Will it soon be the 'Big Three'?
Will it soon be the 'Big Three'?
Three of the Big Four are head-quartered in London†, and so the most likely avenue to better regulate them would begin in Westminster. But Westminster has for many years been in the hands of Tories, who have successfully hoodwinked the British people into believing that somehow all the awful things Tories keep doing would be fixed if only they had more Tories in charge of everything. The Tories pay the Big Four piles of tax payer money, including to "fix" problems caused by other members of the Big Four. For some reason the proposed answer often seems to be "Pay Big Four firms more money" perhaps they could pay a Big Four firm to find out why that is?
† All of the Big Four are organised as Groups, so that a relatively small company - in three cases based in London - handles the global brand, while independent businesses in dozens of countries share that brand, intellectual property and so on. Legally it is possible to pretend these aren't the same firm, although it sure is convenient how easily senior employees move between one of the independent businesses and the others as they wish...
There needs to be an incentive for shareholders to dump shares of unethical companies. The government should provide that incentive.
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/satyam-scam-s...
External accounting has a basic function in society. But when the auditee foots the bill and is also the one to provide information on his / her own (possibly faulty) procedures it's not hard to imagine things going wrong.
Currently the AFM demands higher standards and asks for more budget for oversight in order to be able to look at more cases. Guess who pays for that oversight - the companies already paying an arm and a leg for the audit.
Not a surprise. If they start to scrutinize accountants' practices, then they'll be expected to place the same scrutiny on lawyers' practices.
Really? If scrutiny is what caused the companies to implode, it seems like there's a strong argument to be made that the problem was the scrutiny.
You want to find problems that are problems whether you find them or not, not problems that are only problems because you called them "problems".
My post is specifically pointing out that the wording makes it sound like EY audited the companies and their findings are what caused the companies to implode, which is what the parent comment seemed to assume, but the article actually says that it was the fact that EY did not find problems during their audits, which were later found, causing companies to implode.
You don't think these might have caused problems for the company in the absence of external scrutiny?
The FT started questioning Wirecard's accounts years ago, and Wirecard and the German financial services regulator, BaFin responded by... launching legal attacks on the FT, accusing the paper of colluding with short sellers.
The FT kept finding and printing more and more evidence, EY kept giving Wirecard audit cover, and BaFin kept up an aggressive defence... of Wirecard.
Then finally €1.9bn was found to be missing. The various "evidence" provided to EY to "prove" the money was real shouldn't have fooled anyone who had even the most basic grasp of professional auditing. When the shares were in freefall, BaFin finally admitted that perhaps there was a problem.
Then EY's CEO sent a letter to clients in which he said “Many people believe that the fraud at Wirecard should have been detected earlier and we fully understand that. Even though we were successful in uncovering the fraud, we regret that it was not uncovered sooner.”
The part in italics is simply a lie. EY did not uncover the fraud. The FT did. And in fact what finally killed Wirecard was an independent audit by another Big 4 member - KPMG - which was supposed to vindicate Wirecard, but actually found "irregularities" which Wirecard couldn't explain.
So - what to conclude? It's hard to avoid a cynical interpretation - that auditing at this level is basically PR with spreadsheets, intended to reassure investors that everything is fine, and not a serious effort to reveal financial irregularities.
It's not just EY. KPMG, Deloitte, and PWC have all had issues of their own. The underlying problem is that these companies are hired by their clients to provide a clean bill of health, and if they're too thorough they're not hired again. So the incentives are - let's say - heavily aligned against too much stringency.
The FT Wirecard story is well worth a read. The FT is (expensively) paywalled, but some of the reporting is free.
https://www.ft.com/content/284fb1ad-ddc0-45df-a075-0709b3686...
(Not quite sure that idiom works in US English so maybe only for some markets ;-)