "applied statistics" best source you would recommend that is not dry as bone ?
I don't think he claims that. He even shows charts where positive log-densities appear.
As x approaches 0, log(x) goes to minus infinity.
I think that's what he means (the next sentence about "visualiz[ing] very small values of a function by expanding their range" makes sense in that context), but I agree it is not very clear.
For example, flipping a coin n times, observing heights of people in a population, etc.
It's kind of like just a single point in the convolution for "X_1 - X_2", corresponding to "X_1 - X_2 = 0" ?
If we have two continuous random variables in a probability space, we have a mapping P(X, Y): R^2 --> R, such that the integral sums to 1.
If X and Y are independent, then P(X, Y) == P(X)P(Y). The examples in the linked article are a bit confusing because some of them have P(X) and P(Y) as different distributions. But the plot only shows the plot of the 2D domain along the 1D line of X==Y, which isn't a terribly common occurrence in actual practice.
So, we're talking about the same thing, namely that multiplying two probability density functions pointwise roughly corresponds to a single point where X==Y (the same as X-Y==0), but otherwise doesn't seem terribly useful.
Something like: $ f \cdot g = \int_\infty^\infty f(x)g(x)dx $
No?
The schwartz inequality gives us that the product then has a value between 0 and 1. ...Not sure what it means if the value is less than one. What does orthogonality mean when it comes to probability density functions?
“Function that can in some contexts be treated like a probability distribution” is just too long.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copula_(probability_theory)#Sk...
"... it is very cogent to give evidence in decibels. When probabilities approach one or zero, our intuition doesn't work very well. Does the difference between the probability of 0.999 and 0.9999 mean a great deal to you? It certainly doesn't to the writer. But after living with this for only a short while, the difference between evidence of plus 30 db and plus 40 db does have a clear meaning to us. It's now in a scale which our minds comprehend naturally... In the original acoustical applications, it was introduced so that a 1 db change perceptible to our ears. With a little familiarity and a little introspection, we think that the reader will agree that a 1 db change in evidence is about the smallest increment of plausibility that is perceptible to our intuition."
"... What probability would you assign to the hypothesis that Mr Smith has perfect extrasensory perception? ... To say zero is too dogmatic. According to our theory, this means that we are never going to allow [our] mind to be changed by any amount of evidence, and we don't really want that. But where is our strength of belief in a proposition like this?
"... We have an intuitive feeling for plausibility only when it's not too far from 0db. We get fairly definite feelings that something is more than likely to be so or less likely to be so. So the trick is to imagine an experiment. How much evidence would it take to bring your state of belief up to the place where you felt very perplexed and unsure about it? Not to the place where you believed it -- that would overshoot the mark, and again we'd lose our resolving power. How much evidence would it take to bring you just up to the point where you were beginning to consider the possibility seriously?
"So, we consider Mr Smith, who says he has ESP, and we will write down some numbers from one to ten on a piece of paper and ask him to guess which numbers we've written down. We'll take the usual precautions to make sure against other ways of finding out. If he guesses the first number correctly, of course we will all say 'you're a very lucky person, but I don't believe you have ESP'. And if he guesses two numbers correctly, we'll still say 'you're a very lucky person, but I still don't believe you have ESP'. By the time he's guessed four numbers correctly -- well, I still wouldn't believe it. So my state of belief is certainly lower than -40 db.
"How many numbers would he have to guess correctly before you would really seriously consider the hypothesis that he has extrasensory perception? In my own case, I think somewhere around ten. My personal state of belief is, therefore, about -100 db. You could talk me into a +-10db change, and perhaps as much as +-30 db, but not much more than that."
The bioinformatics community often uses error probabilities that are PHRED scaled, -10 * log10 of the probability. I didn't realize this was so close to dB!
Analysts did use models that take into account that the tails are more correlated. Arguably overconfidence on these sophisticated models brought complacency and led to excessive risk taking.
Despite the fact that these distributions had very similar
looking shapes, their products are entirely different. The
distributions are shifted so that the center of one is 8
standard deviations from the center of the other
Is this last part correct?"the distributions" means the distributions of the resulting products, correct?
I might misunderstand, but the centers of all three distributions are identical, at zero, aren't they?
Edit: by the way, the irony is that the convolution calculates products of probabilities and adds them!