> You seem pretty moved by this discussion. What is your use case that is broken by protecting the clipboard and filesystem?
Yes, I am pretty moved, because this is ostensibly a technical audience and the level of sheer "I don't know how my operating system works" I'm seeing here is quite alarming indeed.
I don't have to have a particular use case to point out that "applications should not be able to access the filesystem at all" is plain silly.
> Yes, if you want to provide a native feel, with native features like clipboards, and native accessibility features, use the native widgets.
So basically any application that does not use native widgets should have zero accessibility or platform functionality. That's most of the gaming industry out the window then, as well as anybody building user interfaces that an operating system does not (yet) support. Additionally, god forbid you be able to copy and paste on operating systems that don't have native widget toolkits (such as, say, Linux), or even implement toolkits for such platforms in the first place.
Am I permitted to call this a hysterical overreaction yet?
> This is the direction desktops are going, and it's where Android and iOS started.
Neither Android nor iOS have ever prevented programmatic access to the filesystem. You seem to constantly conflate programmatic access and permissions/sandboxing, which is precisely the sort of mistake that "moves" me to see from people who develop software.
> Desktop/laptop OS sandboxes should also provide file pickers to give an app access to one file or one directory.
I'm _very_ interested in how exactly the command-line tools you use would work with using file pickers to grant them access to single files and folders.
Also very interested in how Linux, an operating system that explicitly does not provide a widget toolkit, is supposed to provide file pickers to the variety of programs that run on it.
> An app doesn't need to access my clipboard until I'm trying to paste something in that app
A clipboard is a shared buffer. If something is supposed to be secret, don't put it in the shared buffer between all applications. Applications will continue to have the ability to query/read clipboards they have access to (for, amongst other things, actually implementing a paste), much like computers will continue to have the ability to read/query network drives that they have access to - that's the literal point of having a clipboard/network drive.
Discussing permissions and sandboxing (which most clipboard implementations already do, with app-local and/or named clipboards distinct from the system-wide clipboard) is one thing, but claiming that programs should not be able to interact with clipboard contents via code is frankly rather ridiculous.