Huh. He kind of lost all credibility at that point. Breaking RSA isn't something you just decide to do. I'll wait for the day when he announces he's broken it.
After reading him state how astonishing his skills are and how he'll tackle the integer factorization problem, I thought to myself, "he must be a 20 years old university student." Then he states his age.
However, that does not reflect on whether or not he is the one that is behind the attack on Comodo, which has no real indications of being difficult.
Comodo claims that it must have been an organized, planned out attack because they knew which domains to get certificates for. That does not explain why 3 were generated for one domain and one for 'global trustee'. Nor does it take a genius to figure out a set of domains you would want certificates for depending on what you are planning to do (in this case, it seems like attacking large webmail providers).
And so will a massive part of the Computer Science/Mathematics/Physics community. Answering the P vs NP question is kind of a big deal. :D
This is wrong in two ways.
First, a polynomial-time algorithm could still be too slow to be practical, either because the degree of the polynomial were high or because the constant factor or asymptotically disappearing overhead were high.
Second, discrete-logarithm-based cryptography does not depend on the difficulty of integer factorization. That includes Diffie-Hellman, ElGamal, DSA, SRP, and elliptic-curve methods.
You're right that integer factorization is not known to be NP-hard, and so a polynomial-time integer factorization algorithm wouldn't show P=NP.