All I'm saying is that there are easier and clearer ways of presenting the same thing that could be done in a sentence and make the "reason why" obvious. No need to introduce gadgets and go on and on for 30 pages about "exponential time" (is the author talking about the exponential time hypothesis? Or is this P vs. NP?) among other things. There's also some additional crossed wires about "needing to try all cases" or something, that doesn't make any sense. No SAT solver/TSP solver/MILP solver, etc., does this. Anyone who is at all familiar with this topic would not make such statements, and certainly not, in the way you mention, a "mathematically perfect" criterion that "is proven wrong." So which is it? Is the author being cavalier about the literature? Or do they simply not understand the basics?
Additionally, they're not proving anything wrong. This is, like what I mentioned before, similar to bashing people for saying "Nash-equilibria are PPAD-hard (and communication hard) so Nash-equilibrium as a concept is bad because it's computationally difficult." (In fact, I'd say it's even less interesting than this, because at least the latter is a nontrivial result; not a one-line argument that we can embed arbitrarily complex things into the market.)
> Rationalism has not been shown to provide a pathway to a general epistemology.
This is "rational" as in "rational agent" (utility-maximizing, or an agent that makes at least Pareto-optimal choices, or who plays to Nash or correlated equilibria) not "rationalists" as in people who apply rationalism as an epistemology. Applied broadly, "rational agents" could solve halting-hard problems by making an obvious game where an agent who solves such a problem gets a million dollars, since such agents are often assumed to have unbounded computational power. (In particular, nothing about the agent's computational power is often assumed.)
> Fundamentally the author is making a really good case for the idea that oblique or poorly specified/constructed goal and measurement criteria (eg. EMH) should not be assumed as a competent goal vectoring mechanism for society.
Not really, no. For one, EMH says nothing about exact solutions (this would require a much more careful argument with a different type of reduction), and two, in the same way as before, putting EMH on a pedestal (like putting Nash equilibria on a pedestal, or agent rationality, etc.) leads to absurd results. My point is that (a) this is well-known and (b) you can make much simpler examples (like the ones above) that don't appear to be as "clever" but prove the same (nearly-obvious) point.