Two Heads: A marriage devoted to the mind-body problem (2007)
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This is a very western view. Many eastern religions and philosophies have, for thousands of years, expressed the unity of matter and consciousness (non-duality). Not only have they expressed it, but they developed exercises/practices to experience it.
The way the Churchlands' approach the mind is through reductive materialism. Basically they argue that the mind is identical to the brain given that brain process A causes mental/internal process B. With that reduction we should either eliminate language for mental experience or root it entirely in the corresponding physical process.
This sort of reduction is more or less a scientific reduction in that it serves an explanatory purpose. However, some philosophers reject the idea that scientific reduction is sufficient for a philosophical reduction which is something along the lines of brain process A completely explaining mental experience B. The problem that a philosophical reduction poses is that of internal experience.
Non-reductionists would argue that no amount of physical data could explain subjective experience. Brain scans can show what happens physiologically when you are happy, but not the 'what it's like to be happy'. Whether or not that's convincing to you is a matter of personal preference.
The bottom line seems to be that there is a major physical aspect to the mind, but also that we feel like we are more than chemical reactions. It is not clear that we can practically get rid of either dualism or materialism.
If you are curious, look at Thomas Nagel, and 'the hard problem of consciousness' by Chalmers.
If I am not mistaken, you are assuming something along the lines that the physical world is deterministic, and this implies that materialism is incompatible with free will. Quite a few philosophers and scientists (perhaps a majority) are materialists who also are "compatibilists", thinking some form of free will is available within materialism. Here's Sean Carroll discussing it lightly [1], and Daniel Dennett has expounded in depth on the question.
Personally, I am not convinced that the free will of compatibilism much resembles the sort of free will as it is commonly imagined, but regardless, the apparent inconsistency that you outline here is not necessarily so, as an incompatibilist-deterministic-materialist can presumaby think that it was inevitable that we would organize society as if we had free will!
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/arts/television/westworld...
It could be inevitable that once modern science is discovered, that 'free will' is a useful fiction that is disposed of for a more scientifically rigorous determinism. E.g. if we can identify that certain types of brains are most productive (high IQ), and other types of brains most inclined to criminal behavior, then we can modify human genes to produce the former kind of brains and not the latter.
In other words, if materialism is true, then the path forward is to figure out how to reduce the socially useful faculties to their material components, and recreate society through genetic engineering to have just the useful material components. Additionally, we would eliminate notions of property and responsibility as outdated, prescientific ideas.
Just trying that thought on -- not sure i'll keep it, but thanks for provoking it :)
If someone more knowledgeable about the subject would like to chime in, I would appreciate it.
The legal system is designed with "agency" in mind, but it's true purpose is to create law abiding citizens. We hold people responsible, because doing so alters behavior, mechanism of altered behavior is just window dressing.
I doubt this is a description many people would agree with - that agency doesn't exist but we just pretend it does so we feel better about locking people up to modify their behaviour. Aside from anything else, if we are probabilistic systems, we presumably can't actually do things like rationalise, or design things like legal systems. Similarly, I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about the legal system as having a goal if it is a (presumably slightly more complex) probabilistic system.
Of course, just as with materialism we can bite the bullet and accept that our typical descriptions of human life are strictly false and the real story is just a scaled up version of billiard balls knocking each other around (mutatis mutandis for the probabilistic picture). But if we want a picture that lets us keep some of our current view of human life, it is not clear that bringing probabilistic systems into the picture helps any.
Why not? Computers can reason and have constructed proofs. Probably a computer could construct legal arguments too. They might have some probability for errors (e.g. cosmic rays) that need to be accounted for and corrected, just like humans.
> But if we want a picture that lets us keep some of our current view of human life, it is not clear that bringing probabilistic systems into the picture helps any.
It might help people understand why people murder, or commit crime. Criminals might have errors that need to be corrected rather than focusing on a crime that needs to be punished.
It is not clear to me that a computer can hold ethical beliefs, or that it would be troubled when some other beliefs are inconsistent with those beliefs and motivated to find a rationalisation that makes them compatible.
If we don't have any sort of agency, then we have no choice but to believe whatever we believe, including dualism.
I think that most people experience agency, though, whether they actually understand it or not. Even animals do, unless you condition them not to like those learned helplessness experiments: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learned_helplessness
That... might get really ugly if we ignore the social side of things. Even things like curing congenital deafness are controversial in certain communities.