The Looming Bank Collapse
theatlantic.com
theatlantic.com
The author posits one option, of political intervention precluding another bailout. But the Federal Reserve is non-political precisely to shield it from attempted short-term political machinations. Congress will complain to the cameras and the Fed will go right back to "rescuing" the market.
No, the bottom will only well and truly drop out when there's significant capital flight - when the dearth of real investment opportunities relative to currency glut becomes so acute that capital leaves American borders in search of real return. But to where? And under which circumstances?
Can you give some guesses? I don't see any other place that would seem more attractive than the US. Every other place has its own problems whether it be lack of developed human capital, unstable government systems, etc. Maybe in the distant future if Mars transportation takes off that can be the next big thing?
the core problem of hoarding wealth, as exhibited by the flight of capital to the US, is the inability of small groups of people to efficiently allocate capital, to have enough imagination and ingenuity to centrally-plan their allocations. it's literally anti-capitalist.
Rationalizing the irrational tends to be unpleasant.
I think it's a complete fabrication that people are dependent on the financial system and that we need economic stability. People enjoy drama and they are able to recover from any economic failure. Even total failure.
Too big to fail is total BS. If a solar storm wiped out all records of bank accounts and all records of all financial holdings, the economy would quickly recover. The number of new opportunities that this would create would be unprecedented.
From the perspective of most people, the best feature of capitalism is not its ability to provide sustenance (even communism can do that), it's its ability to provide hope for something better... Unfortunately these days our modern version is not true capitalism, it's crony-capitalism and it doesn't yield much hope - You are given a place in society and the only way you can get something better is by doing something deeply unethical and then earning hush money from your corporate masters.
We are heading towards a dystopian surveillance capitalist future. Even if the economy crashes permanently and never recovers, that future doesn't look so bad compared to what would happen if we stay on course with current monetary policies.
I'd take the Black Swan approach. There are probably a dozen each unlikely events that could cause the bubble to pop but you're unlikely to actually predict which one will do it and when it will happen. Your optimal move is to assume something is going to happen at some point and just hedge yourself against that rather than try to predict. Taleb gets called an oracle but his entire philosophy is not to predict rare events that destabilize a system but just accept they will eventually happen and prepare accordingly
In this case having some portion of your net worth in BTC/Crypto seems like an obvious hedge
Central banks are doing everything in their power to keep interest rates low because if they were to tick up even a little bit, the whole house of cards will come toppling down. They can't do it forever and we're all just playing chicken with hyperinflation.
There is no such thing as "artificial" or "natural" rates of interest.
>Central banks are doing everything in their power to keep interest rates low because if they were to tick up even a little bit, the whole house of cards will come toppling down.
Why would, or should, they "tick up"? Capital is abundant. If rates were higher, things would be different, yes. But that is not the world we live in.
>It's the only still keeping this zombie of an economy moving, and it's the entire world
I love the idea that the entire global economy is fake, artificial and zombie-like, because it doesn't operate the way you think it should. A reasonable person would take a step back and question their premises and understanding.
That is not entirely true.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_rate_of_interest
Whether the natural rate of interest is real, or is a unvariate value is a matter of some debate among economists.
In a sense this is semantically correct, there is no one true interest rate, in a hypothetical pure market there are many rates for many different types of transactions.
But to say that wildly misses the point that the rates for all transactions are hugely skewed, all in the same direction, because a single player, who writes the laws, and prints the money, is putting enormous pressure on rates.
So yes, there is no objective one natural rate. But all rates right now are extremely artificially skewed.
> Why would, or should, they "tick up"? Capital is abundant.
Capital is abundant for the sole purpose of keeping rates low. You are confusing the causality here. If they weren't being suppressed, and actors were setting rates on a per transaction basis, then they would drastically tick up as many of the underlying entities economy wide have riskier default profiles than they have in the past. This isn't conspiratorial or speculative. This is widely understood to be true by mainstream economists, even those who support the rate suppression.
...And several Russian novelists burst out laughing in their graves.
If I loan you money there's risk you won't be able to pay me back. So I decide what interest you would need to pay me for it to be worth it for me to take that risk. Lots of other people do that, and you get a "natural" rate of interest as you call it. Everyone offering you the loan has skin in the game.
But if the entity that prints the money says they'll loan you money, it doesn't matter to them if you can't pay it back. They set the money supply. If you don't pay back, they can take the value from everyone dealing in their money by printing more. This lack of risk allows them to undercut the rates of entities who would be taking on risk. Now you have an "artificially" low interest rate.
The new part is the expectation that governments will prop up companies during bad economies.
This is bewildering to anyone with a naive view that believes America is a purely capitalistic economy. Surely if a company prepares enough for the storms, it's worthy of surviving them. Running thin savings is now more risky, but it means more profit. That's fair.
From another perspective, it's economic innovation where unpredictable disasters don't kill huge companies or industries. This can be a good thing, but it's not really capitalism any more.
So the person taking a step back will ask, "How far will the government go to protect large companies? How large do you have to be to get this protection? How does all of this work?" This is what we can't answer.
This is where people (rationally) start to believe things are fake, because the country's leadership gets to decide what happens to companies during these times.
Now this company knows the government is likely to bail them out, what reason do they have to plan for the worst any more? This gets even more uncomfortable when they get bailouts for causing the disaster themselves.
At a basic level, if you removed all demand for airlines, you'd say "well, airlines don't look like a great investment". But now the demand matters less during disasters because demand isn't actually keeping the company alive as in most businesses.
I live in Canada, a huge country. Its not profitable for any company to provide power to remote places with only a few inhabitants. Its only possible because the government mandates it, and the rest of us subsided it.
It's the other way around: the entire reason why everything is so screwed is because of interest. It's an evil and exploitative practice that has destroyed so many people, only for a relative few to become wealthy. It's obvious today how this works out, but it's been going on for thousands of years, which is why it's banned in many religions, and for good reason.
Should everyone sell everything at cost to avoid "exploiting" others?
No one is saying not to make profit, just do it properly. You can rationalize interest as being compensated for risk, but it doesn't make any less exploitative. We have already seen how the economy keeps getting screwed, yet we don't learn.
This logic holds no water. The great majority of things sold are sold to people to need them. Why should money be any exception?
When you sell money for money, this equation breaks. You're exchanging $1 for a different amount in the future, taking advantage of the fact that the borrower cannot pay you in the present. This is what defines interest and usury.
It's easy to get bogged down in the details to legislate or rationalize a certain action. Take a step back and see the destruction that interest based lending has caused throughout history, and in the present.
Just because you buy a dollar rather than a shirt does not suddenly make you exploited. Imagine if everything debt is used for had to be bought in full. Very few people would own homes. Very few capital investment projects would be undertaken. Very few automobiles would be owned. Your life is far better because debt exists. There is no society where debt does not exist that is doing better than societies that allow debt.
You said it yourself, it's correlation, not causation. There are other factors that occurred in that time frame that increased the standard of living for people.
> Imagine if everything debt is used for had to be bought in full
That's how things were generally run back in the day, people saved up, then bought what they wanted. Also, people purchased on installments.
Your argument is basically that the ends justifies the means. That economic growth is the end goal, sell more cars, etc. so we need to put everyone in debt. We are already seeing the huge wealth gaps that exist in hyper capitalistic societies, due to no small part to running everything on interest and other immoral practices. I posit that if there were no interest, things would be more fair, and producers would have to reduce prices, making it easier for people to own stuff, compared to the inflation we see.
The difference with money seems rather to be that the value is created over time, where other transactions happen based on the current value of the things being exchanged. But given that we all die this doesn't strike me as morally wrong.
Food is perishable, and people like diversity in what they eat. Your example is an apples to oranges comparison. If he doesn't like what you offer, he'll go elsewhere.
> The difference with money seems rather to be that the value is created over time, where other transactions happen based on the current value of the things being exchanged.
Yes. Furthermore, when lending money to someone with interest, the lender gets what he put in and more, whereas say leasing a car out, he'll get it back, but it would have been consumed. This type of exchange doesn't happen with money.
> But given that we all die this doesn't strike me as morally wrong.
We can take that to it's conclusion and say nothing matters at all. People are out protesting against racial inequality, but we'll all die at the end, so it doesn't matter.
With lending money, there's usually a collateral involved. If the borrower defaults, then the lender simply comes after his property, taking more than what was originally lent, purely by the passing of time (which accrues interest).
When you read about student loans for instance, especially higher loans for people who go into law or med schools, how even after those people are employed and making good money, their outstanding amounts barely budge (or even accrue) even after a while. This is unjust, unfair, unethical, and exploitative.
If interest rates were to rise to normal levels, asset prices could fall 45%. It's hard to imagine anything but deflation.
Unless interest rates go to extreme negatives, you will not see another effect like the one we have already seen from interest rate manipulation. There's just not enough room for a big rate of change.
It would be completely separate if you had outrageous fiscal spending to try to prop up asset prices. Given that fiscal stimulus is much harder to pass than monetary, hyperinflation doesn't seem like the thing to worry about.
Traditionally if you had a large pile of gold and you wanted to protect it, you had to buy a safe to put it in and hire guards to keep the thieves out. The guard's salary is in essence a negative interest rate.
It was only the invention and adoption of fractional reserve banking that enabled positive interest rates.
- CDOs (although a new generation of them have a new name/initialism)
- Frank/Dodd was partially rolled back
- The definition of bank size-classes was changed to reduce the regulatory burden over most regional banks that were previously more regulated
- No significant adverse event happened after Standard & Poors was identified as having significantly inaccurate ratings on CDO / mortgage bond
- moral hazard all over the financial sector, multiplied by large QE rounds
- shadow inventory of housing (not sure if this was sold off or if banks still hold lots of houses off the market)
- lots of private unicorns have opted not to try to go IPO, despite Wall Street records over the past few years
(edit: I converted the indented list to individual paragraphs)
But given these assumptions, are the US financial markets really that healthy? It still feels like we have a few asset bubbles, especially in the assets which QE propped up.
The formatting doc[1] is very short and doesn't include a list.
I get the difference between what is usually called a "bubble" and what is usually called "inflation", but I don't think you can accurately identify a bubble until it has already burst and you do it in retrospect.
"Fairly priced" is strange because every transaction is "fairly priced" in the moment (given the knowledge at the time), but may turn out to be "unfairly priced" if in retrospect it appears to be fraudulent.
It's price inflation if investors are rationally speculating on the future value of the dollar, relative to the assets.
It is hard to conceive that the dollar is not going to depreciate as a result of monetary policy, or that the monetary policy is going to change. I consider the latter scenario to be more plausible.
> "Fairly priced" is strange because every transaction is "fairly priced" in the moment
To be clear, I'm saying that the price represents fair value.
Yeah, I think my biggest complaint of the private market / public market is the accessibility gap and the face that the actual valuation of a private company is extremely skewed because there is such little public info for due diligence and the company is so rarely re-evaluated.
This paragraph is conceding a point that should not be conceded. The system did not right itself if many Americans lost homes, jobs, and wealth. 12 years later, not everyone has recovered from the 2008 collapse.
The overall economy recovered, but of course it looked a bit different. It was 4-5 years later.
Instead lots of money handed over to banks to fix their books and toxic assets handed over to the .gov. Lots of people losing their homes and jobs, no one in the financial sector really seeing any jail time or penalty for their malfeasance. Much of the financial sector actually made off quite well during/after the crisis.
We're seeing it again with big businesses getting COVID bailouts, meanwhile politicians are wringing their hands that unemployment insurance benefits are "too high" and "main street" needs to get back to work. Make sure "main street" is held accountable and/or penalized, but it seems there are a lot of golden parachutes and soft landings for big business and the finance industries.
2. You're looking at this from a perspective of blame. I recently took out a fairly large loan for a purchase myself, and even as a smart, educated person, it was difficult for me to find insight into what a reasonable monthly payment might be. Lenders have far more information than borrowers do. I think if we're going to place blame for the financial crisis, that blame has to be shared, but I think simply based on the information available to the parties involved, we have to place the blame primarily on the lenders, who have far more information and context than the borrowers do.
3. However, I think blame is fundamentally the wrong way to look at this. To me, the entire point of having an economy is to provide people with a better standard of living. If the economy ceases to perform that function, any intervention by the government should be geared toward causing it to perform that function again. Instead, the bailouts were aimed at improving a few myopic metrics, metrics which only benefitted the already wealthy. The problem isn't that the bailout didn't punish the right people: I'm not interested in punishment. The problem is that the bailout made America a worse place for almost everyone.
> and the system righted itself
I suppose maybe it depends what "the system" refers to, exactly. If it's the same bankers who shape the financial system and the banks who all own part of the Federal Reserve which printed money to put price supports under their worst assets, then sure, "the system" "righted" "itself".
But in the end, there is no right or guarantee that every person will get a job, be able to keep a house, or will not lose wealth. And we should remember that about our future when reading this piece.
That's true for most people, but it's simply not true for the wealthy in practice. The government did try to make an example of a few players in the 2008 collapse, but for the most part, the message sent by the handling of the 2008 crisis was that if you're a big enough company and you take a risk that doesn't pay off, the poor and middle class will be forced to subsidize your mistake.
So now consider, most of the underlying loans have to default and the recovery rate has to be below battle tested assumptions before the top tiers get risky. This is very very unlikely to happen given the Fed and the US Govt. have done so much and are committed to do more to stave off a severe depression / recession. It's more like people were killing it buying the safer parts at distressed prices as over leveraged funds shed them on the back of margin calls in March.
> We already know that a significant majority of the loans in CLOs have weak covenants that offer investors only minimal legal protection; in industry parlance, they are “cov lite.” The holders of leveraged loans will thus be fortunate to get pennies on the dollar as companies default—nothing close to the 70 cents that has been standard in the past.
The trick is "repo", or repurchase agreements.
(1) Buy bonds
(2) Use those bonds as collateral for a low-interest loan
(3) Use the loan money to buy bonds
(4) goto 2
See, e.g [1]
[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-15/how-repo-...
[EDIT] well no that can't be it because it requires even more money coming in for those loans, which can't provide more expected return than the bonds they're buying or the whole thing would be pointless.
That means that investors' internal risk limits are the binding constraint, not repo haircuts.
It's another way of saying that the financial sector sets its own leverage. Historically, that has not turned out well. It's why Dodd-Frank included a leverage rule for large banks.
While part of risk, expected return is a larger binding constraint in most cases over risk limits. I'm probably not going to lever up 20x for an tiny expected return. On the other hand, I may very well lever up 5-10x on something 50x more risky than treasuries if the 10yr is yielding 0.725%.
There is some credible research which suggests that large financial institutions act as if they are optimizing mean return subject to a VaR constraint [1].
But for the sake of argument: large bank VaR models affect hedge funds because hedge funds get their leverage through their prime brokers which are... large investment banks.
Additionally, what's new about this cycle is tech companies being a massive percentage of issuance. What's the recovery value of a tech company with little to no real assets? Additionally, what's the recovery value of an energy company when oil has dropped as much as it has? Both of those sectors make up a huge portion of outstanding and will move the needle meaningfully even if other sectors are fine.
I probably agree with your overall point about the Fed and and govt but you really cannot use historical assumptions for recovery rates this cycle.
The ECB had to bail out quite a few banks, and several states have done the same. Even now the ECB is preparing new bailouts for European banks:
https://www.brusselstimes.com/all-news/business/116135/europ...
And when even the ECB thinks banks have behaved so appalingly they deserve to die (trust me this takes quite a bit of really, really bad behavior), the individual countries:
https://www.france24.com/en/20081020-french-government-105-b...
That's deliberate. If they're too complex for most people to understand then they're very hard to scrutinize.
Back in '08 we heard about how "complex" CDS are. There is nothing complex about a CDS.
Whenever something bad happens in the financial sector, there is always a simple story behind it. Usually a combination of fraud and leverage.
Fraud falls into category 1 (as do many other things, like correlation of loan defaults), and leverage into category 2.
The mechanisms by which risk is allocated are generally quite simple.
The Fed's monetary policy models are another story. If you drill down on the internal politics of the FOMC, you start to see the "research" as Kabuki theater which exists to justify whatever decision the big people upstairs want.
It is this political dynamic, rather than the reduced compensation, that deters most talented people from public service.
[1] https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443989204577599...
If I printed some $100USD bills, took them to the bank and tried to deposit them, they would have no value. The consensus is that you aren't allowed to print money.
The United States Government prints money all the time. This money has value because there is a world-wide consensus that it has value.
The simple fact is that there is and has been (for many decades) no safer place to park vast sums of money than with the United States Government.
There are limits, though it's not clear what they are. If the US Government printed 330 billion trillion dollars, and gave a trillion to each US citizen, then the consensus would be instantly broken.
The US Government printing 'a trillion here, a trillion there', at this moment in history, is not materially damaging the global consensus. This confidence is relatively easy to measure: when the US creates more debt, are there buyers? The answer is and has been for many decades 'absolutely yes'.
I'm not trivializing this borrowing, and I'm not vilifying it. It is a unique tool that should be used wisely.
No the Government borrows against future taxes (consider that an accounts receivable), the borrowed money doesn’t have value because of consensus it has value because it is backed by future tax revenue.
If the government did as you say and borrowed a trillion per taxpayer the system would breakdown but not because of some “consensus” but because the account receivable (future taxes) is insufficient to payback the borrowed money.
Part of it, I imagine, is that the US government is likely to benefit from future tech booms, as it has in the past (despite tax shenanigans from the tech companies themselves). It gets a piece of stock market profits -- a stock market whose own levels are also currently out of keeping with rational revenue expectation.
To your point being rational doesn’t really give insights into these issues, but talk to any government budget officer and the can give you a sobering reality of the situation.
But it's not reasonable for that debt to grow without limit. It has to be able to pay the interest on the debt, for which it requires revenue. We take in only around $3T a year in total. That's still a large fraction of that $26T debt, but we're also supposed to pay our actual obligations out of that -- which at the moment are over $4T. Eventually the debt service is going to be larger than our revenue, and I just don't see investors being willing to just let that amount ride as new debt.
And yet people will loan us money for 10 years at well under 1% interest. That keeps the interest burden down -- and yet with the debt growing at over $1T per year it can't last forever.
Less than 10% of the total federal budget goes into debt payments.
The absolute numbers don't really matter, but the percentages do. Trends also matter, as long as they're considered carefully.
I'm not necessarily defending past or present fiscal policy. I'm pretty concerned about this stuff as well.
(To be clear: I don't think we should have been cutting social spending. But we definitely should not have been giving huge tax breaks to the most wealthy.)
So to answer your question: it's likely that the future probability of safely printing money goes down as more money is printed, thus making that ability a scarce resource.
My intuition is that the federal government giving additional money to the wealthy (as it has done since 2016) is of less marginal value to society than retaining the future ability to print equivalent additional debt.
I could be wrong of course.
A pretty decent 10-year student loan right now is at 4% interest. And you generally have to pay it back with actual money that you earn.
A 10-year treasury note is at more like 1%, and nobody bats an eye at the government covering payments by issuing more notes. Meaning that, in effect, the US government is getting an indefinite interest-only loan at a pretty low rate.
Actual humans don't get to do that because of a sticky problem: eventually we age out of our money-earning years, and (hopefully some time later) we die. Lenders, understandably, have an interest in getting their money back before that happens. Or at least in getting to the point where the loan is collateralized by assets that are worth more than the loan's balance by the time that happens. And that's the ultimate reason why revolving debt gets worrisome: It's running down the clock.
The US government, on the other hand, is theoretically immortal. There's a risk that it might become insolvent at some point in the future, but there's not the same reason to worry about handling debt by endlessly revolving it, because there's no proverbial clock for it to run out.
Another class of entities that have a kind of 'forever debt' are large corporations. In general, they never want to be debt free. As I said elsewhere, it's about the percentages and trends.
To be clear: even this comparison has weaknesses. Indeed, US federal debt truly has no direct parallels.
This is one of two reasons it has value.
As other comments mention, the other reason is because it's by far the leading global reserve currency. Which is to say it's an attractive mix of liquid, stable, and available, compared to alternatives.
Furthermore, there are certain commodities (e.g. oil), for which dollars are required.
As a result, other countries / parties may believe the dollar is overvalued, but they will still have to acquire them, at the market rate, to execute transactions.
As a result of that ongoing demand, the dollar will tend to be valued both on its future tax revenue value AND as a result of a substantial, continuous demand.
Obviously, an individual human can't operate like this. The USA government can, and has for decades. Remember the Gospels' admonition to "render unto Caesar."
https://www.thebalance.com/who-owns-the-u-s-national-debt-33...
* businesses make things and sell them
* businesses take loans as a way to have a base of money to operate with, because the costs associated to make things have to be paid before the revenue from selling them comes in, and sales may be cyclical, etc
* businesses pay interest on those loans. (Hopefully this interest rate is significantly less than their profit margin.)
* the issuers of the loans- usually banks- sell the rights to the interest payments of those loans. Why? When a bank makes a loan, it is exposed to the risk of the business failing- if it fails, the loan principal and interest payments are lost. banks don't want this kind of "all or nothing" risk (more below).
* people who buy those rights package those interest payment rights into legal structures that combine interest payment rights from a lot of businesses together
* parts of those melded interest payment legal structures are then sold, often sold back to banks, because now the risk, instead of being "all or nothing" is "diversified".
The same thing happens with mortgages- banks that issue mortgages sell the mortgages and then buy into structures that package the payment rights from many, many mortgages.
For every given institution/bank, the move to sell the specific asset and buy the diversified asset makes sense.
At a systemic level, when everyone is doing this, it becomes systemically risky.
What's happening now, because of the systemic risk, entities that hold these "diversified" assets are themselves selling them to the central bank, which is then absorbing the systemic risk. This article doesn't mention that bank holdings of cash are at all time highs.
In principle, this does not amount to "printing money to stay afloat"- though many will say in practice it does. In principle, it amounts to shifting systemic risk around.
Only the US account receivable is taxes paid by taxpayers. So what happens is when the rich are in trouble they turn to the government and what the government does is says ok we will borrow against future taxes and just give it to you and typically those being bailed out are banks who turn around and take the taxpayers money and lend it back to the taxpayers. In short the taxpayers get screwed twice once being indebted to the government for future taxes and then again when they have to borrow their own debt from banks.
So imagine I’m your government and say look Bank needs money so I am going to give the bank $100 and you the taxpayers will have to pay that back. Bank gets the money and turns around and lends you $90 while keeping $10 as a fee earned and for lending you the $90 you will need to pay the bank back $100. You see now you need to pay $100 in future taxes to the government and $100 to the bank, so you are really out about $200 less the $90 loan.
That's basically what's been happening since 2008. The main lesson the Economics profession learned from the Great Depression is that it's better to prevent a full-on depression by any means available than to let it occur and rebuild afterwards. Rebuilding after that level of economic destruction is long and arduous, better to preserve what you have. That's what the 2008 GFC would have caused (or worse) if not for extensive US govt and Fed preventative measures.
The modern means of doing that is for the government to deficit spend and for the central bank to pump the financial system full of cheap or free credit. Problem now is, nobody sees a way of unwinding the deficits and cheap credit without causing the depression they were trying to prevent.
Neither political party has the political will to balance the budget and be the cause of the resulting economic pain. Republicans convince themselves we can outgrow the deficits by cutting taxes, and Dems convince themselves that Modern Monetary Theory will spur growth and limit inflation enough to outgrow the deficits. The Fed tried early in the Trump admin to raise rates back to normality, and the market started crashing again, so they stopped. We're stuck.
It's the most consequential economic experiment since the US left gold standard, and nobody knows how it will turn out. Imho our best hope is for a gradual devaluation of the Dollar and a soft landing, avoiding a major shock. But under precarious circumstances like these, unpredictable shocks are a distinct, if not likely, possibility.
Then, I don't know about Wells specifically, but it is possible that these CLOs may not even be external transactions, that the bank securitised its own loans so that it stands ready to post them to the central bank as collateral to get short term funding in exchange, if a liquidity crisis hits. If it is the case, it is actually a good thing.
The banking system is increadibly strong vs 2008, the amount of capital banks hold is a multiple of what they held in 2008, while having reduced the size of their balance sheets at the same time (ex Chinese banks). They hold huge amounts of liquid assets and have limits on how much short term funding they can rely on. In addition the introduction of bailin should protect tax payers in the case of a bank failure.
I would be much more worried about the financial impact of money printing. The amount of QE that the Fed has introduced is unprecedented, both in size and velocity, and they keep printing. And we are only at the begining of this downturn. This will massively distord the markets. And I don't believe it will not create inflation ultimately, which is a much bigger threat to savers than their bank credit risk.
This used to be true, but isn't. The job of the bank to is play the spread. They take 0% interest loans from the Fed, loan the money to you, and then resell the loan into the market (aka, your 401k). This is why the subprime mortgage crisis was a crisis. Banks had almost 0 risk. Just let the credit rating agencies stamp AAA on the CLO, push it into the state of California's pension fund as AAA securities, profit.
If any bank is not selling the loan, they're taking a completely unnecessary risk.
Japanese co-op banks on the other hand have huge CLOs holdings and would be extremely exposed if these went sour.
Almost all of the monetary inflation these days shows up in the markets as inflated asset prices and does not show up in the CPI.
If you believe that bare sustenance of the working class is the only thing that matters, you could argue that this distinction is not significant... But growing wealth inequality is causing concentration of political power, distorting markets, regulating small businesses out of existence, creating useless corporate jobs, driving up rents, eroding privacy rights, eroding democracy, eroding freedom of speech, creating division (Milton Friedman even warned us about this in the 70s), encouraging unethical business practices (surveillance capitalism)... I think we're well beyond the point where we can sweep these problems under the carpet. They have become existential problems for society and they are caused by wealth inequality brought about by asset price inflation and accompanying stock buybacks (often paid for using interest-free printed credit from banks).
We live in a feudal society - But unfortunately for the plutocrats, they cannot use god's will as an excuse to justify their current position in society... The more time passes, the more people become aware of systematic cronyism, the more untenable the plutocrats' positions will be.
To put $29.7B that into context -- Table 4 of the most recent 10K says that Wells has ~1.7 trillion dollars of earning assets. Tables 1 & 2 indicate they hold around 180B of shareholder capital buffer.
But how many other financial instruments they own are tied up in CLOs on the books of other banks?
The whole point of The Big Short and Margin Call was that the banks aren't resilient, independent silos. When one bank shakes or falls, it can impact the neighboring bank which causes a domino effect. They all invest in slices of the things that the other banks invest in, they all do it with lots of leverage, and they all think they've hedged against the downside risk, but that still didn't prevent the 2008 collapse.
it's disgusting that we haven't learned anything from 2008.
Having regulations which restrict which companies are allowed to trade specific classes of instruments/services (eg. Glass Steagall) helps mitigate this, but doesn't even approach eliminating it.
markets require relative participant independence for pricing and allocation to function properly, otherwise we get bubbles. and now, we get constant bailouts (of capital, not labor), so on top of that, there's no downside risk to provide any counterbalance. it's corrupt.
Or maybe you were born in 2009?
FSB:
"Available data indicates that banks have the largest direct exposures to leveraged loans and CLOs. These exposures are concentrated among a limited number oflarge global banks and have a significant cross-border dimension.
... A number of non-bank investors are also exposed to leveraged loan and CLO markets. These include investment funds, insurance companies, pension funds, broker-dealers and holding companies.
... A comprehensive assessment of the system-wide implications of the exposures of financial institutions to leveraged loans and CLOs is challenging.
... These exposures are generally concentrated among a limited number of banks. These banks’ exposures to leveraged loans and CLOs, on a fully drawn basis, are significant relative to their capital adequacy ratios.
"Similar to other markets, the leveraged loan and CLO markets include direct and indirect forms of interconnectedness, both within and across borders. Direct interconnectedness arises from links in the intermediation chain, from origination and distribution of leveraged loans to securitisation by CLO manager.
... Through these direct links, shocks to the leveraged loan and CLO markets could transmit risks to financial intermediaries not directly exposed to such markets.
... Indirect interconnectedness can arise in the form of common exposures of banks and non-banks to leveraged loans and CLOs, and could provide an avenue for contagion among financial institutions."
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P191219.pdf
Fed:
"Similarly, vulnerabilities stemming from leveraged lending were increasing through mid-February 2020, as demand remained strong while credit standards stayed weak. Issuance came to a halt at the end of February, as investors became more cautious and attentive to volatility in financial markets...
Defaults on leveraged loans ticked up in February and March and are likely to continue to increase, with the specific contour highly dependent on the path of overall economic activity. Such developments would weaken the balance sheets of lenders, including CLOs that hold leveraged loans, and amplify the economic effects of COVID-19."
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-...
If you look at what the other guy said in this thread, taking WFC as an example, they have ~$2T in assets, and $27B in CLOs. They could lose every dollar in CLOs at once and the firm would still be fine.
There are certain smaller companies and brokers that deal in CLOs that would not be having a fun time if CLOs went belly up as a whole. The banking system would be fine. There is simply not enough of that paper out there to pose a systemic threat.
Loaning money to high-risk companies? Bundling a whole bunch of said loans into securities? High returns despite the risk of a significant fraction of defaults? Sounds like the world has been here before.
If this was a B-flick, it might well be called the return (or revenge) of the junk bond monster.
We have bad loans on the books? Oops, nothing we can do here and can't have so many foreclosed lower valued assets. Print.
If anyone looked at billionaire net worths, they would know that hyperinflation is rampant. The only reason it doesn't show up in the cost of Milk is because the peasants (we the people) fight for scraps and are willing to take smaller slice of the pie.
In other words, the Bernanke trick of inflating assets in 2008 did its job. It inflated assets and the size of the pie increased. But 90% of the participants still have a lower share of the pie.
If you aren’t doing it yourself already, maybe you should. I’m gonna try and maybe make a medium.com post about it.
> The total is $29.7 billion. It is a massive number. And it is inside the bank.
What percentage of Wells Fargo's assets is that? It looks they they've 1.9 trillion in assets, so even they were worth nothing, would it have a material impact?
There might be more?
Obviously there are theft, fire, and police confiscation risks that need to be overcome first.
Casting literally every inch of his financial judgment into doubt.
Or maybe we've just been pranked
To get some perspective, the FED recently added almost three trillion dollars of "not QE" to the balance sheet, mostly because of COVID-19.
They'll be bailed out.
"But this time, the bailout proposal will likely face stiffer opposition, from both parties"
Doubtful. Everything can be blamed on the virus this time.
[0]: https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm
> But the losses from CLOs, combined with losses from other troubled assets like those commercial-mortgage-backed securities, will lead to serious deficiencies in capital.
You're making a pretty brave assertion given what we saw in 2008. I now assume that the ratings are all skewed to be too optimistic, publicly acknowledged exposure is skewed to underreport, and our ability to see the actual damage that would be caused by a system-wide collapse in CLOs isn't clear because we don't know what each opaque silo is doing to multiply or hedge those CLOs (and neither does any individual silo).
Also, capital reserve requirements dry up very quickly when a panic starts to set in. The Federal Reserve saved us earlier this year and in 2008+, but there comes a point when it won't be as successful and investors may start to see other markets as being comparatively lower risk, especially after the official US debt will likely jump 20-50% this year alone and we never unrolled the $4.5trillion in QE, only added another $4trillion - $10trillion onto that.
Edit for source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm
- Capital requirements against the CLO's assume AAA ratings
- In 2008, we learned that AAA CDO traunches were really AAA (despite not containing a single AAA-rated loan) only when assumptions about (non-)correlation of defaults remained true -- ie real estate markets are local so not everyone defaults at the same time
- The problem with the AAA CDO ratings was that in a time of crisis, all the "good times" defaulting correlation assumptions go out the window and everyone defaults together. Now the magic of blending a bunch of BBB's, BB's, and B's into an AAA no longer works.
So if now we're repeating the same story -- a big shock ('rona) makes a whole bunch of previously uncorrelated loans default together -- then the argument goes that the capital requirements which assumed AAA ratings are insufficient.
What part of that story is wrong or incomplete?
>But there’s another threat to the economy, too. It lurks on the balance sheets of the big banks, and it could be cataclysmic.
(10 paragraphs later)
>I ran my finger across the page to see the total for these investments, investments that Powell and Mnuchin have asserted are “outside the banking system.”
The total is $29.7 billion. It is a massive number. And it is inside the bank.