California bullet train contractors botched bridge project
latimes.com
latimes.com
In China (put aside all the political issues at the moment), they were building elevated track to the tune of something like a mile a day at the peak. (On the order of that magnitude -- elevated! Not even just plain track on bare earth)
What does that produce? A rail-building skilled workforce (10,000+ engineers) that has lots of practice, expertise, and templates to stamp out that stuff like it's their business. Here, we do this now, what, once per decade? Are there even 1000 such engineers that US companies could muster together to work on a project, not even to speak of the necessary contributing industries supplying the specialized tooling, materials, expertise for such a project?
I realize the story in question here was about a road bridge, but still it involves coordination and management with the rail component, and the point still stands I think.
Industry-wide skills and personnel fade and atrophy when a country doesn't do these things any more, or go overseas to where there are projects for them. These generational shifts in capabilities happen, unfortunately, while a country is not looking.
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/world/asia/collapse-of-ne...
That project was to be a showpiece in FIU accelerated bridge construction (https://www.chronicle.com/article/engineer-connects-his-rese...).
I have not kept up with all the analysis(https://www.eng-tips.com/viewthread.cfm?qid=459940) but IIRC the combination of the accelerated construction, the new concrete truss design as well as organizational changes that left key position unfilled were the major design factors.
There were also clear warning signs of the impending collapse that were ignored.
EDIT: I mistakenly named the wrong university FSU -> FIU
Apparently we haven't been good at building bridges for a long time.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astute-class_submarine
In a number of highly specialized military subsystems and platforms, it is easier to understand the decisions that the US DOD makes when looking at it in the context of a minimum viable production rate to retain a core skilled workforce of engineers and factory workers.
It looks like the bridge that failed is a road bridge to carry cars over the tracks. The US driving infrastructure has a lot of issues, but you can’t say we’re “out of practice” building roads and bridges for cars and trucks.
Japan would be a prime example and it's a shame you didn't use it.
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/07/china/china-coronavirus-hotel...
This solar/wind gambit had better work out for the West or I will be a very grumpy old man.
> What does that produce? A rail-building skilled workforce (10,000+ engineers) that has lots of practice, expertise, and templates to stamp out that stuff like it's their business. Here, we do this now, what, once per decade?
Economies of scale, and "economies of knowledge" are a very sensible argument when it comes to operating a fleet of expensive capital equipment, or capital intensive building projects.
Take a look on Emirates Airlines. They are the only company in the world who made money on their Airbus A380. Why? They operates 100+ of them.
Same with HSR in China, not tricks involved. Though it's still a heavily subsidised, loss making business, but their "core" service in between major cities makes quite a lot of money.
For example, in DC the subway system (Metro) is run by the Washington Metro Area Transit Authority (WMATA). In recent years they’ve had a pretty poor safety and service record, which much hand wringing over how to fix the system. There are some financial challenges, some corruption, a good helping of standard union pathologies... but a lot of it is just that the system stopped growing a couple decades ago.
To hear the elders tell it, WMATA really figured out how to build in the mid twentieth century. As long as they were building stations and laying rail regularly, the system worked pretty well!
But then they finished and stayed finished for 20-30 years. Maintenance was under-funded. Power structures calcified, public accountability weakened, constituents took the system for granted.
When they tried to start building again, it was HARD. New stations have structural problems. Contractors fail to deliver. Corruption hits the papers.
And the safety and service levels stay low. They shut down for maintenance sprints that never seem to pay off... and then the pandemic shows up. So now ridership is way down, and the finances look worse, but at least they have more time to repair things..
I dunno where Metro goes next, TBH. I just wish it was efficient, reliable, safe and ubiquitous. Building institutions like that is hard.
And then what you see is as you mentioned above, the cities (customers) having lost their ability to supervise properly and pay for such projects.
A boon! Finally the Red Line can get fixed.
> I dunno where Metro goes next, TBH. I just wish it was efficient, reliable, safe and ubiquitous. Building institutions like that is hard.
It is safe, efficient, and ubiquitous. Outside of the public transit systems that I used in Australia (esp. Melbourne and Adelaide), there are few systems that compare to the DC Metro. I'm from Fairfax and used to ride it into the city all the time, and when I was stationed at Bethesda I would ride it across the city to see my folks on the other side of the river. It ain't Tokyo, but it's pretty good.
Because technology is essentially knowledge, it has a tendency to deteriorate over time as we build abstractions and people with foundational knowledge move on and people with abstracted knowledge move in.
As a contrived example, China made templates for these bridges, which are an abstraction of the underlying knowledge. In say 50 years time, all the engineers capable of designing the templates have died and no one was needed to make new templates for another 20 years, so no one learned howto design them. So you have lost your ability to design bridge templates and likely no longer understand what makes the current templates work.
That probably wouldn't happen with construction but just an example.
> In 2012, Apple attempted to move production, or at least assembly, of the Mac Pro back to Texas. It found it couldn’t domestically source a tiny screw needed for the Mac, indicative of the challenges of trying to produce things in the United States. According to the New York Times account of the fiasco, in China Apple could turn to any number of factories that could produce custom screws.9 Texas had almost none. Further, as said by none other than CEO Tim Cook himself: “In the U.S., you could have a meeting of tooling engineers and I’m not sure we could fill the room. In China, you could fill multiple football fields.” Eventually, Apple had to import the screws from China, and this was merely one production bottleneck among many. In June 2019, Apple announced that the next version of the Mac Pro will be produced in China.10
> If even the mighty Apple can’t source simple things such as screws in the United States, or find enough tooling engineers, we shouldn’t expect one company to solve what is now a systemic problem. It is not rational to expect individual CEOs to expose their companies to the higher costs and bottlenecks that come with reshoring. We should not expect the market to fix this suboptimal Nash equilibrium problem, either, nor can a one-time injection of taxpayer’s money, however large. These coordination, demand, and financial problems are just too staggering for even our most powerful corporations to solve by themselves.
source: https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2020/05/reshoring-supply-...
It is concerning to me our increasing inability to produce material things.
Clearly this is because they're being sued, and they want to minimize their losses. Sometimes I wonder what the world would be like if we just said "that sucks" and required a full postmortem instead -- no legal liability, just a thorough public review that everyone could read and learn from. We see this in other fields, like aviation; the NTSB investigates and publishes their finding of facts. The field learns from the mistakes, and as a result it's incredibly safe. (Even if you account for random chance, like MH370 or the whole 787MAX debacle, we're still doing better than we were 10 years ago.)
Instead we just keep making the same mistakes again and again. Everyone pretty much expects to get on a plane and arrive at their destination alive. Everyone also expects their megaproject to be delayed and be finished over budget. When are we going to fix this?
I think this way of thinking is crucial. Ultimately, these projects start to take this shape at conception... long before the failures are realized. The heads-i-win-tails-you lose games. The liability avoidance. The negotiation of guilt for the expected failures down the road.
It's a similar game in the corporate world, like with enterprise software. Everyone knows that an ERP project will blow the budget and timeline. Lots of lawyerly hours are spent creating liability frameworks for it. The result is always ambiguous, pinning failures on specification failures, changing requirements or whatnot.
Systems respond to incentives in many ways, but institutional (government, commercial, NGO, charity...) response to liability is rarely a positive sum game.
Not saying I have the answers, just that the obvious ones have been tried and failed.
This isn't a marginal issue. As it stands now, there is are huge categories if things we need and can't have... because the systems for getting them are horribly ineffective.
If trains cost 5X what they could cost, we effectively can't have new public transport systems. That's not sustainable.
Even in aviation, however, independent investigations by government (e.g. the NTSB) do not extinguish civil or criminal liability. Incident investigations are inadmissible in court, but civil suits and/or criminal prosecutions can be, and are, conducted as parallel processes.
This is how BAA built Heathrow Terminal 5. They took on all risk and just dealt with each problem as they came up: https://www.christianwolmar.co.uk/2005/04/project-management...
The article was about BAA ( British Airports Authority originally) building the physical terminal building with a roof and ceilings and power and networks. Different organisation and set of project managers.
Still shows that public memory of projects which go well in one area can be effected when someone else screws up.
Not that this would every happen in software projects.... ;-)
[1] If you take projects with a 10% chance of bankrupting you, you'll be out of business in no time.
I see that attitude working with individuals. Most people takes their responsibilities seriously.
But for corporations it would never work. Corporations would do literally nothing and take the money if there were no consequences. Even when all the employees are good caring people, the corporation incentive is to maximize profit. Corporations are less than the sum of its parts when it comes to morality.
Nobody gets rich when government workers do something, it’s outsourcing which enables significant wealth transfer from government to private individuals. That creates huge incentives and means it’s those same companies try very hard to influence the rules.
A fraction of those government workers are people for whom the politicians intervened to alter the hiring process in their favor. You're heads in the sand if you think the politicians aren't getting favors in return either up front or later.
The difference between in-house and contracting out is only the difference between lump sum and a monthly check.
By comparison thousands of people at federal contacting companies are making over 1 Million per year. Further those companies pull in billions in profits.
However, the TLDR is that the US (and, to an extent, the rest of the neoliberal world) botches transit and rail transport projects because government agencies lack the in-house capacity for effective management and rely too much on outside consultants whose interests are poorly aligned with those of taxpayers.
Bringing in outside firms to do turnkey rail solutions does not have a good history, generally because non-local prime contractors want to do things the way they do in their home countries, which often isn't economical, or even possible, elsewhere. Bring in a Japanese, Chinese, or European high-speed rail prime contractor and they'll want to build a system using parts that aren't widely available in the US (think metric vs. imperial fasteners and go way up from there), which will make construction and maintenance very expensive.
[0] https://pedestrianobservations.com (this is not my blog)
https://www.insider.co.uk/news/edinburgh-tram-inquiry-john-c...
France, Germany and Spain have a skilled railbuilding workforce...
The expansion of the network been consistently well delivered over the last ~decade.
The Airport Line opened a year ahead of schedule,[1] the Trafford Park line eight months ahead of schedule,[2] and the Second City Crossing was only a year behind it's aspirational opening date because of the discovery of a crypt buried under where a new station was being built.[3]
I think this is mainly because there has been a pipeline of new projects enabling both the contractors and TfGM to retain skilled engineering and project management staff.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manchester_Metrolink
[1] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-29879147
[2] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-51801265
[3] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-30779807
It's like tipping. No one reports cash tips. IRS looks the other way. Why? It's a tax credit to these workers in that industry.
Political power. Five different middle management hierarchies the politicians can appoint people to as favors.
>And if so why not hire a Japanese or Chinese company that is obviously proficient at building these types of rail systems?
Because it's not about building infrastructure. It's about the government serving itself.
Texas is about to build their own bullet train: https://www.texascentral.com/. It'll be the same technology as the Japanese Shinkansen.
> In 2014, it was announced[71] that Texas Central Railway would build a ~300-mile (~480 km) long line using the N700 series rolling stock. The trains are proposed to operate at over 320 km/h (200 mph). source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shinkansen#United_States
The difference between Texas and California is that the bullet train being built in Texas will be a private venture. It will be interesting to witness the difference in cost, quality and construction speed between the two states. It will be a test to see which state's economic and regulatory environment is more conducive for large-scale construction projects.
This is central California, there is no way an un-grouted steel cable can develop such a serious corrosion issue and in such a short time.
If it was some place with acid rains, exposed to the sea, etc, that would take tens of years, AND it would have needed traffic on the bridge, possibly above the theoretical allowance.
Disclaimer: I have been site manager in the construction of several pre- and post- tensioned reinforced concrete bridges, I have dealt with this stuff for years, but of course I know nothing of the specific project and/or exact type of cables used in it.
So it's the same problem that plagues government and megacorp IT and construction worldwide: they depend on external entities for oversight, QA and controlling of the vendors instead of having the appropriate knowledge and staff in-house.
That's what happens when public sector employees get gutted to "save costs". The politicians who decided this decades ago are no longer there and cannot be held accountable for the consequences, and we are stuck with the fallout.
You don’t have ‘real’ private firms doing work, you end up with these professional gov contractor companies (who focus entirely on gov projects) which act like half baked gov agencies themselves with none of the public oversight/responsibility to tax payers and government agencies acting like profit seeking entities with no competition and bottom feeding talent pools/lowest price contracts (which almost always ends up being flakey organizations mentioned earlier who are entirely designed to get gov contracts as mentioned earlier).
Beyond that, the inherent structure of using a patchwork of consultancies with broken responsibility chains and corrupted incentive structures also kills many over-capitalized tech startups too. It’s a poor way to build any business.
Much like Apple the only things that should be outsourced are manageable isolated pieces, not core parts of the project.
You also can see why people are pro-gutting public agencies when these disasters are all they can produce - while at the same time there are certain areas private firms won’t naturally account for. The whole thing needs a rethinking.
With public infrastructure projects like roads and railways, why should one go for a purely private infrastructure? The only reason for this is if corrupt politicians want kickbacks from rent seekers (for example like the private prison which paid off a judge).
> Much like Apple the only things that should be outsourced are manageable isolated pieces, not core parts of the project.
Actually Apple proves that you can outsource the core part (manufacturing) - provided you have the in house staff for management and oversight of the project. The only lapse in quality stemming from a lack of oversight is the NVIDIA GPU debacle back a decade ago, but to be fair: that one bit the whole industry.
> You also can see why people are pro-gutting public agencies when these disasters are all they can produce - while at the same time there are certain areas private firms won’t naturally account for.
The reason for people (in practice: Republicans) wanting to gut and then privatize public agencies is, as I wrote above, corruption. Demolish the funding during the last days of a Republican presidency, have it take effect during the Democrat term, then campaign with "we should privatize XYZ, it doesn't work", win the vote, privatize XYZ, get kickbacks / "donations".
An old, tried and tested playbook, and for what it's worth not even US-specific - our German Conservative party is a real expert at that, too...
I’m fine with tax money going entirely to public run firms. I just may disagree on what areas the government should be getting involved in - which is most things outside of a few obvious like public infrastructure, healthcare insurance, law enforcement/justice system, etc where private incentive structures, real competition (see the phoney US health insurance ‘competition’), and where other functions of markets don’t exist or will practically excel.
Suppose the FBI wants to build an office in Texarkana. Are they supposed to directly hire a bunch of people in Texarkana? Should the people who install the carpet get an exemption from the agency's normal background check, medical exam, and firearms training? Hiring competent people requires competent managers, in this case for construction, so they'd need to hire before they can hire. Suppose the EPA also decides to build an office in Texarkana. Does the EPA need to directly hire people too, maybe competing with the FBI and trying to swipe employees?
There is also the huge issue of government workforce rules. In the business world, bad employees tend to get fired. Businesses don't last if they tolerate too many bad employees, which effectively fires the whole company. Government isn't about to shut down, and there are numerous rules which make it near-impossible to get rid of worthless and negative-value employees. Hiring is also limited by low pay. Corruption thrives when pay is below the norm for the market. The competent people won't stay. It's a miracle government can function at all. Raising the pay gets taxpayers furious, in part because taxpayers see the corruption and incompetence.
The answer is thus, sadly, to minimize the problem by minimizing the employees. There isn't a better choice that is realistic.
Why not have a central federal agency that does the oversight and planning for all other federal agencies, with local experts in all 50 states that know local building codes and maintain relationships with vendors? That way the agencies don't have individual high costs for the controlling/planning yet benefit from shared knowledge and from having experts that prevent them from getting ripped off.
> Government isn't about to shut down, and there are numerous rules which make it near-impossible to get rid of worthless and negative-value employees.
That one has been solved by many other countries. Reform said rules from the ground up, that's it. There are enough examples to copy from.
> Hiring is also limited by low pay.
The low pay is caused by shrinking budgets, so having multiple government agencies join forces can reduce the individual costs while still maintaining decent competitive payment for staff.
This is what I don't like with American big business: everybody hires consultants, who then subcontract consultants, who then subcontract consultants, who then subcontract consultants.
And in the end it comes to nobody knows anything, despite n-times of my annual salary being spent every few weeks.
Where are those experts really, why they are not being hired instead of the type of "experts" whose only competence is to hire another consultant?
At the bottom of the ladder in the chain.
> why they are not being hired instead of the type of "experts" whose only competence is to hire another consultant?
Because the actual experts don't have experience in how to properly react to government tenders or the political connections to have tenders written so that only a specific company or two match it, and because public sector HR does not have any way of actually evaluating experts (as the historical knowledge of senior employees all got removed).
When you look at the budget of this project, a lot of the cost and complexity is due to accommodating cars and drivers. The rail authority really needs better strategic PR so the public begins to understand what's being spent on what.
and again: https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2014-jan-24-la-me-bay-b...
and again: https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-bay-bridge-repo...
and again: https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2013-jul-08-la-me-bay-b...
and again: https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-bay-bridge-repo...
and again: https://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-bay-bridge-troll-2013090...
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-12-06/waste-fr...
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-sep-17-me-22481...
https://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2008/12/caltrans----n...
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-04-26-mn-59080-...
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-12-03-mn-402-st...
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-mar-28-mn-21927...
In the beginning, when I tried a back of the envelope calculation that the distances were just beyond economical for high speed rail systems (versus air travel), I was willing to support it. However, the gradual resistance to acquiring the right of way cheaply, and the financial mismanagement (along with engineering mismanagement) caused me to lose faith in the CAHSR leadership capabilities. And now honestly, I think the money would be much more efficiently spent to solve some of our other many traffic/transportation problems.
One of the worst times that convinced me the management was not being honest (with themselves even) was when the linked reporter's story came out about the geotechnical problems about crossing the Tehachapi/San Gabriel range, and how this major (really major!) problem had not been solved yet. The CAHSR CEO kept on going on about how they'd saved $1B or something on the current Central Valley construction costs -- as if saving a few pennies on the cost of a bolt on the Space Shuttle they didn't know how to design the rest of, was a great achievement.
Anyway, this is all wrapped up in the larger story of how major projects in the US simply cannot build things cheaply and efficiently any more. It's a big problem for our infrastructure in general... We are getting 1/3 to 1/2 of what we could build (or maintain properly) because it's so expensive to do this now.
What's in it for him?
Recognition? Nope. He'll be blamed in problems with minorities, unions, views from someone's mansion and for all other deadly sins somehow related to the construction. A railroad built on time and within the budget? Come on, folks, it's just his job!
Money? Nope. Government jobs don't pay that well.
Interesting engineering project? Again, nope. It will be a political fight, PR project, bookkeeping exercise, endless lawsuits - whatever, but not the engineering project.
Why bother?
It's possible with rail. You just need to avoid stopping trains on the main line. Switch off on to a siding to serve the station. Switching should be at the fastest safe speed; slow trains do not belong on the main line.
a. You show up, only to discover that the train just left. Since it isn't properly scheduled, you just have to get lucky. Enjoy waiting an hour or two for the next train.
b. You show up, only to discover that there are too many people to fit on the train. Since you don't have a seat reservation, the train fills up and you don't get to board. Enjoy waiting an hour or two for the next train.
Train travel is much more pleasant than air travel and being able to just turn up and go, and carry your own luggage, is a big part of that. This goes beyond fixing what's not broken - why are you trying to make the pleasant thing like the less pleasant thing?
Reality: that won't happen
It costs money to run trains that might be mostly empty, so they are run less often, which makes them less used, which makes them run less often, and so on.
At best, reality looks more like this: https://www.mbta.com/schedules/CR-Lowell/timetable
That's 21 trains per weekday. Weekend days get only 8 trains.
Amtrak is much much worse. At that service level, you could get 1 train per week, seasonal.
Reliable trains are a good thing. Frequent trains are a good thing. Your proposal doesn't help with either of those things and would waste money that could be spend improving them instead.
I'm guessing it's easier to start in that area and it's not "nowhere."
Merced is north of Fresno which is a larger city than many states have at all. It has a half a million people and an international airport.
Bakersfield is also a fairly large city. They are only small by California standards. In most states, either of them would be the biggest or one of the biggest cities in the state.
I actually did a fair amount of research on rail stuff when I was a college student hoping to become an urban planner. I wrote an alternate rail plan for Solano County, California as a student.* So I'm not just talking out my ass here.
No did I suggest that they would have created high speed rail just for that area if it weren't intended to then go on to SF and LA.
But when I was homeless in Fresno, I was already reading articles about the project and I think they were already doing some of the work at that point. So I've actually read a reasonable number of articles about this project as well.
I think it makes sense to do the middle section first. Work out some of the bugs in a relatively low cost leg of the project and then try to connect it to the more dense parts of the state after the "easy" section of track is successfully up and running. It's a test drive for the project to prove the concept and make it more feasible to complete the more challenging sections, basically.
You could make an argument that the big mistake was running I5 along the west side of the valley instead of just improving HW99. A tell is 70 years after they built it there is still dick all nothing between Sacramento and LA.
Fresno only gets 11 inches of rain a year and there's a lot of farming around there. Fresno County also has an amazingly rich history of water development, both technologically and in terms of hashing out state laws for water rights.
California uses two different and competing standards with different historical roots. They use both the standard of "first come, first served" and also the idea that you can't just completely screw people over down river.
Most water in California is shipped in. Fresno County has more water security than most parts of the state and its rich history of water development means that in some years, it is actually raising the local water level while most of the US is draining underground aquifers that will never recover from it, resulting in land subsidence.
I considered remaining in Fresno permanently if only because of climate change and the expectation that water is what future wars will be fought over. Fresno has better water security than most of the state, and not due to rain.
It's also like closing in on 3am here and maybe I should shut up and get off the internet. (shrug)
Edit: Some old comment by me about books I have read about water in Cali that anyone into water in Cali might enjoy:
Also Bakersfield Metro is 850,000 people. Fresno is 970k.
It's not about the train and never was.
I know we are all in love with the idea of high speed rail. I've been to Japan and have ridden the shinkansen alongside Mt Fuji (which is even larger in real life than it looks in pictures), so I definitely get the appeal. But I have zero faith in any state agency to be able to do it sensibly. Get private investors to do it. They will do it affordably, financially sustainably, and safely, and they won't steal money from all the citizens of the state to build something which won't be of use to many of them.
This is how I feel about goverment in general - I want a country that spends enough to look after the less fortunate, but with the administrators' incompetent/thieving/malign hands removed from the till (preferably by slamming it shut on them).
Yes, that's completely unheard of.
This is such a weird position to hold. Are Japanese high speed trains build by private investors? Are American interstate highways?
Highways are build by the government because they are enablers of society. They don't need to make a profit themselves, they lift society as a whole.
Similar with high speed train. It's infrastructure, not an investment portfolio.
Early shinkansen lines were built by Japanese National Railways, a state-owned enterprise; currently they are operated by Japan Railways Group, a private company. Certainly there is still a lot of government integration/interference with their operation, but JR won't, for example, build a shinkansen line which they know will never be able to pay for itself. At any rate there is much less of an expectation that large infrastructure projects will be over schedule and over budget and that's just the way things are.
> Are American interstate highways?
Of course not, and that's why highways are prone to the exact same schedule and budget overruns.
> Highways are build by the government because they are enablers of society.
Society can operate just fine without government.
Any examples you could cite to support that assertion?
What is this society without government meant to be,some kind of anarchy-heaven?
If the government were to disappear right now and there were no more government-imposed consequences for doing so, would your answer to this question change?
Don't you think most people in society would answer the same way?
These arent "government projects". They are private projects paid for by the tax payer.
They fail precisely because of attitudes of this kind: private companies interests are not aligned with taxpayers; and people like you have led to an exodus of talent and skill from governments.
The 90s in the UK saw massive amounts of contracting out of IT, and huge amounts of wasted money as private companies rinsed the state. Since 2010s the gov has been dramatically expanding its high-talent IT capability, and routinely delivering best-in-class IT systems.
The hollowing out of the state is what causes projects of this kind to fail. The people "stealing taxpayer money" are the private interests.
Most of the Asian train systems aside from the Chinese ones - Hong Kong MTR, the privatized Japanese lines and so on - tend to be private companies which, unlike the US systems, derive their profits not from the train lines themselves but buy building giant shopping/apartment/office complexes on top of stations, which makes a ton of sense - people ride a train to go some where, so make the train stations be the places they want to go to, and you will be heavily incentivized to make your trains very efficient at moving people.
The Japanese system under JR originally was a national one but it ultimately got a lot more efficient after privatization, not before.
I think that the incentive structures in the US are super messed up, and while it may be possible for the government to operate systems effectively I don’t see a politically viable way to unravel those messed up incentives.
Okay, so then why do governments keep contracting with these failing companies? Why don't the contracts include stop work orders or penalties for projects that go out of control? Where does the buck stop?