(All of the below assumes that a bank is involved, as banks are the subjects of the relevant regulations. If a bank isn't involved -- which is rarely the case -- anything goes.)
> Swiss, Czech bearer instrument companies were a thing pretty recently. Cypriot trusts were a thing just a few years ago (maybe still are?).
Not sure about the bearer instrument part (especially with the Czech Republic being subject to EU rules), but I'm quite familiar with the Cypriot trusts, and (1) banks must know their Beneficial Owners and (2) those BOs do get reported to their home countries with FATCA resp. CRS reporting.
And of course, you're right -- there are still ways to get around them. But those ways have become increasingly difficult, to the point where many banks simply don't bother with that business segment anymore because the headaches outweigh the potential profits. Getting past a red flag, while operating legally is not impossible, but why bother.
> The whole subthread is somewhat meaningless in the context of the article, though, because it would be ridiculous to expect Lebanon to have the same level of insight into company ownership as say, Austria, Germany, or the US.
That's a fair argument. I have to admit that I interpreted the question more in the sense that someone (not necessarily Lebanon) should have this information.
> Offshore means tax optimization, and anonymous companies may be nothing more than an attempt at keeping competition from guessing your game plan. E.g. real estate investors. I suppose those might be red flags in countries with funny ideas about taxation (the US, parts of Europe).
Hiding something from the competition, or other nosy parties, is my best guess as well. There are legitimate ways of optimizing taxes, but it's become increasingly difficult to hide assets from your home government. (The running joke is that the United States is the last tax haven, as it's the only country not to share information with other countries.)
> I take it you haven't heard about the HSBC's drug cartel money laundering? From the perspective of a small business, stuff like that makes KYC/AML look like unneeded and annoying security theatre.
I'm familiar with that one, and many others. Wirecard in my opinion still stands by far because there were credible reports of malfeasance going back years, and BaFin went after the reporters instead.
As I said earlier, these laws can't prevent crime, they can only deter it. You're still going to have bad actors, at many possible levels (even at the C-level, as we saw with Wirecard).
It's just become increasingly difficult, with diminishing payoffs. Coming back to the original statement I was challenging: doing shady stuff post-9/11 was far more difficult than pre-9/11, and it's become even more difficult since (although admittedly, the recent development is motivated by taxation).