Studies in Intelligence [pdf]
cia.gov
cia.gov
Also compare "The highest realization of warfare lies in attacking the enemy’s plans; next is attacking their alliances; next their army; while the lowest is attacking their fortified cities" with the japanese {Ki, Waza, Ken} wo korosu.
For current US literary style, see https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp2_0... "Intelligence should increase the commander’s understanding of the threat and adversary’s probable intentions, end states, objectives, most likely and most dangerous COAs, strengths, and critical capabilities. This allows the J-2 to recommend objectives, requirements, and centers of gravity (COGs). Once these objectives are approved by the commander, the J-2 must continuously review them with respect to the adversary and the changing situation to determine whether they remain relevant to the commander’s intent."
Edit: p9, footnote c for early (late Ming) steganography.
https://jmss.org/article/download/58139/43748/
But not as early as https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Histiaeus#Ionian_revolt_(499-4...
It seems like a military thing. Though I know other people that do it whenever they're trying to summarize anything tersely (and think they're succeeding when they failing terribly).
on edit: better structure
> a single sentence may be unpacked on multiple levels because the reader/audience for the paper is someone who has a deep background in the subject.
This supposed information density is often a pretext for obfuscation, though. The author is essentially hostile to the reader, fighting a vicious obfuscatory rear-guard action against their comprehension of anything beyond the conclusion they're meant to cite or the technique they're meant to implement (and cite).
I often wonder whether I found student theses so much more helpful because they're long-form, or because either idealism or a less-developed sense of the threshold of acceptable bullshit they can get away with leads them to present their claims and process more clearly.
Beginning in the late 1940s, the Soviet Union began building deep underground facilities at Russian sites. Those near Chekov and Sharapovo, both outside of Moscow, were notable for their heavily concealed national command authority wartime relocation functions. Disguised to look like research and development facilities to US overhead collection, they thus conveyed a deceptive imagery signature to analysts. Only persistent analysis in the early 1980s by the US Air Force Special Studies Group based on anomaly detection and change comparison over 10 years of imagery coverage eventually exposed the facilities' true purposes.
Designed principally to ensure the survivability of the top leadership and provide continuity in command and control during wartime, these exceptionally well-hidden, deep underground, facilities implied Soviet intentions and capabilities to prepare for protracted nuclear war.
A Boy and His Dog would continue the trope.
for the serious original, see p11 of https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM2206.html
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