This means redundancy is written down by MBAs as excess capacity. It means assets are stretched to far nearer their safe limits than was ever envisaged previously. This ironically reduces their safe working life (in many cases), but this problem is cast along the road - in markets where providers re-tender regularly to continue to operate, that means it's a problem for the next franchise holder.
The incentives just aren't there to encourage creation of new redundancy. Existing redundancy won't be removed (as that would cost more!), but the long term outcome of this kind of "regulated private provider" system seems to be systemic under-investment in capital assets, with a view to deferring the problem until another time.
Another big challenge is that often the regulators for energy companies are "market" regulators, and therefore staffed by expert economists, rather than expert engineers. This further perpetuates the myth you can maintain and run critical national infrastructure with an economics degree and a calculator, and means the regulator tends to focus solely on economics, while assuming any issues with technology are fixed through economic incentives. Often they aren't, as the cost of a systemic black swan event is multiplied out by its likelihood, and the end result is to take no action while enjoying the profits today.
At least the above is based on my experience in trying to get energy market regulators to understand security and the issues of their regulator approach.
And please no one waste our time by claiming that the military has some secret magic EMP technology. The laws of physics impose severe constraints on what can be achieved with conventional explosives in a weapon small enough to put in an airplane or truck.
If your choice is completely annihilating one city, or destroying even just 10% of computers (including industrial control systems) in 50% of the country, which do you think causes more damage?
Destroying even a small fraction of individual computers makes most larger systems inoperable.
Without industrial control systems, power plants can't operate. Without power, cities become unsurvivable for a majority of the population within days, industrial output becomes effectively zero, and immediate issues like starvation and resulting unrest become a much bigger priority than fighting a war. Most importantly, recovery efforts will be extremely slow without power. How do you call the supplier, or other places that might have spares, when there is no phone network, no cell phones, no Internet? How do you call the experts that could diagnose which of the hundreds or thousands of control components need swapping? How do they get the fuel for their vehicle to get to you? And food and water to survive until you put everything into place? And safety so they don't get murdered by the looters?
According to http://www.empcommission.org/docs/A2473-EMP_Commission-7MB.p..., a peak field strength of 15 kV/m is expected to cause permanent damage to computer equipment. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_electromagnetic_pulse#... shows a single explosion (of unspecified yield) covering most of the US with a 25 kV/m field.
> which is the very act that triggers a full scale nuclear response because of launch-on-warning.
AFAIK the US doesn't practice launch-on-warning. Even if it did, a peaceful low earth orbit satellite launch is hard to distinguish from a not-so-peaceful low earth orbit nuke launch (unlike a conventional ICBM that's supposed to come back down). It would likely still result in nuclear retaliation, but if e.g. a dictator was already being invaded by the US, they don't necessarily have much to lose.
Again, the threat of an EMP attack is absurd, perpetuated by fundamentally not serious people.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/21/electromagnetic-pulses-...
Then tell me, where is the difference between North Korea saying "we will be launching this peaceful satellite of peace" and launching a spy satellite, and North Korea saying the same and launching a nuke satellite? Same orbit, same weight, contents kept secret to the best of their ability (and possibly swapped last minute in secret), same orbital timer to trigger it, only difference is whether it takes pictures or goes boom.
> and about the US launch on warning policy
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-11/news/clinton-issues-... states:
Bell pointed out that while the United States has always had the "technical capability" to implement a policy of launch on warning, it has chosen not to do so. "Our policy is to confirm that we are under nuclear attack with actual detonations before retaliating," he said.
> https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/21/electromagnetic-pulses-....
This just says that a nuclear EMP attack would start nuclear war (or rather, nuclear retaliation if the EMP nuke was the only one the attacking country had/could deliver).
An EMP attack by Russia is indeed unlikely.