> As a european, I don't see any party that actually have american people's interest in mind.
As an American, I don't see any party that has my interests in mind. Elections always seem to be having to choose the lesser of two evils.
As an American, I don't see any party that has my interests in mind. Elections always seem to be having to choose the lesser of two evils.
https://www.fairvote.org/alternatives
Maine has converted to RCV already and it's stood up in court; 49 to go.
Cognitive dissonance around the idea that there is room for improvement is inevitable.
And I'm surprised that I get the same blank stares from Americans that have lived for a decade in Europe. It's like they've never contemplated any other way of electing. Of course it's not true about everyone. I'm generalizing a lot here, but it still surprises me.
I also believe that "whether the Constitution really be one thing, or another, this much is certain - that it has either authorized such a government as we have had, or has been powerless to prevent it. In either case, it is unfit to exist." -- Lysander Spooner
No Treason should be required reading
The conspiracy theorist in me thinks it is because IRV doesn't effectively change things. The realist in me thinks it is just trendy.
For others: See me other comment (it is large, you can't miss it) explaining these topics in more detail (with links!)
1) When they say RCV they specifically mean Instant Runoff Voting (IRV). There are many other, and better, RCV methods.
2) They overclaim IRV's ability to solve the spoiler effect (see my other comment for links). While other RCV methods have strong resistance to spoiler effects, IRV has a weak resistance. CGP actually hints to this when he talks about that IRV doesn't prevent a trend towards two party systems.
"Ranked voting" is the more general term.
> Ranked voting is any election voting system in which voters use a ranked (or preferential) ballot to rank choices in a sequence on the ordinal scale: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc. There are multiple ways in which the rankings can be counted to determine which candidate (or candidates) is (or are) elected (and different methods may choose different winners from the same set of ballots). The other major branch of voting systems is cardinal voting, where candidates are independently rated, rather than ranked.[1]
> The similar term "Ranked Choice Voting" (RCV) is used by the US organization FairVote to refer to the use of ranked ballots with specific counting methods: either instant-runoff voting for single-winner elections or single transferable vote for multi-winner elections. In some locations, the term "preferential voting" is used to refer to this combination of ballot type and counting method, while in other locations this term has various more-specialized meanings.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranked_voting
I share your frustration with FairVote and CGP Grey (and recently an episode of Patriot Act) painting an unrealistically rosy picture of RCV/IRV as the solution to our voting problems.
There are some other systems that aren't ranked voting at all that I think would be significantly better than IRV, such as approval voting, range voting, and STAR voting (which is basically range voting with an immediate runoff between the top two).
For some reason, FairVote persists in claiming that in approval voting (which is like traditional first-past-the-post voting except that you can vote for more than one candidate), you somehow maximize your voting influence by voting for only one candidate. They call this bullet voting. I don't know what possible reason one could have for believing this.
This manifests in their comparison chart:
https://www.fairvote.org/alternatives
They show "resistance to strategic voting" as "high" under RCV and "low" under approval voting. This is somewhat subjective, but I think they've got it backwards. Under approval voting, strategic voting and honest voting are basically the same: you vote for as many of the candidates as you can tolerate, and maybe if there's a candidate you really don't want to win you vote for everyone but them. Under RCV, it's only safe to put you first choice first if they are either clearly in the lead or so far behind they have no hope of winning. If the outcome is in doubt, it's possible to cause your first place candidate to lose by putting them first. (That's a weird problem for any voting system to have.)
For this reason, I don't trust FairVote; I don't think they're presenting their preferred voting system or the alternatives honestly. They're more of an advocacy/PR organization that's pushing their chosen solution out of a sense of inertia or something.
The Center for Election Science is a smaller, less-well funded group that advocates for approval voting (and similar methods) that I donate to from time to time. They had a successful campaign to convert Fargo ND to approval voting back in 2018.
> RV vs RCV
These terms are too similar and really just confuse people, which is why I push back against it. I try to use "ordinal" a lot, but it is best for places like HN but not when I'm discussing with family. RCV makes people think that this is the only way you can rank people.
> STAR
Anyone who is advocating for STAR has my approval. It is the preferred system in my mind. I want to plug my longer post that has a lot of links and expands on all the topics you described
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23705413
> Fair Vote frustration
I think this is a style of argument that is increasingly becoming more common and is destructive. Pushing the your argument past the point of validity in an effort to make it stronger. Their use of broad classes is a gross mischaracterization. When they discuss Condorcet methods they discuss several types, lumping together the worst features from different ones. But they ignore the good methods like RP and Schulze. The comparisons are unfair. But then again, they aren't trying to appeal to people that are informed on the subject, they are trying to appeal to the masses which are completely unfamiliar with the subjects. But I do not think this justifies the outright lying and mischaracterizations.
> Spoilers and Strategy
In my other post I actually link an example of where IRV fails, and it is the specific type of spoiling that we are about: when similar candidates spoil (e.g. Bernie and Biden, not Stein and Biden). IRV doesn't solve this (but FV claims otherwise).
For strategy, this is the argument that I get into with the Condorcet camp (though we're clearly on the same side and these are nuanced friendly arguments not hostile). To me STAR is good because its range of VSE is more compact (i.e. resistant to strategies). The Condorcet camp claims that there is enough dis-incentivization to not vote strategically therefore just maximize VSE (VSE is only slightly different between STAR05 and RP). So for anyone listening on the sidelines, this is really what we're arguing, minutia. I'm certain everyone in the Condorcet camp would vote for STAR and everyone in the STAR/Score/Approval camp would vote for Condorcet (specifically RP) if given the chance.
> Center For Election Science
I'd also like to mention Equal Vote, which advocates for STAR. https://www.equal.vote/starvoting
Eh... I'm in the STAR/Score/Approval camp and I would be somewhat inclined to vote strategically against Condorcet, because it's worse than what I want and once it was implemented it would be even harder to dislodge in favor of STAR/Score/Approval than the status quo.
It's also a false compromise because the opponents aren't generally people who benefit from the worse voting method, only people who haven't yet understood why it's worse.
Of course, if we were using STAR/Score/Approval to vote on which voting system to use then I could express my preferences more accurately.
This is fair and I won't really push back against it. This is the reason I push so hard against IRV. Because once IRV is the status quo it will be hard to continue moving forward. After all, we already have the capabilities. If you have to chose to eat acid, plain oatmeal, or chocolate pudding you don't eat the oatmeal then the pudding, you just jump straight to the pudding.
> It's also a false compromise because the opponents aren't generally people who benefit from the worse voting method, only people who haven't yet understood why it's worse.
While I'm in this camp I do think it is unfair to completely rule out Condorcet methods. The interview I linked to with Dr. Arrow I think expands on this well. If asked to advocate for a system, advocate for score (STAR). But that isn't to recognize that there's so much uncertainty in Social Choice Theory that we can trust theory alone. There's smaller experiments that have been done, but nothing on the scale we are advocating for. Of course we expect the theory and experiments to be relatively accurate, but we must acknowledge the lack of empirical large scale data. Frankly, you can only get that by doing it.
> Of course, if we were using STAR/Score/Approval to vote on which voting system to use then I could express my preferences more accurately.
;) For me
STAR 5, Score: 4 (4.5), Approval: 4, RP: 3 (3.8), Schulze: 3, IRV: 1 Plurality: 0
I'm pretty similar. I like STAR and score about the same because I like simplicity, and don't see STAR as that huge an improvement over score. So maybe:
STAR: 5, score: 5, approval: 4, *Condorcet: 3, IRV: 2, plurality: 0
Except elections rarely work like that. There isn't a set of options I can tolerate and a set I can't. I want my preferred candidate to win more than I want any of the "fine I guess" candidates. And if I have to pick between "bad" and "horrible" I still want to vote for "bad".
With approval voting, I am forced to vote strategically, considering what point in my preference order to draw the line at in order to maximize my chance of causing the highest possible position in my preference order to win.
I realise that IRV isn't perfect, but it's a lot better than any non-ranked choice voting method as far as I can see, and honestly I think the risk of the situations where honest voting results in a sub-optimal outcome is massively overblown, though I don't have data to back that up.
I would note that IRV has the advantage of being actually put into practice at scale (Australia, Maine), and also comes with the nice property that it can be fairly easily adjusted to work with multiple winners (ie. STV), so you can have systems like Australia where IRV is used in single-winner races and STV in multi-winner ones without the voting public needing to learn two systems.
I cannot think of any way that IRV beats out STAR. In STAR's worst case scenario (1-sided strategy) it still has a VSE equal to IRV's best scenario (100% honest). Any more honesty that people have in STAR just improves peoples' satisfaction. This is actually one of the main arguments of cardinal systems over ordinal systems (e.g. STAR vs RP/IRV).
If you're really into the ordinal camp, I'd also strongly encourage you to look into Ranked Pairs. The satisfaction is A LOT higher than IRV does. On the ballot side it is no different than what the voter sees in IRV (really this is fairly consistent for ordinal systems, by definition).
But I want to stress that STAR and Approval are not equivalent. I also want to stress that scoring is an extremely familiar concept to most people. "Rate this drive out of 5 stars." "On a scale of 1 to 10 how would you rate..." etc. So I'd argue that STAR is fairly expressive (which seems to be your major complaint) and is a simple and easy concept for voters to understand (since they are already familiar with it).
I see this as more when you're creating something. Like if you're writing software if it is good enough then don't continue if you have other pressing matters. Essentially this saying is about Pareto.
But when you already have things invented and you're just selecting things, this saying doesn't apply. We have 3 options: option 1 sucks, option 2 is meh, option 3 is pretty good. Which do you choose? It is pretty obvious that you should choose option 3. There's no other conditions on this problem. You don't have to spend more resources to get option 3. Option 3 is just objectively better, so why not pick it?
And if you think I'm exaggerating, I'll note that IRV is a 6% VSE improvement on plurality. STAR and RP are both 15% improvements on plurality. This is part of why people are frustrated. There's options that are objectively better, so why pick the worse one? And it isn't like they are differing in "betterness" by small amounts, we're talking about a pretty big amount!
You're calling 6% "vastly better" so doesn't that make 15% "astronomically better?"
Here's the first email I received from Mark Frohnmayer where he discussed STAR voting, following my speaking at his conference at University of Oregon, that gave birth to it. :) https://twitter.com/ClayShentrup/status/1278118075972202496
Utila? I think I ran into you on Reddit yesterday. Good to see you're also on HN. Small world (if not, then from your tweet I met Mark).
This is exactly why it makes no sense to waste our limited activist energy and resources on IRV.
https://medium.com/@ClayShentrup/momentum-e5fd12ffce2a
> and also comes with the nice property that it can be fairly easily adjusted to work with multiple winners (ie. STV)
Score voting (and by extension STAR voting and approval voting) have a proportional multi-winner analog that's much simpler than STV and arguably better.
scorevoting.net/RRV
https://www.electionscience.org/library/tactical-voting-basi...
Thanks for donating to CES. I'm the co-founder who filed the 501(c)3 incorporation paperwork back in 2011. We've come a long way, and Fargo was very exciting indeed.
Other countries with other systems don't really do much better.
The fundamental problem is that the people who want this sort of power are the last ones who should ever be allowed to wield it. When people are willing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to get a job that pays $500K a year, you have to wonder what's really going on.
(I'm partial to approval voting (vote "yes" or "no" for each cantidate separately and if the winner doesn't have at least 50% "yes", the office is vacant until the next election), but I suspect the party line would immediately become "you're a traitor if you approve anyone but the Party's candidate".)
Not voting, but it is a real election system, known as Sortition (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sortition). It was used in ancient Athens.
Also, yes, approval voting is a great approach and we should absolutely use it. We'd still get people who vote party-line, and it'd take a while for people to truly internalize that they can safely vote for other candidates they like, but it'd be a massive improvement.
I vaguely remembered that, but not the name, thanks.
It's made much worse by the bad voting system, but it's perfectly possible that I simply disagree with enough of my fellow citizens that any compromise we can reach will be some "lesser evil".
I think there's a strong argument that RCV/Approval would shift the incentives and game-theoretic landscape away from polarization and turnout, and towards big-tent coalition building, to appeal to the greatest quantity of left, right, center, and independent. That does mean compromise, and likely policy concessions; but i think that would be a huge improvement over (a) taking turns at obstructionism, and (b) a de-facto one-party system regarding corporate interests, the military-industrial complex, etc.
The problem is that IRV/RCV doesn't capture your preferences, because it ignores all your preferences except your top choice, until your top choice is eliminated. IRV is reasonably good at making sure that third-parties can't prevent first-parties from being elected, but very bad at actually allowing third parties to actually be elected even if they have widespread approval.
Approval is a good compromise, and fully ranked systems (e.g. Condorcet) would be even better but much harder to enact. I would happily support universal adoption of Approval.
That all said, full ranking systems are definitely the superior option, and I’d certainly take approval over our current state.
No. Approval voting has been extensively studied by game theory experts like NYU political science professor Steven Brams, and found to be one of the most resistant to tactical voting. Computer simulations show it performing exceptionally well even with highly strategic voters.
https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig.html
https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/vse7
There's even a mathematical theorem (proof) that, given plausible strategic behavior by voters, approval voting always elects a beats-all "Condorcet winner" when one exists. This is mild (some would say GOOD) reaction to strategy.
https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW
> Checking approve on someone I believe to be more popular than my favorite candidate lowers the chance my favorite candidate wins.
Yes, this is beneficial not harmful. The alternative is that the voting method must ignore all preference data about the relative support of X vs. Y as long as the voter prefers X to Y. That causes big problems.
https://medium.com/@ClayShentrup/later-no-harm-72c44e145510
It is precisely why ranked voting methods like Instant Runoff Voting are so vulnerable to tactics. If I prefer the Green, my general best strategy is to tactically rank the Democrat in 1st place, thus "burying" the Green and making the mere appearance of un-electability a self-fulfilling prophecy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
https://www.rangevoting.org/NESD
The major moral of voting theory is to AVOID RANKED VOTING METHODS, favoring RATED voting methods like score voting, STAR voting, and approval voting. Here's a presentation I gave in 2015 to the Colorado League of Women Voters explaining more.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HyBm_Hcu4DI&t=488
I would also recommend the 2008 book "Gaming the Vote". Full disclosure: I'm in it.
scorevoting.net/IrvIgnoreExample.html
I would disagree about Condorcet. Score voting and variants, such as STAR voting and approval voting, are vastly simpler than any ranked method, and perform better in voter satisfaction efficiency calculations, and plausibly make better Condorcet methods than real Condorcet methods.
https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW
The biggest moral of social choice theory is: avoid ranked voting methods.
I think most people wildly overestimate the popular appeal for compromise. Only about 20% of the population would support an opposite-side moderate over a near-side extremist. A true centrist party is doomed to lose in any system that knocks out unviable candidates, since it's the first choice of almost nobody.
I think there's a LOT more room for nuance than "this" or "that" even among the ignorant and/or unengaged. Just look at sports-team divides in the US for evidence.
> to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness
- What they are referring to as RCV is called Instant Runoff Voting (IRV). IRV is a RCV, but RCV isn't IRV. Think "Rock and Roll is The Beatles" vs "The Beatles are a Rock and Roll group."
- IRV isn't that great when it comes to Voter Satisfaction Efficiency (VSE)[0]. There's even other RCV methods like Ranked Pair[1] that are exactly the same for the voter. Essentially IRV is a 6% improvement upon plurality (what we currently use) but RP is a 15% increase from plurality. So I ask, why go to IRV when we can do twice as good? (or better! Keep reading)
- Fair Vote claims that IRV has a high resistance to spoiler candidates (a candidate that takes away votes from another similar candidate). This is actually why the distinction from RCV and IRV is important and why Fair Vote is misleading. While RCV is better than plurality in this respect, some RCVs are better than others. IRV doesn't adequately solve this issue (but there are other RCVs that do!). IRV fails when two candidates are similar in positions and similar in popularity. [2] This is specifically the kind of spoiling that we are trying to prevent. We're trying to prevent a candidate like Sanders from spoiling Biden (or vise versa) not Jill Stein spoiling Biden. IRV prevents the latter, but not the former. I am specifically upset with Fair Vote because they are misleading in this context. Because they claim IRV := RCV, they take all the things different RCV methods solve and claim IRV solves them. This is simply not true (and why I make the first bullet).
- There are just better methods besides ranking (also called "ordinal" methods). There's a class called Cardinal[3], that is actually simpler. The simplest is called approval. An example of approval is Netflix's rating system (binary). It does pretty well. Better yet is range/score voting. This would be the old Netflix system where you rated out of 5 stars. The difference in ranked vs cardinal is that you rate each candidate or policy independent of the others. This allows you to be more precise/honest (you may actually like two candidates equally!). It also reduces complexity because a common accident in ranking is rating two candidates the same. In ordinal systems this is a bug, in cardinal this is a feature.
- I want to specifically mention STAR voting[4]. While STAR isn't perfect, it much better handles various types of spoiler candidates, has a high VSE (similar to that of RP), and handles strategic voting well. The last is the major reason you should choose STAR over RP (and there's no reason you should choose IRV over RP, because RP is strictly better). While all three systems encourage honest voting (in a single agent scenario) strategic voting is always an issue. Under no circumstance is STAR worse than IRV because STAR handles strategic voting. Specifically the most important kind is the "1-sided strategy"[5] which is arguably very common.
- Lastly, I want to appeal to authority. Kennith Arrow (who you may be familiar with from Arrow's Impossibility theorem and Gibbard's extension) is a Nobel Laureate and said cardinal systems are "probably right."[6] And I think many of us know science speak into the confidence that conveys. That link is a full interview with him from Election Science. It is a good read/listen.
TLDR: We want a good voting system, use STAR, not IRV.
[0] https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/vse.html
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranked_pairs
[2] https://www.electionscience.org/library/the-spoiler-effect/
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cardinal_voting
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting
[5] https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/
[6] https://www.electionscience.org/commentary-analysis/voting-t...
There are conditions which resolve this (e.g., when ballot markings in a method like score voting represent the amount of some valuable resource the voter commits to paying if the given choice is elected, or where markings in approval represent a binding commitment to not participate if an non-approved option is chosen and/or to participate if an approved options is chosen.) But these resolutions are typically not available or desirable in most public elections.
> that there is no objective question about preferences that they ask
I don't see this as an issue. I also don't see it as a problem to specifically non-ordinal, but to every system. I like to try to explain a STAR05 ballot simply to people with a forum they are very familiar with. A ballot might look like below
How do you feel about ___x___ candidate?
Very Unfavorably, unfavorably, neutral, favorably, very favorably
Those are your 5 options. Yes, this isn't exact, but we can't have an infinite score. But as we understand distributions, we know that the fluctuations won't matter much. If a group of people have an "honest" opinion that a candidate is rated "favorably" (or a 4) we'll see a distribution around this (a fairly tight distribution). So you'll get some 3's and 5's, but most people will give 4's and the average will be 4. So it isn't an issue. Similarly, if you are ranking people and view two candidates equally 50% of people will put candidate A in front of B and vise versa (well real world there'd be a bias for things like: who is listed first, "nicer" sounding name, familiarity, etc. But still, that's not too big of an issue because at the end we get pretty close to the optimal efficiency that the system can provide). You have to remember that there is no perfect system, Arrow and Gibbard showed that. But the question is if we statistically come close to the optimal (that the system can provide).
I want to point out that simple approval voting is VERY effective, even though it is low precision. You're literally choosing "like" and "dislike." Analysts aren't that concerned with the lack of objectivity in the difference between a 4 and 5 or a 3 and 4 because it is much more refined. If this is a major concern, then extend the expressiveness by increasing the range, e.g. 0-10.
I would also encourage you to listen to that interview that I linked. Arrow briefly discusses this topic. He makes some criticisms of score voting but also says it is the option he would push (question is which he'd advocate for). Remember, there is no such thing as a perfect voting system. There's always a trade-off. We're just trying to minimize the trade-offs.
And personally, if someone made RP popular I would gladly advocate for it. But because we're trying to trade one shitty system (plurality) for something only slightly less shitty (IRV) I am going to be vocal about the issues and lying that is happening. I don't really have an issue with RCVs, but specifically IRV. This is why I wanted to make a clear distinction between the two. Because when the discussions come up we end up using different languages, using the same words to describe different things. This may have been a smart move by Fair Vote, but we're on Hacker News and there's an expectation of more nuance than we'd have in other places like Reddit or in person.
So I am happy to try my best to answer questions and provide more resources. If you like game theory, this is a great subject to learn and has clear and immediate applications (even outside of elections).
Two counterpoints:
- I'm aware of Arrow, but I file it under "perfect being the enemy of the good". :) Whatever the flaws of IRV, it still represents an order of magnitude improvement over FPTP at capturing political preferences. (We suffer so much status quo bias, it takes a lot of activation energy just to communicate to the average voter that better options exist at all!) But I happily cede the point: IRV is not the best choice of all the available options.
- My favorite is actually Approval, and I don't always bring it up because it has lower mindshare and is less self-descriptive / "sticky-branding" compared to Ranked Choice. My reasons for the preference:
(a) There's no nitpicking over counting methods: whoever gets the most votes wins.
(b) Easy to explain to voters (including the counting system), and degrades gracefully for those who still want to vote for only one candidate. (I've heard objections that some voters hit a cheater-detection trigger, that "some people get more votes than others"; this can be solved by reframing as "Y/N" per candidate, so X candidates = X Y/N votes per voter).
(c) I believe it largely sidesteps Arrow by redefining the success condition: rather than attempt to perfectly measure ideal preferences, it definitionally represents "Consent of the Governed": not who's your favorite, but who are you willing to live with? This would make it more difficult for bolder and more unconventional candidates, but at the benefit of rewarding coalitions and consensus-building. Polarization and sowing distrust would cease to be a viable strategy.
(As an aside, in a perfect world, a blank ballot would be counted as a meta-vote for "None of the Above"; and if it wins, a whole new election of all-new candidates must be held.)
This is 100% how you should think about it. But what I'm trying to say is that we already have substantially better methods, so why not use them? Perfect is the enemy of good, but if I have the choice of eating acid, a bowl of oatmeal, and chocolate pudding, I'm going with the pudding. Perfect is the enemy of good when we don't already have the choices sitting right in front of us.
> [IRV] still represents an order of magnitude improvement over FPTP at capturing political preferences
And here's where I'm disagreeing, but only slightly. It is definitely better, but not an order of magnitude.
> Approval voting
I love approval voting. It is great because of its simplicity. That's why they use it in systems like Netflix. Easy to collect and gather results from. Honestly I use it all the time. It is how I solve the "where do you want to eat" problem with friends. You just list things until you get a unanimous vote or if you exhaust your list you just take the most approvals. Simple and easy.
The reason I don't like it for elections is that it makes tying easy and I do not believe it has enough precision. The interview I linked Arrow talks about this so I'll deffer to him (he's clearly smarter than me). In elections you need a clear winner.
Why I like score voting (and Condorcet methods, like RP, which is again RCV) is because I actually hate party systems, but I recognize that they can't be destroyed. But these methods drastically reduce their power (I don't think IRV does).
And I highly encourage you to dig more into the subject and am happy to provide links. I also highly suggest looking deep into everything that the Fair Vote chart discusses, mainly because I believe you will be as frustrated as me (and others, like Condorcet proponents) when you learn what each of those topics are. Everyone I know that is well read in the subject is frustrated by Fair Vote's mischaracterizations.
I think this, all by itself, would be a great thing to have in elections. If this had existed in every election in which I have voted, I think I would have used it at least half the time, quite possibly more.
At any rate, I'm very much in agreement, I think it's a sound policy across the board, even in the context of FPTP. One thing our election system fails to do is disambiguate between voter apathy, and the implicit protest vote of staying home (Australia's mandatory voting being another solution, albeit lacking the teeth of a "None of the Above" reboot).
An alternative for many posts would be to have no one in the office once the incumbent's term expires. For example, suppose no one wins a race for a seat in the House of Representatives: when the incumbent's term expires, that seat could simply be vacant, and could be deemed to have voted "abstain" for all votes during the term in which it is empty (or until a new special election is held to hopefully fill the seat).
(For an office like the President, there might have to be some other provision made.)
This would also handle the other case you mention:
> For more local elections, where running unopposed is not uncommon, there's also an interesting conundrum: should that candidate be rejected if they only receive a plurality, ie under 50%?
I would say yes: that counts as no one winning the election, so the seat remains vacant until a new special election is held (assuming someone does win that).
> What if literally no one else wants the job?
Then I would say the will of the people is that they prefer to have no one doing it, if they do not approve of anyone who wants it.
[1] https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Gavin-Newsom-ve...
If you're wondering why it was vetoed, maybe look at the history of CVRA lawsuits and how having districts has helped communities more than RCV. RCV is an apportioning method, which doesn't necessarily make it a good voting method.
The two parties do not significantly differ on indefinite detention of American citizens on US soil.
The two parties do not significantly differ on domestic spying, dragnet-style data collection and warrantless wiretapping.
The two parties do not differ on their support for backdoors in encryption.
The two parties do not significantly differ on allowing extra-judicial targeted killings.
The two parties do not significantly differ on the use of unmanned drones, either for combat or domestic surveillance.
The two parties both support pre-emptive "cyber" war and non-defensive hacking.
The two parties do not significantly differ on their support for continuing the War On Terror and War On Drugs.
The two parties both support maintaining US military bases around the world.
The two parties do not significantly differ on favoring Keynesian economics.
The two parties support delegating monetary policy decisions to the Federal Reserve, including support for quantitative easing.
The two parties do not significantly differ on their use of earmarks and pork barrel spending.
Neither of the two parties have (recently) proposed plans for balancing the budget.
Neither of the two parties plans to significantly cut defense spending.
The two parties both favor taxpayer-funded foreign aid.
The two parties are largely backed by the same corporate sponsors and special interest groups, with a few key differences.
The two parties both backed TARP and in general favor bailing out companies too big to fail.
The two parties do not significantly differ on their general support of "economic stimulus" as a tool to prop up the economy.
The two parties do not significantly differ on their support for and allegiance to Israel.
The two parties both favor and continue sanctions on Iran.
The two parties do not significantly differ on their use of super PAC funding and their support of unlimited spending from corporations and special interest groups.
The two parties do not significantly differ on their use of gerrymandering to gain political advantage.
The two parties oppose any measures that would strengthen the viability of a third party.