By contrast, Microsoft had 95% market share during their antitrust suit. [3]
[1] https://www.counterpointresearch.com/us-market-smartphone-sh...
[2] https://www.counterpointresearch.com/global-smartphone-share...
[3] https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=179876183890909...
Secondly, the fallacy here is that people, like yourself, keep conflating the smartphone manufacturing or operating system markets with the individual software markets that developed around each platform. Mac software doesn't "compete" with Windows software because people tend to have one device or the other. That software is what makes the platforms themselves competitive between each other, yes, but the actual software industry that's dependent on them is not competitive across those platforms. They are competing with apps within their particular platform, including the purveyors they have to go through (e.g. Apple and Google). You wouldn't say that the Bear notes app on iOS is competing with the Scarlet Notes app on Android because they're in different markets. Instead, Bear is competing with Apple Notes. Even if we are to go by your 14%, that's 14% of 3.5 billion people. IMO, that's such a large amount that it should be considered it's own market, but that has to be determined by a court.
No one is arguing "monopoly" of mobile smartphones here. They're arguing a monopoly specifically of iOS software distribution. The Microsoft case wasn't in relation to other web browser developers, but of other operating systems and of manufacturers because they leveraged their market share to illegally maintain their monopoly in that regard. Their monopoly was their monopoly of the Windows operating system, not the Internet Explorer web browser. What's being argued here is that Apple is leveraging their power, or distribution monopoly, over the entire iOS software market, not "smartphone" software in general, to gatekeep competition of software and software distribution while also profiting from that gatekeeping.
This is going to come down to how a court interprets this because antitrust isn't as cut and dry as other areas of law, especially now that individual markets are not so easily distinguishable in the current tech world.
That's fair, however I don't believe web usage is the correct metric to use either. In any case the numbers are still a far cry from the 95% Microsoft held during their antitrust case.
> Mac software doesn't "compete" with Windows software because people tend to have one device or the other.
By that logic Nintendo games don't "compete" with Xbox or Playstation games. I disagree with this narrowly defined view of the market in which Nintendo games, Xbox games, and Playstation games are viewed as competing in three separate markets, instead of competing in the overall video game market.
> They're arguing a monopoly specifically of iOS software distribution.
I disagree that this is a valid antitrust market and I think Epic is going to have a hard time convincing a court to accept this narrow market definition. US courts generally frown upon treating aftermarkets of a single brand's product as a valid antitrust market unless specific circumstances are met.
Those circumstances usually involve situations where the consumer lacks information about aftermarket restrictions or policies when the original product is purchased. In this case, iPhone customers know when they buy an iPhone that they will only be able to install apps via the App Store. If they are unhappy with this limitation they have an option of buying a different phone without such limitations. If they decide to go ahead and buy anyway, they did so knowingly, therefore antitrust liability is not likely in those circumstances.
> This is going to come down to how a court interprets this
I think many people are going to be disappointed by this. Aftermarket scenarios are not uncommon in antitrust law and the existing precedent is not in Epic's favor.
> Courts do not require a literal monopoly before applying rules for single firm conduct; that term is used as shorthand for a firm with significant and durable market power — that is, the long term ability to raise price or exclude competitors. That is how that term is used here: a "monopolist" is a firm with significant and durable market power. Courts look at the firm's market share, but typically do not find monopoly power if the firm (or a group of firms acting in concert) has less than 50 percent of the sales of a particular product or service within a certain geographic area.
[1] https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-a...
Apple has more active users in the US than Android btw.
The fallacy being repeated is actually people defining monopolies by referencing market share.
Following Alcoa and American Tobacco, courts typically have required a dominant market share before inferring the existence of monopoly power. The Fifth Circuit observed that "monopolization is rarely found when the defendant's share of the relevant market is below 70%."(22) Similarly, the Tenth Circuit noted that to establish "monopoly power, lower courts generally require a minimum market share of between 70% and 80%."(23) Likewise, the Third Circuit stated that "a share significantly larger than 55% has been required to establish prima facie market power"(24) and held that a market share between seventy-five percent and eighty percent of sales is "more than adequate to establish a prima facie case of power."(25)
It is also important to consider the share levels that have been held insufficient to allow courts to conclude that a defendant possesses monopoly power. The Eleventh Circuit held that a "market share at or less than 50% is inadequate as a matter of law to constitute monopoly power."(26) The Seventh Circuit observed that "[f]ifty percent is below any accepted benchmark for inferring monopoly power from market share."(27) A treatise agrees, contending that "it would be rare indeed to find that a firm with half of a market could individually control price over any significant period."(28)
Some courts have stated that it is possible for a defendant to possess monopoly power with a market share of less than fifty percent.(29) These courts provide for the possibility of establishing monopoly power through non-market-share evidence, such as direct evidence of an ability profitably to raise price or exclude competitors. The Department is not aware, however, of any court that has found that a defendant possessed monopoly power when its market share was less than fifty percent.(30) Thus, as a practical matter, a market share of greater than fifty percent has been necessary for courts to find the existence of monopoly power.(31)
https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-...