See perhaps Renaissance's Medallion Fund:
> The Medallion fund is considered to be one of the most successful hedge funds ever. It has averaged a 71.8% annual return, before fees, from 1994 through mid-2014.[32]
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renaissance_Technologies#Medal...
People speculate that while mathematically half of trades must win and the other must lose (for each side of a buy-sell), that Medallion may perhaps 'win' something like 52% of trades, but their volume is so high that the (e.g.) 2% gives them their profit just like The House only needs a slight edge when it comes to casinos.
The fact that Medallion had this extraordinary return in a period that included the 2008 crash is remarkable, but even then you would only have had to predict a single black swan in order to avoid being impacted by it. And even I saw that one coming back in the day, and I don't really pay that much attention.
PS: I have tried to time the market exactly 4 times and it’s worked every time. That does not mean the EMH is dead, that’s just like how I am actually up on slot machines and have decided never to play again.
It's a nice model. But like most economic and financial models shouldn't be held as gospel.
Also, information is not uniformly available in real markets. That subset of the traders who have all the information will beat those who have only some of the information.
There is a lot left out of the hypothesis. For instance, even if every trading node in the system has access to all the information, do they all have access to every pieces of new information at the same time? If some of them get it before others, then they have an advantage. If all nodes eventually have the information, then the prices will settle according to the hypothesis when new information stops being available.
[0] http://csinvesting.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/The-Superi...
* over the last few years (15?), he's actually trailed the S&P 500 (IIRC)
* 2013 paper "Buffett's Alpha"
> Berkshire Hathaway has realized a Sharpe ratio of 0.76, higher than any other stock or mutual fund with a history of more than 30 years, and Berkshire has a significant alpha to traditional risk factors. However, we find that the alpha becomes insignificant when controlling for exposures to Betting-Against-Beta and Quality-Minus-Junk factors. Further, we estimate that Buffett's leverage is about 1.6-to-1 on average. Buffett's returns appear to be neither luck nor magic, but, rather, reward for the use of leverage combined with a focus on cheap, safe, quality stocks. Decomposing Berkshires' portfolio into ownership in publicly traded stocks versus wholly-owned private companies, we find that the former performs the best, suggesting that Buffett's returns are more due to stock selection than to his effect on management. These results have broad implications for market efficiency and the implementability of academic factors.