I recognize that this won't necessarily apply to all users or all apps, but there needs to be a way for the user to designate trust. Apple services and traffic should not get special treatment.
However, I would like to limit that potential as much as possible, partly by creating a stigma against practices that remove control from the user.
Now put yourself in the Apple's position where "an iOS app" or a "mac App" is about as trusted as a random website. Tech people have a strong culture of locally installed apps being extremely trusted but that doesn't extend to everyone. Can you imagine if websites could control your firewall?
I don't think it's that ironic. From my vantage point, the big tech companies specifically and consistently invoke the security arguments that are best aligned with their agendas.
• We need to enforce automatic Windows 10 updates to keep your computer secure. (But also, we won't let consumers use the security-patches-only LTSC branch we offer businesses.)
• You cannot install an app on your iPhone that we have not personally vetted. (As part of the vetting process, we enforce a 30% cut on all digital goods.)
• We need to hide URLs in Chrome to protect users from phishing websites. (But isn't it nice how it makes AMP more seamless?)
• We need to give browsers Bluetooth and USB access, because web apps are safer than random Windows executables. (But also, we can advertise inside of web apps more easily.)
I could go on. The problem with all of these arguments is that they aren't wrong so much as they're selective. The iOS App Store does protect users from malware, and hiding URLs does protect users from phishing. What goes unacknowledged are the trade-offs of these decisions—some of which may themselves be bad for security.
Real question: how? I would expect it to be the opposite, a perfect phishing site will have the wrong URL.
Oh that has google in it (twice even) we can go there.
There's also arguments that URLs are too complex for normal people to understand.
I agree with you though, hiding or redirecting URLs is the opposite of protecting users from phishing.
This was solved a decade ago by rendering the 2nd+1st level domains (and sometimes other parts of the URL) in a different style.
> There's also arguments that URLs are too complex for normal people to understand.
That argument is an insulting attempt to justify a form of illiteracy[1]. Most people don't need to know all of the technical features of a URL; they just need to be able to use it as an address and recognize basic features like the hostname.
Street addresses are a good analogy. Most people understand the basics easily even though physical addresses are far more complex[2] than URLs!
The mistake is in creating a category called "iOS app" or "mac app" and trying to fit every piece of third party code in the universe into that category.
What there should be is different categories of apps with different levels of trust. Then 95% of apps can go in the totally untrusted category because they don't actually need any special privileges. Which then makes asking for a trusted privilege a red flag rather than something the user clicks through because they see it for every app they install.
> Can you imagine if websites could control your firewall?
Realize that this has already happened. You wanted to block DNS to untrusted servers so everything would have to use your Pi-hole? Say hello to DoH. You could block AOL Instant Messenger by blocking port 5190, good luck doing that with Facebook.
The web made every protocol run over HTTPS to bypass your firewall, even if it has nothing to do with transferring hypertext.
Because that's what happens when you do security wrong. It has to be usable or it gets routed around. People started blocking unknown ports by default, or blocking/mangling protocols both of the endpoints didn't want blocked or mangled, so firewalls got displaced.
You don't actually want that to happen (again). You don't want the only options to be living in a cage or rooting your device with some unaudited 0-day code you got from some Russian hackers. There is value in the existence of the middle ground.
Oh, they can. Cross-site scripting and request-forgery attacks aren't dead yet thanks to widespread terrible security practices :)
1. Have functionality only accessible through system frameworks, so that the OS can be responsible for prompting for informed consent and granting it to a process. This means that the system itself has to have functionality to prompt for that informed consent in a way that users can understand.
2. Require processes which an application cannot script that are technically complicated enough that users might realize they are pulling off the warranty-voiding stickers. A prime example would be rebooting into recovery mode to turn off system integrity protections via a terminal command.
Both of these wind up getting gated in priority, but such is the priority of their system - limiting the ability of arbitrary software to act as an unrestricted agent of the user so that user security and privacy (as well as device operation like battery life and radio reception) can be protected.
I actually think the way Apple implemented this downright brilliant. As you say, it can't be done automatically, and it's definitely made to be a bit intimidating. At the same time, it's not difficult or onerous, that's a pretty hard balance to strike.
By contrast, when I try to install unsigned drivers in Windows, I feel as though Microsoft is fighting me, and I get annoyed basically every time. I've never had that feeling with SIP; when I get a new computer, I take off the training wheels I don't need, and move along.
Security as an industry is generally all about protecting the interests of corporations and governments. Just look at how they react when normal people use subversive technology like encryption. The people in power simply cannot tolerate anything they have no control over.
…is not a monolith. There are plenty of people in security interested in giving you freedom as a user, actually, many do it specifically for that reason.
Trust, but verify.
The problem with this is that it's taking away the ability to verify. Which takes away the ability to trust.
You start with trust, if you attempt to verify that trust by examining behaviour and discover a covert side channel surely you can no longer trust.
A kernel and the core OS capabilities are a high security domain and I expect Apple to be extremely careful and put a lot of attention into making it secure. Desktop applications are a different domain where security is not quite at the same level and Apple will not and can not provide the same level of security for all of them that it can and does provide for the base OS.
As a simple example, compare Safari and the OS. The domains in which they operate make it extremely hard, if not impossible, for Safari to have the same level of security as the OS and kernel because the use case of Safari opens it to far more attack vectors.
Does anyone believe that exempting all Safari traffic from firewalls would be a good idea? If not, then why should we accept that it's a good idea for some arbitrarily set of other Apple applications?
The issue here is simple, it's the same as it always is with Apple. There's a choice to do the thing that's slightly more complex and requires users to provide even a minimal amount of input that they might have to think about ("An application is attempting to change the traffic flow required by X service, if you allow this it may cause problems with this service. Yes/No?"), but instead they opt for "Users must trust us implicitly and entirely in everything we do", which is their go-to solution. It all comes back to control, does Apple control the user, or the the user control their software? Apple has built their empire around the former, so while we can't expect the latter without if being forced on them, that doesn't mean we shouldn't.
It is too bad - the Mac hit this sweet-spot where it was pretty much my perfect machine for several years - a kickass Unix workstation in a decently built laptop, with a decent GUI, with access to consumer apps, too. It was great while it lasted.
Thing is, this is a reasonable thing for Apple to do. Back when they weren't enormous, it made sense for them to at least make token gestures to the Unix-weenie/developer market - we threw a lot of money at them and made them hip when they were down and out. Now we're in rounding-error territory, and that we got what we wanted for a while was sort of a happy accident, anyway. Building developer dream-machines was never Apple's thing.
I bought my first Mac in 1991, and this one will last a while longer. Can't really complain too much about 30 years of decent-to-awesome tools.
It's a touch of hubris to think that we are and will continue to be taste makers, certainly. Maybe Apple won't get burned by alienating this crowd. But it seems a risky strategy for dubious return.
It's not just that tech people are customers, it's that ten other customers will look at what the tech people are carrying and assume they're the ones to know what's good.
And developers write code for the platform they actually use first. And spend time fixing the problems with that platform that are keeping other people from using it. Then more non-developers switch to it because it's improving.
Not only is it an application firewall, but also gives you DNS filtering (ie. Pi-Hole basics) and DNS-over-TLS.
If you check it out, we'd love to hear some feedback! (Full UI revamp incoming)
So no, I don't trust OS providers. I tolerate them and defend myself against them.
Adding exceptions means adding more points of failure, more complexities in code, more opportunities for attackers to bypass restrictions placed on them but not on OS services. Not only that, but you get the upside of having a unified model for Apple and your app developers "for free"–the latter which is of critical importance to Apple in particular, since they have had years of trouble in this area.
Apple has clearly betrayed users’ trust in this situation.
People don’t install Little Snitch only to prevent nefarious third party activity. Some may want to know what traffic is going to and from their computers. Other may want to block all traffic for testing and/or research purposes.
I can trust that Apple is not doing something nefarious and still see that Apple is blatantly betraying the fact that people trusted when switching stuff like firewalls away from kext that it wouldn’t build backdoors for itself.
Also, any backdoors Apple builds for its own apps and services are simply an additional attack vector that could potentially be used by non Apple malicious actors.
Apple hasn't weakened the security of their devices to provide a secret way in, in fact, they made their systems even more robust.
The question absolutely is whether Apple can be trusted. Little Snitch works for other apps, just not Apple's apps. The remaining slice of the pie you're arguing for is whether or not we can trust Apple.
So what delta in security and trust over Apple are we getting by asking for this change, and how much insecurity and brittleness are we inviting to all other users with our ineffective software based firewall?
I'd consider poking a hole in firewalls to be providing "a secret way in", particularly in the context of Little Snitch. This isn't some antivirus bloatware that comes preinstalled, or a firewall imposed by corporate networks. The entire pitch of Little Snitch is that it enables you, the user, to monitor and control any bit of traffic that leaves your machine. No one was asking for Apple to bypass that.
This is a false dichotomy. I choose to use a Mac, but I also choose not to let my Mac phone home to Cupertino unless I allow it. Why can't I have that choice? Why does it have to be all or nothing? I'm only interested in the Mac, I have zero interest in Apple "services". It's a fine computing device, but I see no reason why the device has to continue to talk to Apple after I purchase it, except to download software updates — which I manually trigger.
It's not about trust, it's about choice.
EDIT: Now if Apple provided a way to easily disable all of those "services" that phone home, there would be a lot fewer complaints about this issue. But they don't.
Whether this is malicious, not malicious, secure, insecure etc. is irrelevant to whether this is an untrustworthy action. It’s not what one would reasonably expect and is therefore a betrayal of users’ trust.
If Apple switched gatekeeper on MacOS to completely remove the option and the workarounds to run unsigned apps, it would certainly be more secure. It would also be a huge betrayal of users’ trust in Apple and the MacOS platform.
I would disagree with that statement. The user bought an Apple computer so they clearly trust Apple already. If anything, the new frameworks make the system more secure which strengthens that trust for users. The only people really affected by this change are users who want granular control over everything whether it comes from Apple or not.
We buy things from companies we don't implicitly trust all the time, because we can isolate and verify those things.
I don't always trust the supermarket to sell me non-moldy produce, but I can look at the produce and see whether it's moldy.
I don't trust oil companies not to destroy the environment, but if they sell me bad fuel it will be very clear.
I don't trust OS makers, but I can run firewalls and network sniffers to verify that the OS is behaving reasonably, and isolate it when it isn't. Until I can't.
This is false, maybe I bought X because it was the least shitty choice.
That's a perfectly reasonable opinion to hold, but 99.9% of macOS users won't know the difference and will be safer for it.
Some of the folks who know the difference will also be fine with it. FWIW, I've used Little Snitch (only to prevent nefarious third party activity), and its biggest UX problem is that it treats legitimate OS traffic no differently than untrusted traffic.
A back-channel that you can't inspect but Apple can use is a back-channel that you can't inspect but malicious actors have found a way to use waiting to happen. Preventing you from seeing that traffic doesn't protect you, only protects Apple at your expense, since you have no way of detecting whether something fishy is going on.