If the total Fed balance sheet is $7T, that’s 7% of their total assets that could disappear. That seems like a lot to me.
Delinquency is also mostly just about being a leading predictor of foreclosure or some sort of renegotiated payment structure. The same stat suggests that foreclosures overall peaked at just over 2% (but up to 15% subprime) [1 again, but also 2 which is more clear on 2.23%].
So I’d assume something closer to 2-5% foreclosure, depending on your estimates of benefits policy. Even in foreclosure, there’s still recovery (financially).
In fact, Goldman Sachs might even make a profit re-selling the mortgages it bought off of Fannie / Freddie as part of its $1.8B court-mandated “consumer relief” program [3]. It’s unlikely the Fed would be as “good” at this as Goldman, but a likely unwinding strategy would be to sell them to similar investor groups. Either way, not going to $0 :).
[1] https://www.statista.com/statistics/205959/us-mortage-delinq...
[2] https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.statista.com/chart/amp/1546...
[3] https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.bloomberg.com/amp/opinion/a...
things are a little better in the other classes of loans but not much! if the economy stays weak and jobs dont come back, some metros may well see a housing price decline. Atlanta, Houston and san anton.
My guess is that even more than during the financial crisis, people are delinquent but would absolutely pay if they could. Was your housing price decline statement supposed to be about those homes becoming underwater and therefore the buyers walk away / end up in foreclosure?
Of course, there might be other reasons and counterarguments, this is just my interpretation.