The Lucrative Art of Chicken Sexing (2017)
psmag.com
psmag.com
0: https://vixra.org/pdf/1405.0016v1.pdf
1: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342532726_Estimatio...
2: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00071668.2019.1...
[1] Dairy farmers maximising milk output for feed input is why there is veal.
(Confining veal calves is illegal here, and labelling is enforced to the point that even restaurant waiters must be able to tell you the provenance of their meats.)
[2] We do occasionally take free range eggs.
I think its more the will, than the ability, that's needed. And if someone considers some products "too hard to switch away from" then, just keep buying that one and skip the others.
Dont like cruelty to animals? Then stop buying it. It's that simple.
All of this is really cheap and quick to make. Almond/coconut/soy milk costs nearly three times as much as cow's milk in my country, and the substitute 'meats' are hard to find outside supermarkets. Veganism here might as well be money laundering. To my knowledge, beyond burgers and such food is still pricey in the USA as well, for instance.
I'm just pointing out what makes me consider vegetarianism or veganism is eating more food, better food, for less money, and less pretentious heat treatment. I'm not finding it right now. Hopeful for the future, though.
One website says that the cheapest eggs on its list (Costco) are 70 grams of protein per dollar, while the cheapest beans (pinto) are 80 grams per dollar, and lentils are 116 grams per dollar. Hmm, that difference is smaller than I expected. https://efficiencyiseverything.com/calorie-per-dollar-list/
Pasture-raised grass-fed beef might come out way better in comparison.
One is collateral damage (mice sucked up etc.) but the other is _premised_ on death.
Probably true if you compare it to conventional cattle farming, as they're largely fed corn from fields.
I suspect pasture raised, grass fed animals have a vastly lower deaths-per-bite count than a veggie burger, though. I don't know that I subscribe to the "accidental deaths matter less" argument, either.
But yes, even plant foods incur animal suffering. Vegans know. Much, much less though.
> Pasture-raised grass-fed beef might come out way better in comparison.
If you consider a bugs life equal to a cows life: yes. Most people dont. I kill bugs when I drive my car, if I'd kill cows at the same rate as bug when driving, I'd stop driving.
Do you really think that anyone is going to see this comment and reconsider eating meat, or wearing leather? Because "that nice _cies_ person on the internet told me I'm a terrible human being"?
Their message was very polite, simply pointing out the existence of other lifestyles, and barring personal tastes, it’s functionally not difficult to change your own.
If that makes you re-evaluate your choices in life, that could be great for the chicks. I never called you a terrible human.
I can eat meat and still believe I may be wrong in doing so. There's absolutely no reason to take this quite polite advocacy as a personal attack.
I'm not aware of any theory which has convincingly been able to show that animals are not worthy of moral consideration (but all humans are). Similarly, I'm not aware of any theory which successfully argues that human pleasure from eating meat outweighs the suffering of the animals (without also applying to a variety of human behaviours). Justification like that usually entails that the suffering is necessary, yet moral vegetarianism does make any claim as far as people who need to eat meat (or at least purchase meat or kill animals) for dietary reasons.
[0] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vegetarianism/#ScheCaseAg...
To argue against eating animals, you need a moral theory which shows that animals are worthy of moral consideration.
There is none, that I'm aware of. Not in a strictly rational sense. Utilitarianism does not bridge the "is-ought gap," for instance.
(I actually think the "is-ought gap" is an imperfect way to look at it, but that's a simplified way for me to try to explain my objection to these kinds of theories, which may be understandable to people who have at least taken Philosophy 101).
Personally, I'm quite convinced that it's impossible to create a rationally justified moral theory that grants rights to animals.
One of the most prominent utilitarians (and ethicists of modern times), Peter Singer, argues for moral consideration of animals on utilitarian grounds. There are Kantians who do the same. The point of more significant controversy is the strength of that moral consideration, as put by SEP:
"That non-human animals can make moral claims on us does not in itself indicate how such claims are to be assessed and conflicting claims adjudicated. Being morally considerable is like showing up on a moral radar screen—how strong the signal is or where it is located on the screen are separate questions."
>Utilitarianism does not bridge the "is-ought gap," for instance.
That's not utilitarianism's job, that's the job of a realist moral epistemology. It is perfectly possible, for instance, to believe in moral reletavism or moral objectivism while being a utilitarian. And although I think I side more with the Humean side of the is-ought debate with regard to moral realism, I can also see that moral realists have some good arguments that natural science is not the measure of everything.
>Personally, I'm quite convinced that it's impossible to create a rationally justified moral theory that grants rights to animals.
We're not talking about rights, we're talking about moral consideration. What we do with that consideration and how it figures into our priorities is only an orthogonal matter. Singer, for instance, in proposing that animals have moral consideration, would not say they have rights, in this case it would be permissible to kill an animal to save the life of a human, whereas it may never be permissible to kill a human to save the life of another human.
I don't agree with either. In my view, the kinds of arguments they make are not even valid kinds of arguments.
> believe in moral reletavism or moral objectivism
I'm neither of those things, nor do I think they are valid positions.
I realize that it's a bit unfair for me to just say that and leave it there, but I can only spend so much time discussing this on HN.
> We're not talking about rights, we're talking about moral consideration.
OK. I wouldn't modify the substance of what I've said even if I accept that. (Though I don't actually agree with this way of separating out the problem space).
On the citations of Singer/various Kantians/etc.:
It's not my intention to talk past you, it's just that if you say "well, $BIGTEXT has a good argument!", that's not really the kind of thing we can discuss efficiently here. I can make very simple and direct arguments for my views without pointing to some $BIGTEXT.
There is nothing wrong with pointing to $BIGTEXT. In fact, somebody might say "Aha! Now I know I need to go read $BIGTEXT."
It's just that we can't really "go there" efficiently on HN. It's better if you can make simple and direct arguments, so that people can actually grapple with them.
But I know that is not always possible (and this time, I'll grant you, probably isn't, if your views happen to agree with some of the people you've cited).
I find it pretty easy to accept some of the arguments within a certain framework, even if I don't subscribe to the framework itself. For instance, I might think that God may have or not have certain qualities or attributes, according to a theological framework, even though I am an atheist, and the question of God is not at all relevant to me. I operate the same way about many moral questions.
On the other hand, I also realize I should spend some time backing up and at least thinking about my alternatives, even if they are 'null' alternatives where I believe the burden of proof is on someone else. With regard to moral nihilism and the burden of proof, for instance, the moral skeptic may need to explain why moral intuitions are not a good starting point (or dismiss the role of intuition entirely, but she still needs an argument). A moral non-cognitivist needs to get around the embedding problem, for instance too.
Nothing, in the sense of "moral concern" that you are asking about.
We have laws against killing humans (and stealing from them, and many other things) because it's practical.
On the other hand, it's practical to kill animals, and would be impractical not to.
That said, I absolutely care about humans and animals (some more than others, but all at least some).
One can envision a future where more crops can grown on a smaller footprint with future agricultural developments (e.g hydroponics, multi level farms, etc)
It also ignores the fact that the production of red meat is incredibly bad for the environment, and one of the large contributors to greenhouse gases.
This argument feels similar to criticisms of electric cars because generating energy currently hurts the environment, but this ignores the future potential of widespread renewable energy, with which petroleum vehicles are incompatible.
https://www.seleggt.com/seleggt-process/
It's already being used in you can buy eggs from hens sexed with this method in the supermarket.
Video of the machine: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OeAWcF1MxNo
This may be a problem for a lot of people, especially as byproducts may enter the food chain.