"Nobody supposes that the computational model of rainstorms in London will leave us all wet. But they make the mistake of supposing that the computational model of consciousness is somehow conscious. It is the same mistake in both cases."
You sound a bit like many of the people who completely miss the point of the argument and insult it (or its author).
You might recognize this as the system's reply for which Searle has a response. But his response is insufficient to save the argument as it merely equivocates on what "the system" is. The system is the set of rules and the database of facts, some input/output mechanism, and some central processor to execute the rules against the symbols. The system's reply says that the man blindly executing instructions is not identical to the system that understands Chinese, namely the entire room. Thus properties of the man have no bearing on the properties of the system; that the man does not understand Chinese has no bearing on whether the system as a whole understands Chinese.
But the man is still not "the system" when he memorizes the instructions and leaves the room. The system is some subset of the man, specifically only those brain networks required to carry out the processing of the symbols. Importantly, these brain networks are different than what we take the man to be. It is true that the man doesn't speak Chinese, but since the system processing symbols is still not identical to the man, properties of the man do not bear on properties of the system. So still, the fact that the man blindly executing instructions doesn't speak Chinese does not entail that the system doesn't speak Chinese.
But we know a lot about the biology of the substrate of consciousness, and none of those properties seem relevant to consciousness. There doesn't appear to be any fundamental property of neurons that is relevant to conscious experience. The only thing of relevance is its organization and thus its causal or computational structure. But these properties can be reproduced arbitrarily well in a general computer.
The idea is if the cloud formations and rain generated by the model are indistinguishable from what you are seeing from your window. It doesn't mean that the model is actually producing rain. It may look the same on camera, but if you go outside, it is very different: only the real rain will make you wet.
In the same way, if a computer behaves like a conscious entity. For example a chatbot acting like a human, as in a Turing test. It doesn't mean that the computer is conscious.
Note that the computer may be conscious, but it is not a requirement in order to run a model. In the same way that a weather model could use actual water, but doesn't need to.