Mathematicians should stop naming things after each other
nautil.us
nautil.us
Once you get to the advanced levels of any field, terminology being "accessible" doesn't really matter, but being precise does.
Areas like philosophy and law actually suffer in my opinion when they overload common words with uncommon meanings, or descend into weird disambiguations that depend on suffixes.
For example, in philosophy there's "contractarianism" and "contractualism", and trying to remember which is the general term and which refers to a specific theory drives me nuts. (If "contractualism" were just known as "Scanlon's theory" it would be a lot easier.)
Naming things after their creator is actually super-helpful because it's really easy to disambiguate, helps situate things historically, and once you're at that level there often isn't a single unique word or phrase that can easily encapsulate the idea anyways and isn't easily confused with something else.
Long articles and opinion pieces are written by people who saw something with these words and it never occurred for them that they should check out what these words mean in the context.
They are much more descriptive and easy to remember, even though the Algorithms can be complex themselves. Event the name "Boolean", could be changed to "Conditional"... and be even more readable. Also, Dijkstra algorithm can be generalized to "Shortest Path Algorithm" (there can be more than one).
Math, and physics to some degree, have become self-referential to the point that start becoming more esoteric magic black books to beginners...
While CS was born out of Math folks, and unfortunately has adopted some of the same esoteric symbolics, I hope Computer Science doesn't follow that path on the long term, otherwise it will become divorced from day to day real life applications.
Let me give you a clear example:
Now, imagine if we called Double Linked Lists as "Darombolo lists", or whoever invented it. (I made up that name), Double Linked List is very easy to visualize and remember. "Giacomo Darombolo List", is not, and just adds to 'must cram/memorize' things to make things work.....
I personally don't like "cramming" useless trivia in order to work in my field. I hope Computer Science divorces from Math, and takes its own path to more logical naming of things and less useless symbols used in it.
It is like the whole field suffers because the authors' Narcissism, that they must name things after them.
Those are trivial concepts though. The article brings up "perfectoid spaces", as if to suggest their superiority to "Scholze spaces", yet neither name gives any clue as to what they are:
In mathematics, perfectoid spaces are adic spaces of special kind, which occur in the study of problems of "mixed characteristic", such as local fields of characteristic zero which have residue fields of characteristic prime p.
A perfectoid field is a complete topological field K whose topology is induced by a nondiscrete valuation of rank 1, such that the Frobenius endomorphism Φ is surjective on K°/p where K° denotes the ring of power-bounded elements. [1]
Oh, okay. See, the problem is that modern mathematical structures are built on top of centuries of prior work. Computer science, on the other hand, is still in its infancy as a field.
I hope Computer Science divorces from Math, and takes its own path to more logical naming of things and less useless symbols used in it.
That's silly. Computer science is a subfield of math. All computer scientists working in research are mathematicians by training. You won't get anywhere at all if you try to enter the field without a mathematical background.
Unnecessary gatekeeping. There’s a lot of engineering-oriented research that has nothing to do with math.
"Research in history involves developing an understanding of the past through the examination and interpretation of evidence. Evidence may exist in the form of texts, physical remains of historic sites, recorded data, pictures, maps, artifacts, and so on."
Pretty much every field in the social sciences and humanities requires their undergrads to take at least one course in statistics. Sure, these students may complain about it but they need to be trained to not make common statistical errors in their publications. Unfortunately, they still do, which highlights the importance of mathematical education even in these fields.
I agree on your first point though, I think the concepts named after people are usually so abstract that the hard part is to really understand the concepts, not to remember the name.
Those topics might seem to have nothing to do with math but all of their components have mathematical underpinnings. Algorithms, data structures, complexity theory, and even the physics of end-to-end latency, colour perception, etc.
There probably are some people out there, working in these fields with only a high school math background, but I'd imagine they're exceedingly rare. Anyone who's completed a CS degree has done their fair share of math.
(I think there is a discussion to be had about making the distinction "CS" vs "theoretical CS" as the GP comment does, or if it should be "CS" vs some other term ("computing"? feels a bit general))
(Mostly joking. Mostly!)
Computer science was developed by mathematicians as a study of algorithms, procedures for computing, and methods of abstraction. In the words of Hal Abelson, computer science is not a science and it's not really about computers in the same sense that geometry is not about surveying instruments [2].
Numerical methods and algorithms are fields of math as old as geometry, especially if we focus on the Babylonian or Chinese styles.
Hermann Grassmann sought to formalize arithmetic, not wishing to assume them as granted. In doing this, he also connects recursion, induction and the natural numbers (he would have known of recursion from its early application in the theory of combinatorics). Peano, Dedekind, Frege, Zermelo and many others would also work on the foundations and axiomatization of mathematics and deduction. Computing began as a side-effect of attempts to formalize just how far such an approach could be taken. The Turing Machine arose to tackle Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem. The lambda calculus as an approach to the foundation of mathematics. Functional programming languages were originally part of tools meant to study formal mathematical objects while Logic programming sought to apply ideas from formal logic and the axiomatization of mathematics to automatically search for programs.
Dedekind said: "In speaking of arithmetic (algebra, analysis) as a part of logic I mean to imply that I consider the number-concept entirely independent of notions or intuitions of space and time, that I consider it an immediate result from the laws of thought."
What we find is computing reaches right to the foundations of mathematics. Whenever we try to systemize thought, we end up with ideas which seeming inevitably also lead to the foundation of computation.
It is not. Applied Computer Science has as much common with math as Chemistry does with math.
I view theoretical computer science as mostly self-masturbatory, to the point that is very very divorced from real life applications and is benefiting very little to us.
Also the market has spoken as well. Someone with CS degree, and 5 years of experience can command a higher salary than someone that took 5 years to get his/her phd in CS. A phd degree is not seen as valuable, mostly because it is not seen as beneficial and it is very divorced to reality of applied computer engineering.
The computer science that helps big companies get more control is the most useful by this metric. Oh look big data and AI are popular. Programming language theory to help create less buggy programs is less so.
You wouldn't have complexity analysis of algorithms, with which most of us don't need to directly involve ourselves, but you do apply its results when choosing an algorithm based on the knowledge that was originally obtained through that analysis. Or if you're not choosing your algorithms, at the very least someone who chose them for your platform did.
You probably wouldn't have lossless data compression (and an understanding of it) at its present level without someone having done mathematically-based work on things like arithmetic coding [1] and range encoding [2]. Again, you probably don't write that code yourself (I haven't), but it's there.
The list goes on.
A PhD degree isn't really a good investment in terms of just salary in almost any field that I can think of. That just means work that's closer to (and directly applicable for) direct revenue streams tends to pay better than work that's further away from them. That doesn't directly mean work that's further away from revenue streams is less valuable down the road; it just means there's less certainty about its ability to help generate revenue, and that there are more steps, more interim work and a greater financial risk involved. While most businesses don't, and shouldn't, bother, that doesn't mean they might not benefit at some point if someone else does it. "The market has spoken" is a shortsighted way of looking at these kinds of things.
Sure, there are areas of theoretical computer science that are more similar to pure maths in terms of abstraction and applicability, and which are pretty much a pure intellectual pursuit. They are very far from engineering or applications. But theoretical work in CS is broader than that, and some of it underlies much of what we have in the practical world.
It's also true that most of software development and engineering work don't really require involvement with much of the theory, partially because someone else is already doing that work within the platform, and partially because most business software is actually theoretically more or less trivial.
Still doesn't mean the theoretical side is useless, because not all software is trivial.
Programming is math. I’m not sure why this bothers people so much. When you cross a bridge and it’s able to keep standing, you don’t feel gratitude to math? When you write any program, you should feel the same gratitude.
Engineering is not a subfield of math either, it merely uses math as a tool. As a field, engineering evolved in parallel with math, only borrowing mathematical methods when their suitable applications were discovered.
Computer Science is a subfield of math because it was developed by mathematicians as a direct descendent of algebra and the study of algorithms, which date back to the ancient Babylonian and Greek methods for division, computing the GCD of two numbers, finding square roots, etc.
Your classification seems as reasonable as any, but the lines seem fairly arbitrary to me.
I wonder what Alan Turing would say about this.
On more serious note... Most people confuse software engineering with computer science.
Computer science is a branch of mathematics, software engineering might not be.
Oh and by the way, there's a bunch of mathematics and logic (again, a branch or mathematics) into language recognition and compilers...
Edit: think that many prominent computer scientists were/are mathematicians: think of Donald Knuth or Claude Shannon, for example. They laid the ground for other stuff to happen.
He grew up in a world where he could only beg an hour a week of compute time off the Americans so his community put a remarkably high emphasis on software quality and clear semantics.
And that’s really what advanced mathematics is all about: clearly communicating otherwise intractably complex ideas by letting the symbols do the work.
I rather enjoyed that!
I think there's truth to it though, even at as high a level of situations where you have logic that leaves you thinking 'ok, this works... but it doesn't actually make sense' where something's hard to understand or debug because it's got tangled up into a functional but illegible mess.
I agree, and I think you nailed the point perfectly.
The point that the article misses completely.
Thank you.
There isn't a lot of theory-building in algorithms, compared to the more traditional fields of maths, but the combinatorics are formidable.
I readily acknowledge that literally is often used when a sentence is figurative; that's not the same thing. For literally to be used to mean figuratively the utterer would be worried that, but for the presence of "literally", the sentence might be understood to be literal.
I contend that the role "literally" usually plays is that of an intensifier. I believe it plays that role through ordinary application of hyperbole: the utterance "X is literally Y" is usually meant as "X is very Y; X is so Y it is almost as if it were literally Y; but of course you understand that it was not, in fact, literally Y - we're all reasonable people here."
In much the same way, when someone says "You left me waiting for days" and it's been a handful of minutes, we don't say "'days' sometimes means 'minutes'" - we say that people exaggerate.
I recognize that I'm disagreeing with at least one dictionary; I believe they got it wrong.
And I won't claim that there is literally no single person who in fact uses "literally" to mean "figuratively" - but I have never encountered such an example and I believe it to be rare enough that we can consider it an error, even in a descriptivist treatment.
1. The Romans spoke Latin 2. Catholic church based in Rome, did everything in Latin 3. Between tithes and indulgences, church got rich and powerful 4. The rich and powerful keep learning Latin to keep up to date with news from the other rich and powerful
And in quicksort, we have Hoare’s and Lomuto’s partition schemes. Not that “quicksort” is actually particularly descriptive.
We also have Timsort.
> Even the name "Boolean", could be changed to "Conditional"... and be even more readable
Booleans aren't conditionals, conditionals in crisp binary (or, as it is commonly known, “Boolean”) logic operate on booleans (conditionals in fuzzy or nonbinary crisp logics do not.)
And Shellsort!
In CS, no doubt, we often end up on the other end, where a single term means different things in different contexts and beginners may get confused at our reuse of terminology. Often the reuse gives some metaphorical understanding to the newcomer, even if it largely leads them astray in the details.
I remember when Duff's Device was a neat trick; does anyone still use it these days?
Edit: a neat trick, not a bear trick.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linus%27s_law
>In software development, Linus's law is the assertion that "given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow".
>The law was formulated by Eric S. Raymond in his essay and book The Cathedral and the Bazaar (1999), and was named in honor of Linus Torvalds. [...]
>Validity
>In Facts and Fallacies about Software Engineering, Robert Glass refers to the law as a "mantra" of the open source movement, but calls it a fallacy due to the lack of supporting evidence and because research has indicated that the rate at which additional bugs are uncovered does not scale linearly with the number of reviewers; rather, there is a small maximum number of useful reviewers, between two and four, and additional reviewers above this number uncover bugs at a much lower rate.[4] While closed-source practitioners also promote stringent, independent code analysis during a software project's development, they focus on in-depth review by a few and not primarily the number of "eyeballs".[5]
>The persistence of the Heartbleed security bug in a critical piece of code for two years has been considered as a refutation of Raymond's dictum.[6][7][8][9] Larry Seltzer suspects that the availability of source code may cause some developers and researchers to perform less extensive tests than they would with closed source software, making it easier for bugs to remain.[9] In 2015, the Linux Foundation's executive director Jim Zemlin argued that the complexity of modern software has increased to such levels that specific resource allocation is desirable to improve its security. Regarding some of 2014's largest global open source software vulnerabilities, he says, "In these cases, the eyeballs weren't really looking".[8] Large scale experiments or peer-reviewed surveys to test how well the mantra holds in practice have not been performed.
>Empirical support to the validity of Linus’s law [10] was obtained by comparing popular and unpopular projects of the same organisation. Organizations like Google and Facebook are known for their quality standards. Popular projects are projects with in the top 5% number of stars (7,481 stars or more). The bug identification was measured using the corrective commit probability, ratio of commits detected to fixing bug. The analysis showed that the popular projects had more bug fixing ratio (e.g., Google’s popular projects had 27% higher bug fix rate than Google’s less popular projects). Since it is unlikely that Google lowered its quality standard in it most popular projects, this is an indication of increased bug detection efficiency in popular projects.
Citation needed, especially for Facebook. The parts I saw are full of vile hacks, committed by an endless stream of new clueless devs --- young developers are of course better by the dictum of Mark Zuckerberg. I'm curious how his code looks or if he ever wrote anything substantial.
rank (adj):
1. (of vegetation) growing too thickly and coarsely.
2. having a foul or offensive smell. very unpleasant.
3. (especially of something bad or deficient) complete
and utter (used for emphasis).Yes, I included that one as a joke. "git" is a British slang term. Linus once quipped that he names all his projects after himself.
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filter_(signal_processing)
I've lamented this for a long time, but on the other side, I doubt if mathematicians would ever get sufficient recognition if their names weren't immortalized thus, since they can't get patents on their works. They totally deserve recognition. Would you even remember Leonard Euler if his work was named factually? Most of us I guess have no idea who came up with sin/cos/exp/log etc. I'm glad for the names of these functions, but lament the loss of knowledge about the one (or many) who discovered them.
Longer names are a candidate .. along the lines of "Einstein's theory of general relativity". "Euler's relative prime counting function" .. but they too will likely, depending on familiarity, collapse over time.
edit: If I want to talk about distance in a curved space, we already have a well named "Geodesic distance".
That depends on your native language, though. For Non-English speakers sounds no different than 'Shell sort'.
I don't think it really "proves the point", though, except for the point that sometimes names are confusing. So maybe it would be nicer if someone had happened to consider whether a specific naming might be confusing, but that's not the same as "names that aren't directly descriptive are automatically bad".
Common enough (though there's a diversity of pronunciation and spelling of the name), though for any practical purpose probably "edit distance" works better. (And Hamming distance would probably be better called XOR distance or something.)
Funny coincidence, there was a comment on HN the other day when someone called Euclidean distance "bird distance", and everyone agreed it was a great coinage. I think "Manhattan distance" is similarly evocative, and no less precise than any alternative.
Often the closest thing we do to the whole 'Thurston maps are Thurston-equivalent to polynomials, unless they have Thurston obstructions' thing is that we qualify our statements about programming entities by the programming language or platform to which the statement applies. So you might reasonably have a statement like 'A JSON value consists of an array of JSON values, a map of string keys to JSON values, or a primitive value', which sounds just as self-referential as the Thurston example, but because it's called a JSON value, not a Crockford value, it sounds less conceited.
But back in 1909, it was also the name of the guy who signed the patent. Whose company name was his surname.
I meant it followed the branding pattern, so it happened the brand was derived from the name.
Gaussian noise.
The list in physics could go on for quite a long time. Terms like "gaussian noise" are used as short versions to describe something that would need an entire paragraph if described in a verbose way, as if the reader did not understand the fundamentals of the concept.
At least Gaussian noise is easily googled.
> ... Thus, I thought dynamic programming was a good name. It was something not even a Congressman could object to. So I used it as an umbrella for my activities.
http://www.eng.tau.ac.il/~ami/cd/or50/1526-5463-2002-50-01-0...
Just because it's a common practice does not mean it's good.
"Boolean" and "conditional" are semantically very different, the difference is significant.
The "there can be more than one" is specifically why it's important to call the algorithm Dijkstra. It's possible to look it up in Google or in a textbook and immediately find the algorithm in question. Generic terms don't have that property.
Calling this narcissism does everyone a significant disservice.
It’s not even really narcissism.
Here’s the original paper describing what is now called Dijkstra’s Algorithm: http://www-m3.ma.tum.de/foswiki/pub/MN0506/WebHome/dijkstra.... Note that the algorithm isn’t called that anywhere in the paper. In fact, it’s not even named.
When other people want to discuss that work, they need to call it something, and some natural solutions are “an algorithm proposed by Dijkstra” and, subsequently, “Dijkstra’s Algorithm”, as you can see in this contemporary paper. https://www.ams.org/journals/qam/1970-27-04/S0033-569X-1970-...)
As that second paper shows, you can’t really call it “the Shortest Path Algorithm” because others were developing other approaches for similar problems. “Shortest Path, Assuming All Edge Weights are Non-Negative and You Can Afford to Search Blindly Without a Heuristic, Algorithm” doesn’t really roll off the tongue either.
a) It'd need to be called that by Dijkstra himself to be even arguably narcissistic and
b) The qualifier "Dijsktra's" is important because there are other algorithms for finding a shortest path (Bellman-Ford, Floyd-Warshall, A*), with different trade-offs (Bellman-Ford is slower, but can handle negative weights; Floyd-Warshall gets you all pairs and may be better when the graph is dense). Accordingly, I think the grandparent's suggestion of purely descriptive names isn't feasible.
Unfortunately, we rely on idioms and made-up terms for lots of complicated concepts, but I don’t believe that narcissism is to blame. I believe the magnitude of the number of concepts we need to know about overall is gargantuan, so much so that words would get overloaded if we tried to describe everything accurately. Which would be more confusing than it is now.
Also, you’re assuming a minimum context of knowledge when you say something like “Shortest Path” is a better name for Djikstra’s algorithm. What if you don’t know what a graph is, or know what a graph is but don’t know what a path is? How is Shortest Path any less opaque? There’s no lowest common denominator of knowledge, so having agreed upon terms in a given domain is the only way to remain precise.
Definitely not. The term conditional is used for statements of the form “if X then Y”, in computer science as well as logic/philosophy.
Consider coming up with a descriptive name for LLL basis reduction (where LLL is the initials of the 3 authors) or some other advanced algorithm.
Someone more educated in CS might be able to give better examples.
It's rather that others start calling the concepts by the person's name when discussing the concept or algorithm, after it has been introduced by that person in an article or elsewhere.
It would be good not to accuse others of narcissism when there's actually no narcissism involved.
Edit: omitted part that wasn't constructive
ah, my pet peeve. When I invent my language, a "bool" is going to be a set, closed under the operations "union" and "intersection".
if you want conditionals, you can use zero and nonzero, the way things were always intended.
I strongly disagree that accessibility doesn't really matter. It always matters. Maybe not during draft time, but in the long run. There are strong economic incentives to make things less accessible for non-experts, but in no way does that help advance the field, or force experts to reduce elements to their most basics, it is just rent seeking.
For the most part I agree with you, however there are some notable edge cases where someone's name can be heavily overloaded (e.g. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_things_named_after_L...)
If you use three words, you're in real danger of forming acronyms, but I think two words are a sweet spot.
One side feels the intended audience is of the same field and sufficiently sophisticated enough to understand the somewhat obscure naming. Others don’t understand it because it simply isn’t for them.
The other side may come from other tangential domains with their own unique language. They don’t understand why those specialists use such obscure language meanwhile they do the same in their own field.
You see the same in any large organization. Seemingly random acronyms get created as lazy shorthand that conflict with other orgs understanding. It’s of course no consequence to those in the “in crowd” but it hampers communication between groups. Considering communication is one of the ever present hurdles between groups it seems reasonable to me to optimize communication between groups rather than within groups.
https://www.tek.com/blog/window-functions-spectrum-analyzers
>Hamming and Hanning
>These two similarly-named Hamming and Hanning (more properly referred to as Hann) window functions both have a sinusoidal shape. The difference between them is that the Hanning window touches zero at both ends, removing any discontinuity. The Hamming window stops just shy of zero, meaning that the signal will still have a slight discontinuity.
The Hamming Window is named after Richard Hamming.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Hamming
But the Hanning Window is named after Julius von Hann, and lots of people just throw in an extra "ing" to make them sound alike, but its excruciatingly correct name is Hann Window.
But it seems fitting that they're almost but not quite alike, and so is their spelling. Maybe for symmetry there should be a Halling Window that stops just below zero.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julius_von_Hann
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Window_function#Hamming_window
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hann_function
https://numpy.org/doc/stable/reference/generated/numpy.hanni...
https://numpy.org/doc/stable/reference/generated/numpy.hammi...
Rather, what really happens is that mathematicians are a community, and they refer to things in whatever way is convenient. Davis's colleague refers to such-and-such theorem as "Davis's Theorem" not because of some committee on naming, but rather because they were there at the conference where Davis announced the theorem, and everyone at said conference excitedly talked about "Davis's Theorem" for the whole rest of the conference because it was so exciting.
> Many of these entities have been given simple and ambiguous names such as Euler's function, Euler's equation, and Euler's formula.
> In an effort to avoid naming everything after Euler, some discoveries and theorems are attributed to the first person to have proved them after Euler.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cepstrum
>References to the Bogert paper, in a bibliography, are often edited incorrectly. The terms "quefrency", "alanysis", "cepstrum" and "saphe" were invented by the authors by rearranging some letters in frequency, analysis, spectrum and phase. The new invented terms are defined by analogies to the older terms.
>Thus: The name cepstrum was derived by reversing the first four letters of "spectrum". Operations on cepstra are labelled quefrency analysis (aka quefrency alanysis[1]), liftering, or cepstral analysis. It may be pronounced in the two ways given, the second having the advantage of avoiding confusion with "kepstrum", which also exists (see below). [...]
>The kepstrum, which stands for "Kolmogorov-equation power-series time response", is similar to the cepstrum and has the same relation to it as expected value has to statistical average, i.e. cepstrum is the empirically measured quantity, while kepstrum is the theoretical quantity. It was in use before the cepstrum.[12][13]
If you really want to build knowledge barriers, then yes.
This might have been true decades ago when advanced academic concepts really might have been relevant for a small group of experts - but today, advanced math is the foundation of huge industries - and not everyone working with it can be assumed to have a formal education in the field: Often, you want to make use of an algorithm and simply need to know the concepts necessary to understand that algorithm.
Also, being precise doesn't have to mean being opaque - a name should give an uninformed reader at least enough information to roughly categorize the concept: Even "Timsort" is better than "Tim's algorithm", because this at least gives me a hint that I deal with a sorting algorithm.
For naming things after their inventors, you are very much losing accessibility to outsides (that includes mathematicians working outside the field). I could see the trade-off for clarity (for most people) not being big enough to off-set the loss in accessibility. The easier a field is to get into, the quicker it will grow. Moreover, it also makes the field a lot more fruitful to work in.
It's more that people take material from our fields and misuse them in casual contexts.
>If "contractualism" were just known as "Scanlon's theory" it would be a lot easier.)
It would also be wrong as it isn't his theory, he's just a philosopher with a recent in-vogue formulation of it. The source of the theory in modern western philosophy is Rousseau. There's no issue with discussing "Scanlon's theories"; but that term refers to his theories, not contractualism at large.
Social contract theory is known as contractarianism. [1] (And the source was first Plato, but is best known through Hobbes. Rousseau was then the next best-known iteration after Hobbes.)
But "contractualism" is generally used to refer to T.M. Scanlon's theory specifically. [2]
This is my point. They're too easy to mix up. ;)
The preambles of the articles that you're citing do not agree with your position, neither does a number of other definitions found easily online, neither does the academic publication record (you'll easily find 500+ articles on Contractualism penned before Scanlon).
See: "There is no necessity for a contractarian about political theory to be a contractarian about moral theory, although most contemporary contractarians are both. It has been more recently recognized that there are two distinct strains of social contract thought, which now typically go by the names contractarianism and contractualism."
[...]
"Contractarianism argues that we each are motivated to accept morality “first because we are vulnerable to the depredations of others, and second because we can all benefit from cooperation with others” (Narveson 1988, 148). Contractualism, which stems from the Kantian line of social contract thought, holds that rationality requires that we respect persons, which in turn requires that moral principles be such that they can be justified to each person. Thus, individuals are not taken to be motivated by self-interest but rather by a commitment to publicly justify the standards of morality to which each will be held. Where Gauthier, Narveson, or economist James Buchanan are the paradigm Hobbesian contractarians, Rawls or Thomas Scanlon would be the paradigm Kantian contractualists. The rest of this entry will specifically pertain to the contractarian strain wherever the two diverge."
In other words, this isn't about Scanlon the person, it's about two different schools of thought regarding people and their relationship with society. To dumb them down significantly, one's about the selfish, desperate flight from the state of nature, the other is about the crafting of a persuasive encompassing rationality of co-operation.
----
Also, just as an aside, while this difference might seem like it's a small nitpick, it's actually one of the fundamental theoretical divides between continental European and American/British legal systems. So yes, there's a reason why the terms are distinct.
This is definitely true. It doesn't matter as much as a technical person learning it but at a certain point it becomes absolutely impossible to communicate with regular people not steeped in the terminology about it (e.g. object, property, event, part, substance, sort, kind, type for analytic ontology).
There is also an argument that for experts names are even more accessible than the alternative - if a descriptive name is used but is wrong, then it becomes more confusing. Math already has a problem with overloading common words with special meanings.
I think this trend needs to die, and luckily it seems to be falling out of favor.
Similar to naming companies after the founder. Tesla Motors could easily have been "Musk Motors" if it was started in the era of Ford and Lockheed.
And in what multiverse is "Calabi-Yau manifold" a precise terminology? Literally all that can be gleaned from that is that it's a manifold and it's the invention of some mathematicians (or maybe one mathematician with a hyphenated surname).
> If "contractualism" were just known as "Scanlon's theory" it would be a lot easier.
My disagreement would make diamonds look soft in comparison.
"Contractualism" at least conveys it might have something to do with contracts. "Scanlon's theory" tells me absolutely nothing about what it might be. That is worse by every objective measure.
The term “polymorphism” is a good example. It isn’t named after someone, but could anyone without a background in computer science have any clue what that term actually refers to? Sure, they could examine the root words and try to figure it out, but would they be any closer to the actual meaning of the word?
I don’t think it makes sense to make field-specific jargon accessible to the masses. Instead I think it makes more sense to make it easily researchable and distinct from more commonplace words.
Because it helps me wrap my head around what it is, what it does, and why I should care about it.
And by "me", I more importantly mean a rhetorical "me", i.e. a random layperson who happens to be a politician or someone else with disproportionate power over things like scientific endeavors. More on that in a sec...
> Sure, they could examine the root words [of "polymorphism"] and try to figure it out, but would they be any closer to the actual meaning of the word?
I mean, a little bit, yes. "Poly" = "many", "morph" = "form", "ism" = some kind of state of being, and from that someone could figure out that if something exhibits "polymorphism" it means it has many forms (and this does indeed provide at least some intuitive understanding of e.g. how a function can have many different implementations under the same name, and that implementation being decided by the form of its arguments).
> I don’t think it makes sense to make field-specific jargon accessible to the masses. Instead I think it makes more sense to make it easily researchable and distinct from more commonplace words.
And this is why the masses write off science and "them nerds telling us how the world works" as useless, and in turn why our planet is dying and humanity's decline into stupidity is accelerating. It's precisely why so few people trust science: because they don't understand it, because every effort seems to have been made to make it entirely opaque to anyone without decades of academic background that the vast majority of people cannot afford (schoolwork doesn't put food on the table).
Maybe - just maybe - we could instead try to remove barriers to entry into making STEM some elitist Kool Kids Klub that deems laypeople as unworthy because they don't have the time or energy to memorize the names of a bunch of dead white men, and maybe then we can live in the world we all want: one where science and scientists are taken seriously, and where we don't wait until it's already too late before we even start thinking about addressing a self-induced extinction event.
You are absolutely on point with the contrast to Law; I have degrees in both subjects, and this has also been my experience.
Jargon exists for a reason. The deeper the field, the better the jargon needs to be to allow proper communication. The fact that we can communicate complex mathematical ideas in language at all is a minor miracle.
Because I don't give a shit about who discovered something allegedly first. I do care about what it means/does. Maybe it's a language problem, because some languages make it more easy to add words into a new word describing that new thing.
edit: Otherwise it's just protocol overhead, line noise, gibberish to me.
I she kidding? Off the top of my head: diseases named after people. Parkinson's disease. McArdle's disease. Bell's Palsy, Hodgkin's Lymphoma, ...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_human_anatomical_parts...
In Law, precedents are referred to by plaintiff and defendant names: Smith vs. Klein. There are laws named after people, e.g. in the US. Kirsten's Law; Mann Act; Wetterling Act; Sonny Bono Copyright Extension; ...
Having not read the article, is it possible she’s arguing the similar notion of erasing history because it’s psychologically unbearable for some people?
Wikipedia catalogues two different lists of eponyms in medicine: diseases and symptoms!
“Being awarded an eponym is regarded as an honor: "Eponymity, not anonymity, is the standard."”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_eponymous_diseases
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_eponymous_medical_sign...
My mother always joked you could tell that elastin got named by an assistant while the doctor was out sick.
When law does use descriptive terms it's actively damaging to lay people. Too many laws are written where common words mean something similar to but importantly different from what they mean in the field. So then as a layperson you think you know what is legally required to do, but (surprise!) you don't.
This is why in programming, we're so often suggested to name new things non-descriptive terms. As you replace things and split things out and combine them together, you introduce tons of ambiguity if you name things too descriptively.
I'd read the evolution of math to name things how they do to be a collective choice for precision, rather than a move for people's egos.
We include meaning-words in names. That's why it's "Bell's palsy" and "Feigenbaum constant", and not just "Bell's" or "Feigenbaum".
Such shortenings are possible in a narrowly established context surrounding an informal conversations.
I.e., it's a fake problem that only sounds plausible to outsiders - if you live in the Bay Area, then Mountain View being called Mountain View is the least of your problems in driving to Mountain View.
Jokes aside there are places in the world that name themselves much more intuitively like you described.
Beijing = northern capital
Nanjing = southern capital
Shanghai = on the sea
Hong Kong = fragrant harbor
Xi'an = western peace
Tokyo = eastern capital
Taipei = north Tai
Tainan = south Tai
Taichung = middle Tai
Taitung = east Tai
Shandong = east mountains
Shanxi = west mountains etc.
In the USA there are many places like that as well and it's more obvious, since language hasn't changed since they were named. Ironically the landscape has due to human doing in many cases. Think Thousand Oaks, Walnut Creek, Mill Valley
A sibling post makes the argument that descriptive names would eventually lose the descriptively as language changes. This is very much validated by the German names. However, that took hundreds if not over a thousand years in some cases.
The advantage of descriptive names is that the more you know, the more you can infer despite them being far removed from current language. On the other hand if there isn't a good candidate for a descriptive name, a surname-shaped nonce is better than a misnomer.
* Latin for Broken Bridge
Plenty of similar examples in the United States. West Gate, South Park, Big Ugly Creek. Sometimes it doesn't work out, like how South Charleston, West Virginia is northwest of Charleston.
Related, you can learn a lot about the history of a place by studying maps.
Hartford, New York, Throggs Neck, Kill Van Kill, Schuylkill, Gravesend, Brooklyn, The Bronx, all gain extra meaning if you know a little bit of history.
> Tainan = south Tai
> Taichung = middle Tai
> Taitung = east Tai
> Shandong = east mountains
> Shanxi = west mountains etc.
Not quite. Shandong = "east of the mountain(s)", not "the mountains in the east", and similarly for the others. Note how in Shandong, dong comes second, whereas in Beijing, the north capital, bei comes first.
Shanghai is a weird one. "On the sea" should be haishang. 上海 in another context should mean something like "get onto the sea".
The name is much older than the size.
Wait, does that mean that "shanghaiing" someone is actually a literal description rather than just a reference to a prototypical destination?
It's an English word; it's got nothing to do with Chinese.
Perhaps the biggest historical example of this is Greenland, whose name is said to have been chosen to attract more settlers to a place that is very cold in reality. (The corresponding bit that people like to tell, in which Iceland had its name sabotaged to make Greenland more attractive, is not based in reality.)
It'd be hard to deny that descriptive terms are easier to memorize. Sometimes a piece of natural and/or physical intuition allows such terminology to arise.
Scientist and mathematicians do tend to think about terminology quite frequently: communicating with other scientist and mathematicians is a major part of doing science, and "the reviewers couldn't follow your argument" is a valid, and not especially rare reason for rejected articles in mathematics. Given the amount of thought put into it, "intuitive" names do tend to come about when possible (as it happened with what we now call the Ham Sandwich theorem, the concept of Fibration, the Squeeze Lemma, and countless others).
Given that mathematicians do put thought into terminology, there's often a good reason for not having more intuitive names: maybe no good common-sense intuition was available (e.g. Chu constructions are too general for this sort of thing), or the thing comes up only in highly specialized contexts where it's not worth bothering with it (e.g. Girard's paradox), or there are too many different metaphors that one would have to invoke to describe the situation appropriately, so that it's more efficient to derive a completely new term from an associated name (e.g. Abelian became such an adjective, which now has its own associations).
It's telling that the author criticizes terms like "Calabi-Yau manifold", but doesn't suggest any alternative: coming up with an insightful name that communicates the key properties of such an object, and is easier to use and remember than "Calabi-Yau" is, let's just say, very very hard.
The same phenomenon is not limited to mathematics. Would Dijkstra's algorithm, the Haber–Bosch process or the Otto cycle be easier to learn and remember if they had snappy, insightful names? Probably. But the same concerns apply. It's hard to come up with genuinely better, more descriptive names for these processes. And even if we were successful in popularizing newer, better names, we would find that the names were not the real bottlenecks that made computer science, chemistry or mechanical engineering difficult to master.
The Wikipedia article for Dijkstra's algorithm gives an alternative name of "Shortest Path First", or "SPF algorithm", which I do think is a much better and more descriptive name.
It also made me think of sorting algorithms, which all have wonderfully snappy and descriptive names. I think the world would be a sadder place if – instead of quicksort, mergesort, and heapsort – we had to struggle with opaque names like Hoare sort, Neumann sort, and Williams sort.
Well, bubble, shell, insertion and merge, sure. Quick less so. And then there is Tim...
I recently learned that in Polish, "nagle" can mean "all at once" - not pronounced the same, but still a cute coincidence!
While I agree that precision is necessary, is it really that hard to say something like a complete inner product space vs a Hilbert space? Should we have an argument about whether we should call the triangle inequality the Cauchy-Schwarz or the Kantorovich inequality? How many years did it take to recognize Karush for providing algebraic optimality conditions long before Kuhn and Tucker?
Anyway, outside of general griping about names, very specifically, I have to regularly interact with technical people in other fields and memorizing names is one additional, often superfluous, barrier to their understanding. Even if it's important for someone credit the (supposed) originator outside of a citation, giving an intuitive name for the context would go a long way in improving understanding. For example, the triangle inequality from Cauchy and Schwarz or the algebraic optimality conditions from Karush, Kuhn, and Tucker.
By the way, I'll also mention that the majority of other mathematicians that I know don't feel this way and prefer using names after people. I understand; I just disagree.
imo, "Hilbert space" is a lot easier to read, you really only have to recognize the guy's name, it's a fairly easily recognizable word. "Complete inner product space" has me look more closely at more words, and it's all extremely boring-looking words so they don't even stand out in a block of text.
Now that I have a job a similar problem appeared with translations, Microsoft has this annoying habit of translating useful technical error messages and many times the error in Spanish doesn't yield any useful information on Google searches (if at all) so I'm again having to guess-translate terms into their original form.
But I think it's important to keep Teichmuller around as a reminder of the important lesson (especially around here) that mathematical genius does mean that everything one says on all topics is logically or morally correct.
As Teichmuller wrote: > I am not concerned with making difficulties for you as a Jew, but only with protecting – above all – German students of the second semester from being taught differential and integral calculus by a teacher of a race quite foreign to them. I, like everyone else, do not doubt your ability to instruct suitable students of whatever origin in the purely abstract aspects of mathematics. But I know that many academic courses, especially the differential and integral calculus, have at the same time educative value, inducting the pupil not only to a conceptual world but also to a different frame of mind. But since the latter depends very substantially on the racial composition of the individual, it follows that a German student should not be allowed to be trained by a Jewish teacher.[8]
Star-autonomous category constructions?
> Girard's paradox
Provability paradox?
> Calabi-Yau manifold
Smooth n-dimensional complex manifold?
> Dijkstra's algorithm
Shortest-path-first algorithm? (I'm cheating here because this is literally an already-common alternative name for it)
> Haber–Bosch process
Ammonia synthesis loop? (Also cheating here, since the "Ammonia production" Wikipedia article uses this exact terminology)
> Otto cycle
Four-stroke cycle? (Cheating yet again, since Wikipedia states: "This is why the four-stroke principle today is commonly known as the Otto cycle and four-stroke engines using spark plugs often are called Otto engines.")
Non-Otto four-stroke cycles abound (cf. Diesel cycle); new industrial methods for ammonia synthesis come into existence every few years and there's not much point in singling one out and calling it _the_ ammonia synthesis loop. The case of shortest-path algorithms has been thoroughly discussed upthread. Your suggestion for Calabi-Yau and Girard's paradox are not coherent with the meanings of these terms.
No big deal: giving a purer meaning to the words of the tribe is not easy, and requires deep domain expertise. And those with deep domain expertise do think about this task, have some strong incentives to think about it (teaching evaluations factor into promotion and tenure) and generally do fairly well at it.
(Startup idea: your-jargon-reform-is-bad as a service, backed by GPT-3?)
The last three, like I mentioned, were pretty much direct from Wikipedia.
But yeah, I'm under no pretense that these are necessarily correct. My only point is that we can surely do better than "$person $thing" for nomenclature. The Otto cycle is a perfect example; sure, "four stroke cycle" might be too broad, but "spark-ignited four stroke cycle" (maybe abbreviated to SI4C) doesn't seem to be (there are technically other such cycles, but the vast majority of the time people talk about a spark -ignited four-stroke cycle they're talking about an Otto cycle or some evolution thereof).
Some people, though, have so many things named after them that Googling for concepts can become challenging. In my thesis, I needed to use something called the Steiner point, which is sometimes also called the Steiner curvature centroid, although I didn't know about this name at first. For a convex set K, this is the limit, as R goes to infinity, of Bar(K + B(0,R)), where Bar(L) denotes the barycenter of L. This is the unique continuous map S on convex sets with the two properties
(i) S(K) is in K for all K
(ii) S(aK + bL) = a S(K) + b S(L).
It is also the map on convex sets satisfying (i) which has the smallest possible Lipschitz constant when the space of compact convex sets is endowed with the Hausdorff metric.
It took me a while to get a thorough enough grasp on the literature to learn these things, though, because when you Google "Steiner point", you mostly get stuff about a triangle center, also named after Steiner, which is a totally different concept. It's not that I thought this other triangle center was the Steiner curvature centroid, it was that I literally didn't know what to search for in order to get results on the Steiner point I was interested in.
As an aside, the Steiner curvature centroid has a perfectly reasonable interpretation in terms of the "curvature" of a triangle. For a convex set in the plane with smooth boundary, the Steiner curvature centroid is equal to the barycenter of the probability measure on the boundary weighted proportionally to the curvature. Given a triangle, take a sequence of smooth convex sets converging in Hausdorff metric to the triangle, and the limit of the Steiner points of these will converge to the following thing: the average of the vertices of the triangle weighted proportionally to pi - the angle. This is the analogue of the barycenter of the curvature-weighted perimeter for triangles.
I see now, rereading, that you were in fact making two points. First, that understanding the definition dwarfs learning the name. (I'd argue that a better name won't make you instantly understand a definition, but it can help but the very example of Steiner point vs Steiner curvature centroid.) Second, that sometimes multiple defintions and theorems are named for the same person, which causes confusion. So you were making a for-and-against argument.
Steller's jay, Steller's eider, Steller's sea eagle, Steller's sea cow, Steller's sea lion, and the Stellera genus of flowing plants. Oh, also the mineral Stellerite. He's also in the scientific names of a couple others: Cryptochiton stelleri (a marine mollusc) and Atremisia stelleriana (a plant in the sunflower family). And a school: Steller Secondary School in Anchorage, Alaska.
The best discussion I've seen of this topic is in the 1st chapter (which is fortunately freely accessible and concise) of this excellent programming book:
https://leanpub.com/elementsofclojure/read_sample
Relevant excerpt:
> Most natural names have a rich, varied collection of senses.3 To avoid ambiguity we must use synthetic names, which have no intuitive sense in the context of our code.
> Category theory is a rich source of synthetic names. ‘Monad’, to most readers, means nothing. As a result, we can define it to mean anything. Synthetic names turn comprehension into a binary proposition: either you understand it or you don’t. Between experts, synthetic names can be used to communicate without ambiguity. Novices are forced to either learn or walk away.
> Conversely, a natural name is at first understood as one of its many senses. Everyone understands, more or less, what an id is. In a large group, however, these understandings might have small but important differences. These understandings are refined, and gradually converge, through examination of the documentation and code. At the cost of some ambiguity, novices are able to participate right away.
> Natural names allow every reader, novice or expert, to reason by analogy. Reasoning by analogy is a powerful tool, especially when our software models and interacts with the real world. Synthetic names defy analogies,4 and prevent novices from understanding even the basic intent behind your code. Choose accordingly.
Two of those things are not named after a person, and none of them are understandable without special training. Naming something after a person doesn't make it any harder to understand unless there are multiple things named after that person and you can't figure out which they mean from the context.
In case you're wondering about those structures, here is what Wikipedia has to say about them:
- A Riemannian manifold "is a real, smooth manifold, M, equipped with a positive-definite inner product g_p on the tangent space T_p M at each point p."
- "A complex manifold is a manifold with an atlas of charts to the open unit disk in C^n, such that the transition maps are holomorphic."
- "A symplectic manifold is a smooth manifold, M, equipped with a closed nondegenerate differential 2-form ω, called the symplectic form."
The only thing in the above descriptions accessible to non-specialists is probably that the Riemannian manifold is probably named after that guy that they heard of in calculus class. Let's not get rid of our ability to honor people in a failed attempt to make the communication more effective. You can call a Riemannian manifold or a Kähler manifold whatever you want, but it's not going to prevent someone from having to spend years before they are able to understand them.
I think we should honor mathematicians less with eponymous theorems (prestige culture is toxic), but I agree it shouldn't be done at the expense of worse communication.
On the other hand, we know far more about the lives of Fermat, Euler, Gauss, Riemann, and Newton. While we can't owe all of the work of historians to eponymous topics, the use of their names in everyday mathematics helps to keep their memory alive so that new generations of people may be interested in learning about the history of mathematics.
As for long-dead mathematicians... theorems are still being named to this day for living people. I think the glory we attach to discoverer of the mathematics diminishes the glory of the mathematics.
Imagine C++ would be named as "Object oriented, generic, general purpose programming language with C compatibility"(of course C won't be named C then).
Java has Turing complete generics as well
C, D, F, R, COM, .NET, node ...
Swift (the bird; Google eventually gives me https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/swift, but that page thinks it’s more common as a name of a lizard than as the name of a bird, so Google’s small preview says “Definition of swift · 1 : any of several lizards (especially of the genus Sceloporus) that run swiftly · 2 : a reel for winding yarn…”)
On-off switches. Or conditionals. Or bits (depending on implementations). Or truthy/falsey values.
> Turing Machines
Symbolic tape machines.
> Bolzmann machines
Hidden-unit binary threshold networks.
> Markov Chains
Cumulative event probability chains.
> Liskov Substitution Principle
Instance Substitution Principle.
> ISO 8601 dates
Big-endian dates (or simply YYYY-MM-DD dates).
> the MIT and BSD licenses
n-clause copycenter licenses.
Truth values.
> Turing Machines
Tape automata. (Though there are a lot of variants.)
> Liskov Substitution Principle
Behavioral subtyping. Even Liskov calls it this, but "SOBID" doesn't have the same ring to it. (BOIDS?)
> ISO 8601
Lexicographic dates. (ISO 8601 also specifies ordinal dates, with day of year (i.e. YYYY-DDD), but the "big endian" ordering principle is still accurate.)
Although "ISO 8601" tells you what specification describes it, which is a lot better than widgets named after people.
As someone with a degree in pure math, I can tell you, we had Turing machines, Boolean networks and Markov chains coming out of our ears. These are not programming concepts; all of these people were mathematicians/physicians who lived before computers even existed. This is just reaffirming the point that mathematicians tend to name things after each other.
> Liskov Substitution Principle
Actually, this is the only instance of a "truly" programming concept named after a person that I know of. And by "truly", I mean that a mathematician does not benefit from knowing this (would probably even write it off as "trivial"). It really is about the art of designing programs. Well, at least it has "substitution" in its name. Not like a Noetherian ring, which is just the opposite of an Artinian ring :D
Licenses belong to law. And ISO is not run by programmers either (for Christ's sake, they have a standard for A CUP OF TEA). This goes to show how much of a polymath a programmer has to be. Reminds me of this fun little rant: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1311_05-08_mickens.pdf
Stigler's law [1] also exists, and I have found far too many eponyms to be named after people who had nothing to do with the concept (and sometimes they did not want their name attached to it even).
Eponyms have the advantage of being short and simple. Descriptive names can be pretty wordy. Take "Mach number" as an example. Surely I can call it the "ratio of the velocity to the speed of sound", but that's pretty much the definition at that point. "Mach number" saves a lot of space. Terms like "sonic number" or "sonic ratio" could also work, but everyone already knows what the "Mach number" is, so there is no point in introducing a new word needlessly and sowing confusion (in my opinion).
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stigler%27s_law_of_eponymy
Some more modern examples than "isosceles":
- Heaviside function → step function (edit: though maybe this one is, amusingly, already descriptive by accident?)
- Fourier domain → frequency domain
While I'm here, just a couple suggestions from me:
- Markov chain → memoryless chain
- Lebesgue integral → horizontal integral
You repeat this operation to get more and more (but always a fixed constant maximum) history.
Also see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memorylessness ("memorylessness refers to the Markov property")
All I'm doing is suggesting just using the existing description as the name itself.
Even if there were some cases where it wouldn't apply, though, it wouldn't really matter. Fourier domain also applies to things other than time but that doesn't make frequency domain a bad term. It's just a name meant to carry some intuition; that's all. It's not meant to serve as the formal definition.
Though that example brings up a decent counterargument to the thesis: ”groups”, ”rings” and ”fields” all have descriptive names, but that doesn’t help a bit, they’re still mad confusing. They’d almost be easier to pick apart if they were named after people.
Interesting point! So like we'd rename group theory to Galois theory? :)
'Horizontal integrals' does not work. It refers to one way of visualising functions (and even then, only of 1 or 2 variables, and only with specific conventions), and not to the integral itself.
We already have "left" and "right" Riemann sums...
It’s not a general concept like Riemann (or Lebesgue) integrals.
The situation isn't much better in computer science, where now when you look up half the simple nouns in the dictionary, you get some language, tool, or javascript library claiming it.
I think beginners are looking for shortcuts, can I reduce this complicated thing into something I already know? And the truth is, you can't, if you could, it would be a trivial concept and there'd probably be nothing interesting about it to learn in the first place.
Similar != Same
And treating similar things as same is the source of a lot of error and confusion and misinterpretation.
If its just to help a beginner at first with a little bit of understanding, you can just say X is a bit like Y, but also very different in really important ways so forget most of what you assume about X, because Y does not work like X, even though it has relations to it.
Of course people could learn them eventually.. but what's the advantage? It's much easier to understand the relationship between an unsigned & signed integer vs. a Karson and an Aisling.
I experienced a form of this firsthand when interning at IBM quite awhile ago. They used unnecessary acronyms for everything and it was amazing how much it slowed down onboarding compared to other tech companies. Even for the regular employees it was crazy how much time was wasted at meetings and e-mail back & forth clarifying needless abbreviations.
Been many years since I went to uni and haven't used much of the math since, but I still recall the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, what the Kronecker product is and how to do Taylor expansion.
All the examples given are of trivial things. Isoceles triangles and Fermat's last theorem. Both things you can explain in a sentence.
Let's look at something with "mnemonic names": groups, rings and fields. Quickly by just looking at the name which one is the most generic and which most specific.
Maths already involves a ludicrous amount of rote memorization, I'm not sure that using some guy's name is the hard problem. Internalizing all its nuance is.
How did you come up with this number? You took 100,000 samples and 99,999 of them agreed? I don't personally know 100,000 mathematicians.
But let’s make an experiment. Let an average high school student memorize these names:
A Calabi-Yau manifold is a compact, complex Kähler manifold with a trivial first Chern class.
And now let her explain what the above definition is about.
It seems like the experimental procedure would require definitions at least several layers deep, the control based on real names and experimental group based another metric. Maybe the experimental groups names would be more closely tied to the structure of the math they were naming though that seems challenging.
The foundations of algebraic geometry were basically rewritten in the 1960s by Alexander Grothendieck, perhaps the greatest mathematician of the 20th century. He found names to be extremely important, and many of the basic objects that he developed have very carefully conceived and suggestive names: schemes, stacks, topoi, etale morphisms, dessins d'enfant,... none of which will I attempt to define here. But all of these have stuck.
On the other hand, things other than the foundations of the subject? Sure, name it after who did it. Suggestive names aren't really possible for most stuff.
A "Kähler manifold" exists, as a name, because there is no way to fully describe what it is (and bring forward in the reader all the corresponding context) in two or three words. Using a long sentence (full of things that could themselves be artificial labels, recursively) instead would be a waste of everyone's time.
If one can use a short descriptive name for something, then it's not a name, it's just the thing, and everyone refer to it directly. And when you can't, or when you want to indicate its importance, or you want to neatly package all the relevant context about it, all the mathematical baggage that should come with it in something short, then the pretty obvious thing to do it to abstract it away and stick a label on top.
It doesn't really matter whether they use mathematicians, flower names or characters from The Lord of The Rings, as long as it's unique enough, in context, then it's fine. The names become part of the vocabulary of the field, just as much as supposed "descriptive" names. All those "descriptive" names have to be precisely defined too anyway, because they carry natural-language connotations, assumptions, and so on, that just don't apply.
If all we want is uniqueness, we could just number theorems and concepts using GUIDs.
Might as well abdicate and embrace the fact math is going to be automated, and all mathematical objects are just abstract constructs devoid of meaning that can be referred to by arbitrary labels.
But it seems like there's more to it.
The names of mathematicians are interesting for the genealogy of theorems... but they're also completely opaque about their semantics.
Is it not possible to think a system could make math more intuitive by relying on a more structured nomenclature?
Seven favorite cave names: Abisso "Queen Mama", Big Cave with Bats, Cave of the Swords, Eisriesenwelt (world of the ice giants), Hell Below, Lemon Drop, Mad As A Wet Hen Pit
Nice caves, but seven names that could use some help: Carroll Cave, Ellison's Cave, Fitton Cave, Kartchner Caverns, Lehman Cave, Lilburn Cave, Russell Cave
Skip to 5:10 to see Peter Scholze apologize for the name: https://youtu.be/J0QdTYZIfIM
This makes it hard to choose generic names from the get-go since the first person to use name might not attach it to the best concept for it, making it unavailable for the best concept for the name to describe.
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I've always imagined people's names in concept names to be a shorthand for the papers that defined them. Eg. "Calabi-yau manifold" is just another way to write "manifolds as described by calabi and Yau in <well known paper>" and importing all the detailed definitions from that paper. To get the same from properties from a generic name, you need to get a canonical definition that everyone agrees with
But speaking practically, it’s by far the beat option in many cases. There might be a small number of basic concepts (like dodecahedron or inverse) that can be given actually descriptive names, but for anything even slightly complex it’s impossible, so we end up with a mixture of almost nonsensical and often confusing “descriptive” names, and concepts named after people.
Is it harder to remember and distinguish “Hamiltonian”, “Dirac delta” or “Lagranian” than “cohomology”, “homomorphic” and “homeomorphic”?
Having said that, in many cases the names are quite evocative, like “fibre-bundle”.
While I agree with your overall point, I must note that you did write Lagranian instead of Lagrangian ;)
And these are not hard concepts as far as maths goes.
But on the other hand, names are simply irrelevant. Anything is better than a name of a person, even if that person was brilliant. The person may be remembered as an aspect of some discovery (say, Einstein), but the concept as such should have some distinct name, not tainted by history, or mere human lifetimes. It should transcend existence as experienced by a human.
"Hestenes is adamant about calling this mathematical approach “geometric algebra” and its extension “geometric calculus,” rather than referring to it as “Clifford algebra”."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hestenes#Geometric_algeb...
Unfortunately, this should really be called algebraic geometry, but that name is already taken by another field...
Rational numbers
Real numbers
Imaginary numbers
Complex numbers(including imaginary numbers)
Hypercomplex numbers
Hyper real numbers
Surreal numbersI found this statement in "How to Write Mathematics" (https://bookstore.ams.org/hwm):
"... surely I cannot stop without a discourse on the proper naming of concepts (why 'commutator' is good and 'set of the first category' is bad) and the proper way to baptize theorems (why 'the closed graph theorem' is good and 'the Cauchy-Buniakowksy-Schwarz theorem' is bad)."
I thought he'd said more in "I Want to be a Mathematician" (https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9780387960784), but I just looked through the book and couldn't find anything. (Halmos was a particularist, and thought very highly of examples, and "I Want to be a Mathematician" has examples/opinions of how to do nearly everything in the profession, from teaching to writing to being a department chair to giving talks to doing research ... He was very opinionated, but also specific and absolutely clear, so at least if you disagree with him you know what you're disagreeing about.)
To be fair, I do actually think some math jargon is unnecessarily complex and we could do better, and that it is something that actually matters. And I do think, for instance, that "commutative group" is better than "abelian group", since it is descriptive, unlike the latter. But this rarely is the culprit. Kähler manifold is called after Kähler, because he is the one who introduced such a thing, and we don't really have any better name to describe it. (And it wasn't Kähler who named it after himself too.) Can she propose a better name? I'm curious to hear it, but she conveniently skips that issue in her musings. If not, this whole argument of hers is just silly, as is thinking that "monster group" is a "cool name". It is not cool, it's rather awful, it's called that precisely because we don't have a clue WTF this thing is, and I sincerely hope that some 300 years later we'll have a much better understanding of group theory to rewrite all that stuff and to see that "monster group" is not such a "monster" after all, but quite a natural thing, that can be described conveniently and assigned some proper name.
So if we want to improve the landscape, let's rather start small, by abandoning π in favor of ½τ. Let's see how many centuries that will take.
> Why not call it a Reimann-Hamilton manifold
I'm not sure if this is top-notch sarcasm or not, but I'll upvote just to be safe.
Also, let's not talk about the LaTeX-fraction hell we enter when using τ. (π/3, π/4... are bad enough but don't appear all that often in core formulae). In fact, let's use δ=π/180. Then Eulers formula becomes a nice e^(180δi)=-1! This also solves the degrees/radians problem, use the constant °=δ=π/180. sin(180°) is then 0.
The mathematicians should have invented and standardise the notation that can be expressed as the plaintext decades ago.
It must be called the "mathematicians should stop naming things after each other" law!
Statements and theorems are extremely dense with information, where every word might have a it's own area of study.
Of a problem may begin with something benign like, the following function is blah blah, but even then, the term function is well defined, and you may need to know the intricacies of functions to be able to solve the problem.
Something like "Djikstra's Algorithm" is too vague. Maybe if it were something like "Djikstra's Path", it would be easier to understand.
It took me about 3 months to realize that i’d known what “ReLu activation” was for a decade by another established name.
I don't think medicine or law are the best examples to use here unless you think Sarbanes-Oxley or the anterior medial malleolar artery are well named.
I think when people name things, unless they are very narcistic, should be having that sole purpose in mind.
This comment by xamuel relatably describes what people usually do when naming things https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24386695
> Rather, what really happens is that mathematicians are a community, and they refer to things in whatever way is convenient. Davis's colleague refers to such-and-such theorem as "Davis's Theorem" not because of some committee on naming, but rather because they were there at the conference where Davis announced the theorem, and everyone at said conference excitedly talked about "Davis's Theorem" for the whole rest of the conference because it was so exciting.
The arguments that say names should be self descriptive is only a part of the discussion.
There's the name overloading problem, where we only have a limited set of existing descriptor which can cause two object name to conflict.
There's the memorability aspect.
There's the homophonic / homographic problem where multiple names could be perceived differently.
There's the complexity aspect. The more complex an information, the harder it is to write an accurate name.
There's context aspect.
There's the extreme connotation aspect. Some words triggers extreme emotional response to someone.
There's the dependency aspect where people have been using a name for years.
All in all, naming things are hard problem. But the important thing is naming things should be done for the sake of naming things in mind. If naming things is done primarily for other agenda, like someone's glory, the result might be questionable.
Assuming that people are naming things for the right cause, problems that arise from names should not be attributed to naming process. For example the article author's problem might be simply caused by the complexity of the information referred by the name.
Edit: grammar and formatting
So when I learn about and need to recall “isostatic rebound” and not “the Chip Dipson Effect” it just eliminates an entire layer of key lookup and parsing I have to do.
However, coming up with simple names is incredibly difficult. It's easy to write a 10,000 word on a complicated topic, but incredibly difficult to squish it into a few letters.
>"Why do mathematicians continue to proffer and accept this courtesy, when it increases their own mental load and makes their own work more opaque?" (the OP) //
I imagine because it doesn't increase their mental load? It might even reduce it; abstraction is a principle component of the field after all.
Using descriptive names sounds like it requires a half-arsed disabstraction, a series of munged verbose partial truths?
Naming for authors is partially self-documenting too, though practically that's probably not often useful.
This is the first time that reading about math has made me hungry.
Entropy
Conway just referred to it as a monster while corresponding with Fischer and the name stuck.
My current employer uses atlassian confluence for that. So if you don't know what is this server "potato1" with 7 docker containers for, you can type "potato1" in confluence and hopefully get an answer.
Maybe in big companies they use homebrew solutions for this
https://expeditedsecurity.com/aws-in-plain-english/
Azure naming is comparatively more pedestrian.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y8OnoxKotPQ [this is a link comedy video about microservice architectures, it should be safe for work except maybe for Uber employees]
This is how I feel every day in my new job, there are 3 (depreciated) ways to do everything, and the current way is never feature-complete.
And of course... naming remains one of the hardest things to do in any field.
This is precisely how knowledge is built, one thing on top of another. Naming would not have solved this "manifold" issue, in fact in would have obscured the root of that bit of knowledge.
In short, the author's real problem isn't names, is that they don't fully appreciate the way knowledge is built with ever more complex layers of abstraction.
Also many of the people who are doing their PhD dream of one day having a theorm named after them.
It always trips up my mental English parser when someone says "the Hamiltonian" and I'm always like "the Hamiltonian what? what is or isn't Hamiltonian?"
As noted in a sibling comment, Ethiopian and Libertarian are both also nouns. As are lots of things ending in -ian, some also adjectives, some not (mathematician, statistician, magician, parliamentarian, crossopterygian, historian, librarian, fruitarian,...)
If you want good Italian [food], you might ask an Italian [person] to translate some Italian [text] you saw in a restaurant review.
You name things after who discovered it. In these case you name it after mathematicians like Newton, Euler, Turing, Gödel. For me its some sort of ignorance if you do not honor the one who discovered it.
Other sciences has it too named after persons Fahrenheit, Celsius, Pascal etc.
Edit: you added a link to a pg essay about self-censorship. Pretty droll excuse to not say what you mean.
I don’t. What is this article really about?
It’s about erasing white male names/dominance/influence/privilege/?? from math history.
And let's look at that pg article. Is discussing the ergonomics of naming things in math taboo? Is it taboo for everybody, or just people of certain demographics?