Comment by hnarn | Hacker News Reader

Comment by hnarn | Hacker News Reader

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The best predictor for future behavior is past behavior: China is testing the waters, in some cases in a quite literal sense (South China Sea), and you're correct that how the world reacts to Hong Kong and the Xinjiang "re-education camps" will be seen as a vital piece of information in the future when deciding on how to proceed with other "problematic" regions: for example Taiwan, which in the case where strong-arming the island into obedience, most probably would require military intervention. Before you claim that this is unlikely or extreme, remember that thanks to the PRC, almost no countries in the world even recognize Taiwan as a country -- so how are you supposed to question the "invasion"?

These actions can all be traced back to China's increased tendency towards authoritarianism, for example the elimination of the term limit for Xi Jinping in 2018,[1] which stands in contrast to China's economic liberalization in the early 1990s.[2] It's important to understand that this liberalization is more or less the sole reason China is the "young superpower" we see today (just look up the GDP numbers from 1990 onwards), so the question is how a reversal of this attitude will serve future Chinese interests. Although unconfirmed, there are claims that Xi's grip on power may be decreasing somewhat, and that there is "widespread opposition" from within the party, but for obvious reasons few are willing to speak out.[3]

[1]: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/25/world/asia/china-xi-jinpi...

[2]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_economic_reform

[3]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/18/china-xi-jinpi...

I have sympathy for the statement that lifting 500 million people out of abject, generational poverty ranks among the greatest humanitarian successes in history. At the same time local corruption, and the number of protests against those officials was an enormous problem and seemed to get remarkably little coverage.

A mature legal system is the only reliable way to combat problems like corruption. A legal system is much more reliable than a single powerful executive. China could have gone beyond mere convergence in its economic success. Different egos are running things now than during the start of the economic reforms, but in a better timeline I think some successful institutions from Hong Kong would have been adopted in more areas of China.

However, the west isn't in a position right now to say that in spite of it being harder work to run a system where political influence doesn't affect the legal system that strong institutions are the source of our prosperity. We're simultaneously in a period of dismantling established institutions, and less capable when it comes to managing crises than we used to be.

Local corruption is the defacto mechanism CCP exploited to pull 500m out of poverty. Deng's entire model is harnessing corruption with bureaucratic incentives to forward development goals. This is posited by Yukon Huang, former World Bank director for China. He notes China is the only country where increased corruption is correlated to increased growth, everywhere else corruption leads to inefficient allocation. Also discussed in depth recently in China's Gilded Age by Yuen Yuen Ang, which breaks down corruption into four categories:

https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Yuen-...

Chinese corruption focuses on access money (steroids) to coordinate massive development projects and a cadres ability to graft is directly correlated to their projects success. The flip side is pervasive corruption is socially destabilizing as recognize in the 2000s, which is why Xi inaugurated his office with the anticorruption campaign. Yes, there was some power consolidation involved, but most of the effort was genuine - CCDI has investigated close to 2,000,000 officials, even Xi doesn't have that many enemies. Despite some terrible human rights campaigns that affect <1% of the population, this is very much the "better" timeline. The legal system is being improved, it's _not_ (<-edit) going to be modelled after the west, the most optimistic outcome is Singapore, whose political institutions has trained 50k+ Chinese officials until a few years ago. Incidentally, Singapore style single party dictatorship was about the best HK could have ever hoped for - people keep insisting HK's role as financial centre is predicated on it's western values yet in the same breath suggest HK's loss will be Singapore's gain. Authoritarianism + capitalism are absolutely compatible.

Your last paragraph hits the nail on the head, western institutions are failing. They don't have to be, but as long as they are, China will be more reassured in it's model.

I think Chinese authoritarianism may be best though if as a rent based system much like resource based economies such as the Gulf states, except that the ‘resource‘ they are extracting rent from is a capitalist market economy. It’s a strange beast for sure. One thing the Chinese authorities do not lack is competence. They make horrific, catastrophic mistakes, sure, but they are incredibly organised and disciplined. They will turn in a dime and execute whatever strategy it takes to set things ‘right’, as defined in their terms with ruthless efficiency. They must not be underestimated.

I think western institutions are being underestimated. The whole point if democratic systems is their flexibility. We will simply adapt and grow new institutions. We have the dynamic systems of social discourse and public accountability to do so. Authoritarian systems find this hard to do because their top down architecture limits them to solutions envisionable by a single authority. They have no way to do public input or to generate a range of options, or try things and have them fail. It’s fine. It’s part of the process.

> which is why Xi inaugurated his office with the anticorruption campaign. Yes, there was some power consolidation involved, but most of the effort was genuine - CCDI has investigated close to 2,000,000 officials, even Xi doesn't have that many enemies.

Xi became president as a compromise candidate between the internal factions, so he didn't have much support or allies. CCP officials are corrupt by default, of course the effort would be genuine, even though the true intention was to consolidate his power inside the party.

Re. CCP lifting 500m out of poverty -- I'd argue that the Chinese people prospered and lifted themselves out DESPITE of what CCP has done. Looking at the potential alternative and what KMT has done to develop Taiwan, I'd think that's the case. But there is no way of testing that.

> Authoritarianism + capitalism are absolutely compatible.

I agree with this in the case of Singapore. But when CCP is actively exporting its brand of authoritarianism to other countries and influencing the freedoms of other countries' citizens as part of an ideology war [1] using unrestricted warfare [2], then that organization becomes a threat to the world. The best case HK can hope for is the collapse of CCP.

[1] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/chinese-comm... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unrestricted_Warfare

> I have sympathy for the statement that lifting 500 million people out of abject, generational poverty ranks among the greatest humanitarian successes in history.

Do the ends justify the means? A long form piece entitled "Why Do Chinese People Like Their Government?”:

> But, with only very few exceptions, they really conceived of liberalism not as an end in itself but rather as a means to the decidedly nationalist ends of wealth and power. They believed that liberalism was part of the formula that had allowed the U.S. and Great Britain to become so mighty. It was embraced in a very instrumental fashion. And yet Chinese advocates of liberalism were guilty, too, of not appreciating that same contingency, that whole precarious historical edifice from which the liberalism of the Enlightenment had emerged. Did they think that it could take root in utterly alien soil? In any case, it most surely did not.

> It must be understood that liberalism and nationalism developed in China in lockstep, with one, in a sense, serving as means to the other. That is, liberalism was a means to serve national ends — the wealth and power of the country. And so when means and end came into conflict, as they inevitably did, the end won out. Nationalism trumped liberalism. Unity, sovereignty, and the means to preserve both were ultimately more important even to those who espoused republicanism and the franchise.

> […] By the mid-1920s, the overwhelming majority of Chinese intellectuals believed that an authoritarian solution was China’s only recourse. Some looked to the Soviet Union, and to Bolshevism. Others looked to Italy, and later Germany, and to fascism. Liberalism became almost irrelevant to the violent discourse on China’s future.

* https://supchina.com/2019/07/22/why-do-chinese-people-like-t...

That was a good piece. The author is well researched and aware of opposing viewpoints, even while advocating his own. I wish more discussion were this informed and nuanced.

> > […] By the mid-1920s, the overwhelming majority of Chinese intellectuals believed that an authoritarian solution was China’s only recourse. Some looked to the Soviet Union, and to Bolshevism. Others looked to Italy, and later Germany, and to fascism. Liberalism became almost irrelevant to the violent discourse on China’s future.

I did not read the article, but I'd point out that this is in opposition of what Sun Yat-Tsen and Chiang Kai-Shek believed in. KMT take over happened around the 1920's, they believed the road to rebuild China was through [1]

> three steps: military rule, political tutelage, and constitutional rule. The ultimate goal of the KMT revolution was democracy

And indeed, this is what Taiwan had gone through under the rule of KMT, evolving into the democracy today.

More were lifted out of poverty without needing concentration camps.

For the totalitarian claim to rewrite history all territories are ultimately problematic.

> We don't know a perfected totalitarian power structure, because it would require the control of the whole planet.

- Hannah Arendt

I would add that several totalitarian singularities, that each are closed off from one another or perceive each other through a completely controlled ideological filter, might also constitute such total control.

Capitalism is not incompatible with dictatorships. Pinochet is a common example, but also Nazi Germany had a working state capitalism, like China.

Not structurally incompatible but typically suffering from stunted growth. Nazi Germany didn't go on enough to show its limits, but Franco's Spain or Pinochet's Chile struggled to grow until their strongman went away.

I want to say that defence treaties, are a bit special in the context of USA.

Why USA has historically entered into so many treaties?

They reason is is because USA's constitutional arrangement makes it really hard for the US government to declare a war... on the paper.

So, by giving a treaty, USA was giving the strongest assurance that by turning a treaty into its own law, it prevents the chance of anybody in the constitutional order of precedence stopping, or reneging on the obligated retaliation.

That’s an important point.

From a political standpoint, one of the purposes of the defense treaties has been to discourage allies from building up their own militaries. This was an explicit policy in the wake of WW2 to promote both US hegemony, but also to promote stability - the theory being a world with one dominant military power is less likely to see large wars like WW1 and WW2.

Pax Americana, like Pax Britannica before it. Wonder how much longer that can hold?

Until Pax China.

*Pax Sinica if we want to be consistent with our Latin analogizing.

They're going to need a lot more reeducation camps for that.

Between "Pax X" and "Pax Y", there's often a war. The war leaves X weakened to the point that they can't enforce "Pax X" any more. Pax Americana ending probably won't just be because Pax China peacefully superseded it.

Is this true? I keep reading that the US is putting increasing pressure on allies not spending at least 2% of GDP in their military.

It was for a long time. This is why GOP handwringing about our allies underspending on military defense is so incongruent - other countries underspending on their militaries was a cornerstone goal of post-WW2 policy. Complaining that Germany doesn’t have a strong enough military marks a pretty sharp break from prior US policy goals.

That was true until Trump, and it's really only Trump pushing for that, and the GOP going along with it b/c Trump owns the GOP now. The US policy establishment is against it, but have to follow the President's orders.

Well it was also because 1900s Europe couldn't seem to stop causing major wars with itself that pulled in the US and other countries. So this policy was also to rein in Germany permanently, in parallel with economically integrating Germany more closely with Europe to reduce incentives for militarism.

Has the US entered "so many" treaties?

WWI was caused by an overuse of treaties.

"Declaring" war had meant almost nothing since 1789.

You forgot that Chinese invasion on Indian borders left some 50+ people killed just 3 months ago.

You can't give a pass by saying "They're just testing waters". Everything in war is testing waters.

I'm not "giving them a pass" for anything, that's your interpretation of what I wrote.

I read it as "They're just testing waters, they have no intentions for further expansion". I am sorry if I misread it. If I didn't, then I strongly believe that China wants to expand its terrorial powers to SCS, Taiwan, disputed areas on the Indian, Bhutanese, Nepalese and Vietnamese borders.

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