I hope RISC-V will get booting right.
https://linuxplumbersconf.org/event/4/contributions/381/atta...
https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=UEFI-RIS...
Early discussions (cannot find a trace online, from my mail archives):
From: ron minnich
Subject: Re: [sw-dev] SBI extension proposal v2
Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2018 08:46:07 -0800
At Google and other places, we've been struggling now for years with
overly complex firmware that is implemented incorrectly, enabling
exploits and other bad things. The list of things vendors get wrong in
firmware, both enabling exploits and enabling others to enable
exploits, is long and it continues to this day. There is an
unbelievable amount of money out there all involving firmware
exploits, very little of it involving nice people.
I'm currently working on deleting all use of the x86 version of M
mode, i.e. SMM. There are many proposals out there for deleting SMM
from the architecture. I've also shown at a talk in 2017 how we could
redirect SMM interrupts back into the kernel. We're also removing all
use of callbacks into UEFI on x86. We're almost there.
Which is why I'm a bit unhappy to see this (to me) cancerous growth in
proposals for M- mode code. PPP in firmware? Really? multiple serial
devices? really? We've been here before, in the 1970s, with something
called the BIOS. If you're not familiar with it, go take a look, or
you can take my word for it that these proposals implement that idea.
We spent over 20 years freeing ourselves from it on x86. Why go back
to a 50 year old model on a CPU designed to be in use for 50 years?
My early understanding of M mode was that it was an Alpha PALCode like
thing, enabling access to resources that were behind a privilege wall.
I did not like it that much, but I was OK: it was very limited in
function, and the kernel could replace it, or at least measure it. I
also accept that every cpu vendor uses m mode like things (e.g. ARM
TF) for reasonable purposes and also (let's be honest here) for
dealing with chipset mistakes. But that does not mean you need to
recreate BIOS.
The SBI should be hard to add to, deliberately. It should be used only
when there are no possible alternatives. It needs to be open source
and held in common. It should be possible for a kernel to replace or
at least measure it. And, further, there needs to be some work done on
why you add to it, and why you don't, with bias against adding to it.
This proposal works against those ideals, as it explicitly enables
vendor-specific forks of the SBI. Sure, this can happen, but why make
it so easy?
see https://github.com/riscv/riscv-sbi-doc/pull/12 for other thoughts.
Also, I've had discussions with some security folks in our firmware
community about the fact that the PMP can be used in a way that the
kernel can not measure the SBI, since SBI might read-protect itself.
This is a real step backwards, FYI. Not sure if it can be changed at
this point.
ron
p.s. For interleaving debug and console output firmware, use the
oldest trick in the book: ASCII is 7 bits. Since console out is 8
bits, reserve 128 values for console out, and 128 for debug stream,
and if the debug stream needs 8 bit for some words, you know what to
do. It's very easy and doesn't require that we add multiple UART
support to SBI.