This seems like an unfair characterization. Whether or not judicial review formally exists[1], in any system where the courts are functionally independent of the legislature it stands to reason that having the
last say in a matter puts one in a rather consequential position that's vulnerable to easy criticism.
That's why people who think Textualism is a check on the judicial power are mistaken, IMO. Notwithstanding that the first and usually only step in traditional statutory interpretation is to apply the text of a statute according to its facial meaning, the underlying principle is to give effect to the intention of the legislature or the purpose of the law. (Most scholars will tell you those--intention vs purpose--are distinct philosophies, but I personally think it's a distinction without a difference.) Textualism doesn't care about intention or purpose and will gladly apply an interpretation that would have seemed absurd to anyone who drafted or voted for the law before the implications (i.e. the insanity of the world) laid bare the ambiguity. And because no self-professed textualist applies this method with perfect consistency (including and, especially IMO, Scalia), expressions of partisan bias can be even greater as the fiction of textualism provides an effective cover, both for the judge and his critics; discretion is disguised because nobody cares when you apply a meaning with which everybody agrees--or at least which seems reasonably consonant with the application of intent or purpose--yet which is nonetheless at odds with the text on its face. Recognizing one's own inconsistencies in this regard, or proving the inconsistencies of others, is far more work than identifying and calling out specific instances of obvious partisanship--especially when the latter are admitted, like during the Warren Court years.
[1] In Western legal philosophy it's usually considered a violation of separation of powers and of justice more generally for a legislature to directly overturn the result of a particular case, as distinguished from changing the law for future cases. Because the buck stops with the courts, of course they get all the flak for disagreeable decisions, and it's convenient to attribute subversive or even malicious motivations. This dynamic is exaggerated in systems with formal stare decisis because the courts effectively only get one bite at the apple. Without stare decisis courts can apply the law differently in different cases, often in response to partisan or popular reactions, which while lowering the stakes and defusing tension has its own obvious problems regarding consistency and discretion. Indeed, even in civil law countries I think there's a direct correlation between the maturity and strength of the judiciary and de facto application of stare decisis--pretense of a lack of discretion. In terms of obeyance to precedent, French or Italian courts are far more consistent than, e.g., Russian courts. Discretion invites corruption. It's no coincidence you never hear stories about how a Russian judicial opinion substantially frustrated the government or legislature. Likewise for Chinese courts, though in the commercial sphere they're far more independent than in Russia, AFAIU. Similar criticisms have been leveled at Japanese courts--e.g. the Supreme Court of Japan has only once or twice overturned a law even though it nominally has the same power as in the U.S. and there's a strong academic consensus it should have done so in many more instances. Though, the peculiarity of Japanese culture makes it difficult to ascribe it to corruption.