The vulnerability is not in the computer chip. The vulnerability is in the management software of the OEMs.
I was expecting some exotic VPU hardware backdoor. Nevertheless, the article was a good read.
I was expecting some exotic VPU hardware backdoor. Nevertheless, the article was a good read.
> Many such devices on the market today are based on HiSilicon (a Huawei brand) hi3520d ARM SoC running a special Linux distribution called HiLinux, with a set of user-space utilities and a custom web application on top.
(emphasis mine)
So while this is not a hardware backdoor it's in no way less problematic.
EDIT: Which you never said it was... Anyway it's useful to know that it's the software which is chipped alongside with the chip and not some arbitrary 3rd party software some arbitrary OEM put on-top of it.
They defend HiSilicon and suggest that the vulnerabilities were introduced on top of the SDK by the vendor.
Full administrative access with hard-coded password: https://kojenov.com/2020-09-15-hisilicon-encoder-vulnerabili...
Commonly known as backdoor.
Edit: to be clear: 1, I don't know that the backdoor isn't in the hardware itself, but that's what they're claiming. 2, it sounds like the software in question is the manufacturer-provided drivers for the hardware, which is worth emphasizing, but not the same as the hardware itself being compromised.