OpenSSL Raccoon Attack (CVE-2020-1968)
openssl.org
openssl.org
Why is the attack called "Raccoon"?
Raccoon is not an acronym. Raccoons are just cute animals, and it is well past time that an attack will be named after them :)
Just in case anyone was trying to workout the meaning.
We used to have three pet turtles that we kept outside. They had a bunch of grass and dirt to roam around in and then at night we would put them in a plastic container.
One day we woke up and only had two turtles. A thief has struck! I thought it might have been an raccoon so I added a window screen as a top and weighed it down with two large bricks to make sure it stayed on.
The next morning I woke up to find the top knocked off and now we were down to zero turtles. The raccoon simply figured out how to knock the bricks off and get the two remaining turtle snacks inside.
Very crafty indeed.
I’m also going to note that folks with a backyard flock aren’t really participating in the industrial scale operations you’re bringing up.
Disclaimer: we have a seven bird flock, though it’ll be six soon if the cock (one pair of chicks was unseeded) doesn’t stop attacking people in the very near future.
My point is only that at the industrial scale, raccoons are a non-issue. The cages that keep the chickens in probably do a fine job keeping the raccoons out.
Those of us muddling along with our backyard flocks with the intention of not supporting the industrial raising of chickens are the ones dealing with random predators.
You’re right that at a species level it looks ironic. Looking at it at an individual level, I think, revolves the irony.
If you've ever ate raccoon, you'll understand why.
The name seems fitting to me. They aren't just cute animals.
"Development Tradecraft DOs and DON'Ts
[...]
(U) Networking
Directive Rationale
[...]
DO NOT solely rely on SSL/TLS to secure data in transit. Numerous man-in-middle attack vectors and publicly disclosed flaws in the protocol."
The easiest solution would be to only enable the X25519 and X448 key exchanges by default. (and in the future a post-quantum one)
> Raccoon is a timing vulnerability ...
> So is this really only a timing vulnerability?
> Sadly no. [...] You should probably check that you are not running a vulnerable configuration (see CVE-2020-5929) since this allows mounting a direct attack without complex timing measurements.
Running this attack gets them the premaster secret (now the main secret presumably in RFC8446bis?) for one particular TLS session they're attacking. Assuming that session has meanwhile concluded and the attacker has recorded the ciphertext, they can now decrypt and read it. I think in principle if it's still in progress when they complete the attack they could try to MITM the session from a suitable on-path position. This might also impact resumption.
Because you (the server) use the same DH private key repeatedly the attacker gets to do a bunch of separate connections which fail, but they can measure the timing of those connections and use that to try to figure out the main secret for some particular TLS session they witnessed talking to the same server when it used the same DH private key.
If clients never do an affected DH key agreement the attacker doesn't have anything to work with. If the server picks random ephemeral DH keys the attacker doesn't have anything to work with.
If the server uses a better DH scheme which is less vulnerable to a timing attack (for example not stripping zeroes or ECDH instead of conventional DH) this attack gets much harder to do, maybe you need to be very much closer to your target, e.g. running on the same physical hardware to measure the time differences. But using ephemeral keys makes this whole concern moot, and was also necessary to Forward Secrecy, so everybody should already have been doing that.
Like while claiming an ephemeral ECDH key, it is actually only generated once when the device is provisioned? (Or worse, the same on every device of that series)
But here's something that mentions semi-static 0 round trip session setup
https://www.cs.virginia.edu/dwu4/papers/PrivateIoT.pdf
as well as what goes wrong when you do reuse things
https://www.math.uwaterloo.ca/~ajmeneze/publications/ephemer...
tl;dr cryptographically it's a neat attack, but practical risk is very small.
that's what Intel said!
sorry. i will see myself out...