The issue with multihop is that it's all from the same provider. In the event that they were legally forced to log their network by an abusive local government it wouldn't help you. It might be sufficient to frustrate an adversary that only managed to compromise their operations at a single data center though.

I question the wisdom of placing Tor in the middle of a VPN chain. By routing your traffic back into a VPN account that's linked to you it seems like you would lose most of the benefits that Tor provides.

* A single VPN means that the provider could link your primary ISP provided IP to your browsing history if they so chose.

* Chaining two VPNs means that neither provider can correlate your IP to your browsing history on their own. However the terminating VPN can obviously link your traffic to your payment details. Also obviously a criminal investigation involving warrants is still a serious threat.

* Chaining one or more VPNs into Tor means that you can rely on the above guarantees as a fallback in the highly unlikely event that an adversary manages to directly compromise Tor. It also hides the fact that you are using Tor from anyone that snoops your traffic at the ISP level. The latter might be very important in some jurisdictions.

* In the end, even if you only use Tor without a VPN the biggest threat to your anonymity is probably your own OpSec (or lack thereof). Ross Ulbricht is a prime example of the fact that you only have to slip up once. Related to that, it's important to be aware of all the ways that modern software and hardware leaks potentially identifying information (ie fingerprinting).

I use a VPN first because it arguably attracts less attention than Tor does.

As Reelin notes, the difference is using multiple VPN providers, so you distribute trust.