Oil's Collapse Is a Geopolitical Reset in Disguise
bloomberg.com
bloomberg.com
It's fascinating the cost of extracting oil is so high in Iran in particular, a country that is under constant sanction by the US. I wonder how much of the cost is due to the sanctions and disturbance in trade (ie Iran cannot import key technologies), and how much of it is because Iran's oil deposits is just "harder" to drill.
I think you might be reading that wrong. It isn’t that the cost of extracting the oil is so high, but that the budgets of these countries depends on the price of oil being high. When the price drops, they can no longer cover their entire budget and will need to borrow or reduce their spending.
These numbers aren’t related to the cost of extraction (which is a different issue but is also variable between different regions).
79% of their exports is unrefined crude oil. While exports are not always the whole story, in this case it is extremely relevant.
If Iran's economy was 99% domestic and 1% trade, (essentially autarkic) then it wouldn't really matter at all what the price of oil is, as Iran makes everything it needs for itself, whether that be automobiles, medical equipment, financial services, concrete, etc.
However, Iran is not autarkic and trade is about 50% of its GDP. In order to complete international trade it requires foreign currency. At the start of the year, Iran had $85B in foreign reserves, according to FRED anyways. It was expected to lose $15B this year, but that was supposed to be while exporting $30B of crude oil. If that $30B is now only $10B, then Iran could lose $35B of foreign reserves this year.
They can reduce domestic spending (potentially lowering quality of life for citizens), or they can spin up domestic industry to replace imports, or they can figure out how to increase the $$ value of their exports (potentially by refining the crude oil into higher value products, for example).
If they don't do anything, and the trend continues in a straight line, they'd run out of foreign reserves within 3 years. At that point, it would be very difficult for them to buy any of the imports they need and they'd face a venezuela-style situation where citizens would find it impossible to get whatever goods used to be imported.
For Iran, this is food, cars, durable goods & machinery, electronics, and textiles: https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore?country=107&product=un...
>...The Government Pension Fund Global, also known as the Oil Fund, was established in 1990 to invest the surplus revenues of the Norwegian petroleum sector. It has over US$1 trillion in assets, including 1.4% of global stocks and shares, making it the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Pension_Fund_of_Nor...
EDIT: To be clear I am glad the fund exists. It has been and is a much better way of using the natural resource bonus. However, I strongly suspect that Norway will use the entire fund cushioning the transition away from being an oil producer.
My very cursory understanding of the Fund is that cushioning that known inevitable circumstance was the entire point in the first place.
Dutch disease is common, but hardly universal. There are known mitigation techniques that can be applied, including a sovereign wealth fund.
1. The US ceased being a net oil exporter, and began importing oil, in 1950, over 70 years ago.[2]
2. When the US was an oil exporter, both global oil use and industrial capacity were far lower than today, and cargo shipping costs much higher. The US was among the early industrialised nations (with the UK, Germany, France, and Italy, generally), all (save Italy) with major coal reserves. For the US to meet industrial demand it largely needed to self-provision.
3. WWII.
4. Even within the US, oil-producing regions and industrial regions tended to be quite distinct.
Norway became an oil exporter quite recently (major production largely coming online in the 1990s), and its economic and industrial policy has been excellent. The UK similarly, though it's arguably been hindered by a legacy industrial system as well as its role as a major finance centre (another form of Dutch disease).
________________________________
Notes:
1. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23060290
2. With fracking, over the past 5 years or so, the US has exported ... some petroleum-based products, mostly lease condensate and natural gas liquids (NGLs), very light fractions of petroleum. This is unsuitable for motor fuel (its octane rating is too low, and much is sold to Venezuela and Canada, effectively to make their tar-like oil more soluble. This is likely a tem-orary circumstance.
Heck, the fact that America setup an industrial economy while being an oil producing nation is a fascinating counter example to Dutch disease.
There are several powerful mechanisms, however, of which Dutch Disease / resource curse is one. (There's also Twyla Tharp's wonderful "Whom the gods wish to destroy, they give unlimited resources.")
Understanding how it does apply, and why, and where it doesn't, is useful. I've pointed at mitigations for both. exceptions you note, though you don't appear to consider them.
Paper, pen, and ink are useful in communications. But neither paper, pens, or ink do this exclusively, nor by themselves. The blank page, the one uniformly covered in ink, or the one scribbled on at random, communicate nothing. This doesn't mean paper, pens, and ink useless. Markings made according to rules of recognised charactersets, words, spelling, grammar, reference to existing facts, references, and concepts, logic, narrative, metaphore, nuance, and culture ... may succeed in communicating something. Occasionally truth.
Theory of political economy operates similarly. Beware those offering blank pages, spilt ink, random scribbles, or writing lacking, or ignoring, coherence or correspondences.
The city I live in has nearly twice the people and making more at an astonishing rate.
I am not an expert on it, but it seems to me that while Iran may have been offered a "path" to join the global economic system, they were not mature enough to "play nice" in the global playground.
"All excess heavy water which is beyond Iran's needs for the modernised Arak research reactor, the Zero power heavy water reactor, quantities needed for medical research and production of deuterate solutions and chemical compounds including, where appropriate, contingency stocks, will be made available for export to the international market based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer for 15 years. Iran's needs, consistent with the parameters above, are estimated to be 130 metric tonnes of nuclear grade heavy water or its equivalent in different enrichments"
Refer to IAEA reports [6] dated 26 February 2016 [7], 9 November 2016 [8] for the two occasions that are referenced. Iran's needs of heavy water were estimated to be 130 metric tonnes. Beyond that, they would have to sell and deliver the water to an international buyer. IAEA reports indicate that this is what Iran was doing. Paragraph 10 of the Nuclear section of the JCPOA contains more language relating to heavy water. From page 9 of the PDF:
"There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for export to the international market"
Again, it appears that this is in-line with what Iran was doing. Heavy water in excess of 130 metric tonnes was sold and delivered to international buyers. In addition to the 130 metric tonnes stored within Iran, heavy water was allowed by the Joint Commission to be stored outside of Iran, with some sources [9] calling this a loophole in the cap. Regardless of whether or not you believe that exceeding the 130 metric tonnes of heavy water constitutes a violation, there's a dispute resolution mechanism included in the JCPOA. See paragraphs 36-37 on pages 19-20 of the PDF. The US could have used this dispute resolution process to address concerns about violations of the agreement, but did not.
I will take your "path" to refer to the JCPOA. It should be clear that rather than Iran first stepping off this path, it was the US that did so. It was not after all processes set forth in the agreement were exhausted that the US left the agreement, but instead the decision is made in lieu of engaging in dispute resolution. Note that in the withdrawal briefing [4] President Trump made no references to violations of the JCPOA by Iran, but instead lists criticisms of the JCPOA itself. Given that the US did not utilize the dispute resolution mechanism process established by the JCPOA, and the fact that criticisms of the JCPOA greatly outnumber the Iranian violations of the JCPOA, it is my view that the withdrawal from the JCPOA by the US was not in response to Iran straying from the path.
There are a couple of other grievances that President Trump cited in his October 2017 [3] briefing, but I could find no support for them, and so I don't address them here.
[0] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/06/gov2019-21.pd...
[1] https://news.yahoo.com/iran-still-holding-end-nuclear-deal-i...
[2] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-iaea/iran-st...
[3] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-pres...
[4] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-pres...
[5] https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2165399/full-text...
[6] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iae...
[7] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2016-8-derestri...
[8] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/16/11/gov2016-55.pd...
[9] https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Closi...
I would add that, in order to spin up domestic industry or increase the value of their exports they need expertise and technology. Due to the sanctions that will not be easily available to them. This is really economic warfare.
Countries with both a large, long-term energy-export sector (that is, oil) and a significant high-end industrial base are ... rare.
The US and Norway come to mind. Few others.
The US was the first country to the oil game, Norway one of the last. And Norway's industrial capacity ain't tremendous, but does exist.
The UK had already fallen enough by the time North Sea oil came online, and its economic policy was sufficiently poor, that it didn't recover.
Most major industrial countries have, or had, a large coal resource. Japan being a notable exception.
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Russia (mostly), Nigeria, Iran, Libya, Indonesia: little industry.
Even in the US, oil states (Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, California, Alaska) tend not to be heavy-industry states (CA being the possible exception). Those were Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, Illinois, mostly, old rust belt.
And there is another angle to these numbers. They are the prices based on recent exports of oil. Iran isn't a silly country that requires $300 oil to break even. Their oil exports have dropped in recent years. That drop (sanctions) is a separate factor than oil price. If oil exports a halved, the break-even price doubles. But if oil prices climbed Iran would probably find a way to export more oil, decreasing its break even price to something more reasonable.
79% of Iran's exports are unrefined crude oil: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Islamic_Republic_of_... (edited to 2017)
Countries typically "go bankrupt" in a practical sense (with very noticeable real-world effects on the local citizens) when their foreign reserves run out.
Schlumberger, a French/Texas/Dutch/UK company, earned themselves the largest international sanctions fine ever for skirting the rules. It wasn't illegal for them to work with Iran, even though they are headquartered in Houston, TX. However, they used US-based personnel and assets and now are barred from doing any business with Iran as part of the penalties.
So Iran does find it difficult to get some of the latest technological advantages. That said, their geology doesn't demand super high tech solutions to extract oil. And they could be using 1960's technology to refine their oil into higher value products but they simply aren't, for reasons I don't understand.
The details of the sanctions have changed a lot over the past 10 years. Between 2013 and 2016, sanctions were globally supported and it was extremely difficult for Iran to sell its oil. Now it's just a few countries embargoing Iran, so Iran seems to be able to sell nearly as much as it wants, presumably at near-market prices.
Not really. I am no expert, but my understanding is that US sanctions bar Iran from accessing any financial services by US institutions or in US dollars. Apparently, they have jurisdiction to enforce that if a transaction uses US dollars. Unfortunately for any country who provokes the ire US, currently USD is the only real option for international trade. Thus, even if Iran sells its oil, it cannot get access to the funds it generates. Some European countries tried to create an alternative for the global financial transaction system specifically for Iran to be able to sidestep the sanctions. It would have had serious limitation, e.g. allowing Iran to only purchase food and medicine. But even that has not been successful. Only a single transaction has been done using the new system so far.
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/instex-successfully-concl...
I think you have conflated currency matters with sanction matters. I will attack that here, but much of your point stands.
My points here: international business tends to be done in USD only because it is convenient, and no business ever failed to happen due to that convention.
International trade tends to happen in terms of the USD because USD is convenient. Factors: (1) The world's largest economy does its business in USD; (2) There are many large lenders in the US and (3) There is a free and liquid FX market for USD.
Many companies reduce their friction by working in USD. They borrow some money in USD and then spend some money in USD, and thereby avoid paying a fee to their bank's FX desk. Instead of managing a complex risk situation between their home currency and a dozen others, they concentrate it into a simple risk situation of their home currency vs USD.
Iran could put oil in ships, and send it to China. China could put gold in ships and send it to Iran. Or - far more easily - Iran could price its transaction in terms of New Zealand dollars, and the two parties could make adjustments to a ledger in a tax haven.
The USD conventions is akin to the role of English as lingua franca. It's convenient., or China
The other part of your point is that US sanctions are harsh and far-reaching. No arguments against that here. Would I trust billions of dollars to a tax haven bank, or in countries with a strong rule-of-law tradition? Also, any time you want to spend substantial money in the developed world, the other party is going to need evidence that it is not sanction affected.
> The power of U.S. sanctions lies in the use of the U.S. dollar in most international transactions. A foreign company that sends its proceeds from trade with Iran through an international bank would likely face sanctions because part of it would be conducted in dollars.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-...
However, for sake of understanding: currently about 4-6% of global oil and gas is used to produce plastics. This represents about $600 Billion in total market value.
The total global crude oil market is about $1,800 Billion if oil is $50/bbl.
So it seems that you get roughly 5x higher revenue on a barrel of oil turned into plastic than sold in its unrefined state. Probably much more if oil is $20/bbl.
[1] https://www.canadianfuels.ca/website/media/PDF/Publications/...
> And they could be using 1960's technology to refine their oil into higher value products but they simply aren't, for reasons I don't understand.
"Refine" was used loosely, but the bulk of the plastics market are still relatively simple products that don't necessarily require extremely high technology to produce. It's still a cutthroat commodities business, but producing a little plastic has the potential to add a lot of dollars.
You can see this happen in Saudi Arabia over the past decade. They worked with Dow Chemical to produce the "Sadara" plant - a very large refinery and chemical plant. Crude oil made up over 80% of Saudi's exports from 2010-2014. The first phase of Sadara began selling product in 2015, and the final major piece (of 26) was commissioned in 2017.
When Sadara opened its first phase, crude oil dropped from ~80% of export dollars in 2014 to just 55% in 2015.
So yeah, opening a chemical plant can massively change your export profile. Now, this data includes a huge drop in oil price after 2014 so it's not entirely fair. But is is reasonably fair vecause it wasn't just oil prices that dropped - chemicals+plastics dropped up to 50% as well. Their $ value in exports stayed constant despite the price drop, indicating a large surge in export volume.
And this is largely driven by the construction of a single integrated refining facility.
Injection molding and most other plastics manufacturing methods are much more sensitive processes than combustion which means that the commodity is much less fungible and much more logistics sensitive than fossil fuels. It's pretty common for a manufacturer to pay 2-10x market price for plastic pellets because of repeatability. Few would risk the repercussions to buy unrefined crude from Iran at a discount and there's certainly no one who;'s going to do it at $200 a barrel.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Islamic_Republic_of_...
Source:
https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/irn/all/...
Based on my back of the napkin math, the UK would need to export it's oil (yes, the UK is a net exporter of oil) at $350/barrel to cover that.
In a vacuum this isn't really a good-faith argument. It can be used to illustrate limited concepts, as another user did in this thread, but it's not really a valid point in general for anything. That's because the question of "what price of oil does [country] need?" only makes sense for countries where the supermajority of their GDP is based on resource extraction.
UK to Iran is not a great comparison because only 4.5% of UK's exports are crude oil. https://oec.world/en/profile/country/gbr/
Second, trade only makes up 30% of the UK's GDP, meaning it can and does better leverage its domestic production to meet domestic needs.
Lastly, the UK has not been nearly as dependent on exports to balance foreign reserves as Iran is. Due to its uncommon status as a global financial hub, I think it has other ways to ensure it can continue to finance trade.
Who, exactly, is going to loan them money?
If Iran were a person they'd have a sub-600 credit score while seeking a no-documentation car loan. Nobody in their right mind is going to loan them money for non-predatory rates.
When we talk about a country taking out loans, we're frequently talking about bonds and, if you're not the US, actually talking to banks via the IMF.
Are you going to buy Iranian bonds? Consider the following:
- Which asset(s) do you think Iran will use to pay you back? Keep in mind that their largest asset - oil - has a rocky track record.
- Loans are more likely to be paid back by a stable government. How stable do you expect Iran to be over the next 10-30 years? How likely is another Arab Spring?
- Taking the above into account, what kind of interest rate would be adequate? Is it higher than the Iranians are likely to pay? How much higher is it than they can afford right now?
How much cheaper is a drilling rig now vs. 12 months ago? How about an electrician?
Most of the change in Iran seems to be as a result of US sanctions significantly cutting the amount of product exported. They were in the $60-70 a barrel range prior to these sanctions, like most of the Middle East. I actually think this piece is awful, as it leads us to believe things like "Iran doesn't have the expertise" or "Iran has harder to access supplies". In reality, Iran just needs to export oil in a world without restrictive sanctions to reach parity with the rest of the region.
I don't think this is the case. I think it's "balance the country's budget", not the break even point in oil.
Wikipedia has a 2016 table of extraction costs, which shows Iran is only marginally more expensive to extract than Saudi Arabia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_of_oil#Comparative_cost_...
From another POV the world was on a mad debt-fuelled spending spree, and a lot of the spending was either useless or downright destructive.
Oil is in the middle of that. An oil economy has been an obvious strategic stupidity since the oil shocks of the 70s. But instead of switching to renewables as soon as possible, there was a political decision to double down on instability and to protect the supply - and also provide "social" spending on militarism - with expensive resource wars.
The world has basically been run like a frat party for the last sixty years or so. Now it's waking up to find the house is on fire, the rent is due, and the landlord is waiting outside with some "friends" to have a quiet word.
In general, generating electricity as close to where you need it is a better idea (because of loss from transmission).
They are not completely reliable for backup, which I think is an under-appreciated point, but nuclear can provide any backup necessary (which i suspect wouldn't be as large as you might think).
Wind and solar is less than 1% of the worlds energy consumption and not expected to be more than 3-4% in 2030 exactly because its not reliable and the more renewable you build the more expensive it becomes as it need one of those or multiple backup sources mentioned above to be reliable.
FTFY. That's a very significant omission.
On top of that especially oil, but also gas and coal and to a lesser but extent but still important contribution the dual usage of those sources makes them superior and foundational to all the other things. You can't even make windmills or solar without the use of oil and coal.
So downvote me all you want. Renewables aren't even close to being serious contenders to anyone who want to live in modern society.
There is a world of difference between being able to produce energy when you want it and then having to wait for the right conditions so it is being brought up again and again because it's a relevant difference. France has no problem making it work.
So, perhaps, not that much of a reset in terms of keeping fossil fuels in the ground. And it's such a fine time to address that question.
A third option, which I consider most likely, is that this piece is doing both. The author most likely believes in what they are saying and are trying to manipulate things in a certain direction. There is noting wrong with this, and I think understanding the bias is merely a more effective way to gain more from reading this.
Actually I meant the author was aware of his view and is being both manipulative while fairly forwarding his agenda. Your option would be a fourth possibility? Which would make sense since any two binary outcomes will give a 2x2 sample space for a total of 4 outcomes.
Same principle behind why double-blind tests have high efficacy.
Also, most geopolitical problems aren't simple analytical problems. There isn't a 'right answer' that one can divine by approaching the space with an emotionless evaluation.
Reading news articles or analyses is in effect a metastudy and doing it double blind is pointless - a metastudy requires an analysis of the provenance of the information in order to weigh the results from multiple sources.
A random bit of context with no obvious connection isn't much context. Context is more than a single given fact.
This is fascinating :)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/0...
The first casualty of war is the truth after all. Last I checked we've been in a neverending period of war.
Full disclouse: I knew him personally… mostly from a distance. It was disgusting seeing the likes of Senator John McCain try to capitalize on his death. That doesn’t mean he wasn’t the man depicted in Jon Krakauers’ book.
Pat Tillman was killed in friendly fire. But the story we got initially was that he was killed by the enemy.
"Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal approved the Silver Star citation on April 28, 2004, which gave a detailed account of Tillman's death including the phrase "in the line of devastating enemy fire," but the next day he sent a P4 confidential memo warning senior government members that Tillman might actually have been killed by friendly fire"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pat_Tillman#Surrounding_Tillma...
Certainly Tillman didn't spread the lies. Jessica Lynch didn't spread the lies either. It was the military/news/etc.
Hence : The first casualty of war is the truth.
> Full disclouse: I knew him personally… mostly from a distance.
Yeah, I knew him "personally" too like millions of other football fans.
It's akin to taking business advice from Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling.
His failure was in ethics. THAT might be something you'd not want to look towards him for.
It's very useful to separate the two.
In this instance, an expert's read on a situation is interesting and informative. You just might not want to take his policy recommendation.
> geopolitical disaster
"disasters" are profitable (for those able to benefit from corruption). And enable western/democratic governments to get away with violating their citizens. PATRIOT Act for instance. Read 1984 for background of how "fear of attack" and "security" is used to keep the masses in line.
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Less than a third of Harvard students come from a household with income greater than $100,000/year. Almost half the students come from households with income between $30,000 and $75,000/year. One in six students comes from a poor family.
Harvard is firmly middle class. The data simply doesn’t support the argument that Harvard admissions is some old money New England conspiracy.
---
No. Only 25% of households in the US have annual income between $35,000 and $75,000. About one in five families in the US is below the poverty line. So middle class students are over represented at Harvard. Students from poor families are only slightly underrepresented, and considering that household income and academic achievement are correlated, it’s actually a testament to their efforts to have socially conscious admissions. The facts do not support your argument. On this you are simply wrong.
"The median family income for Harvard undergraduates is $168,800—more than three times the national median, according to a recent study."
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2017/1/25/harvard-income-...
There is the non-elite "meritocracy" and elite finishing school, side by side. Which are the suckers propping up the other? You tell me.
I’m curious to learn more about this. Do you have a good source for this data?
Why do you tell me to "keep in mind" essentially the very point I was making?
It is legal to influence the instituions themselves with money as they have ownership of all resources involved. The admissions scandal demonstrated the difference quite well. Of course the admission has other unspoken reasons for wanting them - contacts for tbeir network and their own pride and flatrery about "cultural worth". Stupid human social trick stuff of skewed priorties.
First, I have no idea how she got her scholarly titles when her writing is so incoherent, and devoid of line of though. Some times she outright descends into polsci technobabble, and I loose her. She is not a scholar, but a person who went to school and bullshited her way to the degree with every mean and way, in hope to get a cushy government job.
Second, for a portion of her writing making sense, her vision of reality is a laconic polsci101 recital, and carbon copy of her mentors views, without a iota of extra thought. The reality of politics is that shit happens, the reality of war is that you don't improve global stability by starting one. Her works state that it can be otherwise.
My criteria for a politician who knows his onions, is caution. Above all is caution, and an understanding that whatever he or she does returns threefold if made in error. Anybody claiming a clear, logical, rational picture of the world has never worked a day in job where his life depends on it.
I repeat my opinion https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23051520
> People must stop decrying types like McNamara, Kisinger, Dulles as some kind of "smart calculating types." They were top idiots at the apex of power, and their coming was a prelude to what America got itself in now.
Every big name "strategist" USA had since the WW2 I can name was a big joke, and such types will keep coming unless people will start calling things their real names. The "geopolitical technobabblers" should not allowed to sit in high posts.
In this case, I think there can't be a better way than to pull her early works, and her academic writing for everybody to see.
> She was an assistant to Paul Bremer in the Coalition Provisional Authority. She was Senior Director for Iraq at the United States National Security Council.
Around that time, Bremer decided to bar former ba'ath officer from either serving the new military or getting pension. That decision almost single-handedly created the backbone of the terrorist networks that would become ISIS.
People from that admin should be shunned from any published analysis but failing that, I am happy that forums like this allows us to augment their biographies.
On the other hand, I have yet to see a Bloomberg article not about finance that was not misinformed. Those about tech especially are pretty bad, and every time I dug a bit around their geopolitical analysis, I was pretty underwhelmed.
Interestingly, it was GWB that also put a lot of effort into pandemic preparedness. See: https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/homeland/pandemi...
History is kind of a weird place.
Sure he may have done some things that are good, but he made many horrible decisions.
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President%27s_Emergency_Plan_f...
How did Bush get a fifth year from a four year presidency?
Why is this complicated and where did the number 5 even come from?
I think this is splitting hairs over who gets credit. Remember that Congress needed to raise the money and the taxpayers needed to pay it.
From a practical standpoint, usually some credit is given for leadship to the one who gets a program off the ground. It seems fair in this case that GWB gets credit for that. You can also look at later people over a longer span of time and give them credit/blame for maintaining and administering it, as well (or letting it stagnate, like his pandemic plan, unfortunately).
The main point here is that the GWB presidency was not black and white. I think he was a good person and made many good decisions and one really bad one. Quite possibly, with a different VP, he would be a lauded and dignified president, and a lot of things would be different.
Or, if his pandemic plan had been maintained, and bore fruit today (that is showed benefits in fighting coronavirus), it may have redeemed his presidency entirely.
But consider at the time, the United States had just suffered an unprecedented terrorist attack, the conventional wisdom (and much intelligence) was that Iraq held chemical weapons and finally the United States was engaging the Iraqi military on a regular basis as the sole enforcer of the UN sanctioned no fly zone. I won’t argue that the Iraq War wasn’t a mistake. It was, but it was made in good faith and largely, I think, out of fear.
He was a warmonger. His aides and his vice president stood to make tons of money out of that war.
The GWB admin still had the level of competence to organize something like the last Iraq war so it made sense it could have pandemic preparedness which is orders of magnitudes easier.
I don't think the US public really realize how incompetent and dumb the current administration looks from abroad.
This isn't true. The Ba'ath party had already largely lost its Arab nationalist identity and become progressively more and more Islamist after the first Gulf War.
Saddam announced the "return to faith" campaign[0] in 1993 (which he publicly hinted at by writing Allahuakbar on the Iraqi flag in 1991) and by the time of the second 2003 invasion, Ba'ath party loyalists were already beheading suspected prostitutes in the streets.
What created the backbone of ISIS is a culmination of things - mostly around the collective, ongoing punishment of the Middle East. Arab nationalism was challenged in every direction by the West, country-based nationalism was challenged in every direction, and then the US put on a surprised pikachu face when the only thing left was religious identity.
That's not so much the point the parent comment was making, I believe. Mostly that by making sure the previous military and political leaders would not be allowed to play any role in the future and not get pensions, they'd obviously have zero incentive to work with the new regime/administration/whatever.
On the other hand, they had plenty of incentive to work against it, which they then did. They may have gone full Arab nationalist if that had been an option, but to be funded in the middle east in a war against the US and Shiite-aligned governments, you'll look to the Saudis, and that pretty much only leaves Wahabi fundamentalism as your rally-cry.
Picture that: your skill is to organize soldiers and military operations but the only local and legal employer refuses you and denies you any pension. Did they really think they would go beg in the streets rather than join the militias in dire need or organizational advices?
But O'Sullivan came to Iraq via the State Department, and Rumsfeld didn't want her there, which seems to indicate that perhaps she wasn't as insane as the Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz/Cheany neo-con people.
In anycase, I think this article makes a good basic point: lots of countries are going to be in deep trouble with this oil price.
Yeah, I really needed a State Department analyst to tell me that.
The point of analysis pieces often isn't to share new information, but instead is to share that fact that information is now very important.
Also I for one didn't realise that most of Saudi support in Congress had eroded enough in favor of the US industry to the point where is was now (to quote) "a sharp increase in hostility from members of the U.S. Congress who in the past appeared to appreciate the multifaceted relationship between Riyadh and Washington"
Damn, checks all the boxes
All I see is public sentiment turning against fossil fuels and an inevitable death for 90% of the industry as we move away from petroleum. We only use something like >20% of raw petroleum for plastic and medicine and such. And the price curve is not linear, so the oil necessary to satisfy the first 20% of today's demand is probably priced some absurdly low number, my gut says less than $20.
It feels like our entire geopolitical system is crumbling. A vulnerable state had been brewing for a long time. Coronavirus was the trigger. Perhaps the american hegemony was not sustainable, or recently became such. For those unaware, petroleum really does factor into a lot of worldbuilding that we do in the middle east. Major shifts in oil markets typically mean major shifts in geopolitics.
Interesting times ahead.
If the last 30 years was about the rise of China, the rest of the century is going to be about the rise of 'the rest of the world'.
Pre 2000 it was as if these places didn't exist - they had no money. Just people in huts.
But now they want Hondas and iPhones and there are a lot of them.
The US was 1/3 of the world economy, but less than 10% of it's population. Not it's like 22% of world economy.
This is the 'macro macro' thing that will be the biggest driver of everything.
Those 5 billion are going to have to wait. Also, it may be harsh but if history is any indication, these people are unlikely to gain access to oil themselves - which means they're dependent on probably their neighbors (developing countries probably are sensitive to shipping/deliver charges) which means that their demand is subject to international sanctions if, say, G20 decides to wean the globe from petroleum. So if the west decides no more fossil fuels, these people will likely stay in huts until they stumble upon reserves in their country (unlikely) or find another civilization-sustaining energy source.
You think oil dependence will last forever? Also with the rise of the internet, you don't think people in developing countries are likely to give preference to renewables if the price is within reach? Everything's getting cheaper.
Nobody, not the entire EU/West and certainly not anyone else is going to say to poor Africa and Asia: 'you can't use Oil', moreover, nobody is going to send troops to Nigeria to stop exports, or embargo Indonesia and Pakistan or wherever from receiving oil.
It's like telling 5 billion people they can't use tapped water or water wells that they have to 'figure something out'.
It's a non-starter.
The only shift will be economic - either Oil is too expensive - or - in some situations, solar might be cheaper. Which it will be, but for the most part, there is no end in sight to oil.
If there is a magic leap in solar and battery tech, and China pumps out super cheap electric cars that can be re-fueled cheaper than gas and there's enough sunlight, that would work. But that's not in the cards.
If half a year ago someone would tell me that the entire world will be shut down because of some kind of a flu, I wouldn't even consider this: it's a non-starter. And yet here we are.
I can easily imagine a mind shift amongst current world powers that will be strong enough to reduce fossils usage to half of existing levels. And since they have all means to enforce this on developing world, I wouldn't dismiss this possibility.
Yes, we could invent some magical technology tomorrow that solved all of our energy problems, but lacking divine intervention - there is no foreseeable path in which the Oil stays in the ground.
Telling the 3rd world they must stay poor because 'we already used up all the Co2 emissions' is not going to work. Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Iran, etc. etc. will sell Oil to willing buyers.
Why not? To sell oil you need massive and fragile infrastructure in place: pipelines, storage tanks, terminals, etc. This infra can be easily controlled. As soon as world powers decide that the damage done to the planet outweighs economic effects of cheap energy, they can easily impose global limit on oil trade. Which can be enforced by both economic and military means.
Vaclav Smil's Energy and Civilization and books on energy transitions gives a mostly energy-physics and technological bacground on the coal-oil transition (and ag-coal previously). Manfred Weissenbacher's Sources of Power adds in some of the political dimension.
https://thetyee.ca/News/2013/03/13/Soviet-Union-Oil/
The actual scientists say it's more complicated. As you should expect:
https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/29/formation-and-evolu...
There are already multiple refineries in Mexico: https://argus-public-assets-us.s3.amazonaws.com/2018/07/17/2...
The author links to data [1], which states that Iran needs $319 / barrel oil to balance its budget. Between 2018 and 2019, this number jumped from $67 (In line with the rest of the region) to $244.
I feel like this statistic was trotted out and means something different from what I'd casually read it as.
Iranian exports fell significantly between 2018 and 2019 [2], it seems because of the fallout of the Iran nuclear deal and resumed sanctions [3]. There was a 69% decrease (1800 units to 570 units), which, means the calculated number would be ~3x higher, or about $211 a barrel. Which means the "statistic" doesn't really tell us what we think - that Iran can only profitably produce oil at >$200 a barrel - but that US sanctions have crippled Iran's ability to use oil as a primary source of national income.
To be fair, I'd love to see the author do the math on US oil. Actually, I'll take a stab at it. If the US tried to balance its physical budget (Let's say $984B in 2019 [3]) based entirely on increasing the price of current US oil exports (770,000 barrels a day [4]), how much would the price of oil need to rise?
770,000 barrels a day * 365 = 280M barrels of oil
$984B/280M barrels of oil = $3,514
The US would need to make an additional $3514 per barrel of oil to balance its physical budget, which is an increase from $63 a barrel to $3,577 a barrel.
Can you imagine a journalist writing this as a supporting figure? "US, implied to be a failing state as it is the largest number here, requires $10,000 a barrel oil to balance budget". Yes, that statement is a bit biased, but I'm willing to defend that this is how the US media most often interfaces with Iran.
One critique I would expect is along the lines of "Iran is more dependent on oil for its economy". Iran's GDP is 23% oil [6], whereas the US is around 8% [7]. I think the story still stands out as a bit insane, even if we adjust for "Expected contribution by GDP %", which would still put us well-north of $1,000 a barrel oil.
I don't mean to state that this is my fully-formed opinion, yet, but I think it is worth discussing these either (A) misleading (B) uninterpretable without far greater work "data facts" actually add little value to the story, and instead (seem to) further a narrative. This is in opposition of the traditional scientific approach, where we state our expectation and validate or invalidate that conclusion, with the author being expected to prove instead of just say something with "QED" implicitly attached. This critique, now, seeks to be a more general one: Data-driven media seems be misunderstood as a narrative where the data is in the driver's seat -- in reality it has let anyone ride shotgun as long as they get along with the driver.
[1] https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=60214246
[2] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IRNNXGOCMBD
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_federal_budget
[4] https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42735
[5] https://countryeconomy.com/raw-materials/brent?dr=2019-11
[6] https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/gdp
[7] https://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/taxes/oil-and-nat...
Edit: Formatting
A US writer supports the header "Prepare for more fragile, or even failed, states and the risks that can accompany them.", with these facts. I find it quite disingenuous, I'd be happy to discuss that if we disagree.
The language makes people (Some of them even in this thread) think that there is something intrinsic to Iran as a state, rather than just US geopolitical policy causing chaos for banana republics and oil adversaries of the US. Overall, the fact isn't linked at all to oil's current collapse (Which is the article's context), as Iran is still in a horrible spot even if the price doesn't collapse.
Tesla is the only real electric hope, and they have many many years before they supplant combustion based vehicles.
Didn't this same thing happen at a lower level in 2014, when Saudi Arabia pumped a lot of oil to international markets to bankrupts American shale oil producers? And didn't the price go back up after some time when the Saudi government couldn't afford breaking up OPEC?
Why can't the same thing happen now? The price and supply of world oil is almost completely controlled by Saudi Aramco, and there's nothing preventing them from increasing the price in the future.
Demand will come back after the pandemic is over, and the Russian government can't flood the market for very long.
And I believe Putin has a stronger grip over his own people than MBS, so in a race to the bottom I think Russia could definitely come out "on top".
I really dislike the article's mention of "balanced budget" oil prices, it distracts from more salient arguments when presented alone. For proper analysis, the author should have provided more numerical data, like foreign/gold reserves, budget comparisons (historically, and across countries), etc.
>> Demand will come back after the pandemic is over.
Man, I go back and forth with myself/other people over this all the time. I think there's a significant risk that energy consumption will be lower in the temporary short- and mid-term futures, and slight risk that energy consumption will also be lower in long-term future.
Take a look at US consumption: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_in_the_United_States#Pr... https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec1_7.pdf We still haven't reached 07/08 levels of energy consumption, of which 67% is nat gas/oil. I also read a while back that US households have steadily decreased their individual usage of energy post-2008, despite economic gains. I forget where, I think it was in an article about nuclear power plants.
With that said, I think global outlook (for oil consumption) over the next 5 years is not good for developing economies. Their economies will suffer until developed economies recover and stimulate their under-developed economies. However, long-term population growth in SE Asia and Africa will demand greater energy consumption and I believe economic growth in these regions will be the primary drivers of greater oil consumption. That's because renewable energies will be much, much more expensive than non-renewables (until we tax the hell out of them) and developing economies must pursue the most cost-effective alternative.
Sorry, for the long response, I just love this shit.
Serious question: who, exactly, are the United States' partners these days?
(I'm from Australia and would consider the "client state" assessment for us to be fair.)
So my understanding is that SA increased production because it couldn't get Russia to limit its output? So they crashed the market with the hopes to bend them to their will. If so are they basically signalling that they can survive such conditions but Russia can't? Or what's going on here
They used to predict doom and gloom due to an oil shortage, but what we got instead was doom and gloom and an oil glut. Where are they now?
As it played out, fracking technology matured, and a lot of additional supply was "added" once the price crossed a threshold.
We'll see if the shale gas boom is sustainable. The oil prices required to make it profitable are not comfortable. It isn't obvious to me what the 'new technology' here was beyond prices being very high in 2010. We'll be using a lot less oil at those prices.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:World_crude_discovery_pro...
They are still around. Now they just rebranded themselves as "green energy advocates".
> They used to predict doom and gloom due to an oil shortage, but what we got instead was doom and gloom and an oil glut. Where are they now?
Check out yesterday's thread. A few of them there. Now, instead of saying high oil prices is good for green energy, now they are saying low oil prices are good for green energy. Don't bother pointing out the flaw in their logic or you'll get flagged.
Peak oil is inevitable, given the fact that it’s a finite resource. But what its advocates failed to consider was how quickly free markets innovate when the price incentive is high enough.
One thing I don't understand is, why is it favorable for OPEC not to cut supply? Is it they want to crush all non OPEC based producers? Or are their buyers forced to buy at a particular price so they don't care if they keep producing?
The oil is still there, they ability to extract it exists... so company A goes out of business, but once the countries tire of shooting themselves in the foot and prices rise, Company B will just extract it.
At best they spite company A, but didn't change much.... maybe they make a few bucks while company B ramps up.
And that all assumes other nations play along... that is not common.
Once prices rise again it becomes profitable to extract again....and all Russia got were their own losses... and if other nations don't play along, maybe more losses.
Ultimately Russia can't stop the US from having a supply of oil anymore than the US can stop Russia.
I grew up in an area where oil had been found decades ago. There was mini oil rush and then ... it was discovered to be not as accessible as initially thought. Suddenly the rush was over.
It was a very fast boom and bust.
For a good 20 years I saw bumper stickers that said something like "Please God give us another chance, we won't screw it up this time." It was a very midwestern sort of self blame for a thing that wasn't anyone's fault.
Decades later... they got their shot again and the boom lasted quite a bit longer, until recently.
As a result they increased supply to fight back and hurt Russia’s export.
At least that was the story I read a few weeks ago when this went down.
(This is related to why haven’t wells shut down in response to the drop in price, as opposed to simply producing less oil from existing wells.)
https://arstechnica.com/science/2020/05/heres-why-the-world-...
On top of that, the Covid19 happened.
Some theorized that SA and Russian pumping more oil was a plan to kill USA's fracking and shale industry. I'm just hoping it'll force us to move toward renewable so we won't be dependent on these countries.
Saudi Arabia has been producing around 10.5 million barrels per day fairly consistently-ish for the last 5 years. If anything it's a bit lower over the past 12 months vs the 60 month average: https://ycharts.com/indicators/saudi_arabia_crude_oil_produc... So that theory is right out, imo.
Russia has increased production only 7-8% in the last 5 years. https://ycharts.com/indicators/russia_crude_oil_production
USA has increased production 54% since the beginning of 2016. https://www.macrotrends.net/2562/us-crude-oil-production-his...
I'd investigate what you're reading that gave you the impression that Russia and SA increased production drastically in order to tank USA. It's likely the sources are providing misinformation.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Russia–Saudi_Arabia_oil...
https://www.eia.gov/opendata/qb.php?category=1039874&sdid=ST...
Production for the month of March is published and does not show a significant increase. Again, its likely that the sources you follow are providing misinformation - not just about this, but about other things as well.
More generally, I follow oil news quite closely (as I work in the sector, and I have worked in Saudi Arabia specifically). These types of claims are "widely report in the media" constantly every year, although it is interesting that there's a Wikipedia page about this year's events. I personally wouldn't trust that version of events, as it only narrates changes in price without addressing movements of the supply/demand curve. I consider volumes of supply and demand to be more narrative for fungible commodities than statements of price alone.
As all these price movements happened after China's enormous quarantine and reduction in road traffic in February, I'd posit that the falling prices are a result of concrete reduced demand, rather than hand-wavey price adjustments.
Saudi can't adjust price lower globally single-handedly, the next marginal sales will happen at the market price. This wikipedia article doesn't seem to see that. The only way Saudi can reduce the price for its competitors is by supplying more oil to the global market.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-price-war-batters-poorer-op...
This is all so recent that it’s entirely possible they have reversed course already, absolutely. However this isn’t some wacko conspiracy theory, it’s based on the explicit statements of these countries governments all over the mainstream media.
It's a much more complicated prisoner's dilemma.
Many of the oil producing countries are nearly entirely reliant on oil sales for their economies and national budgets. Something like, yes, you could optimize month to month prices with high cooperation cutting equitable amounts. But.
For some states it's like agreeing to starvation, no matter what they do prices are too low to pay the bills. Many of them only maintain their power because of oil money. And for some, losing money now means they can bankrupt or seriously disrupt their competition meaning they will make more money over a longer period.
So if you're starving there's a strong motivation do cheat. Everybody else cuts production, prices go up, and you sell everything you can to take advantage.
And remember we're talking about price fixing cartels here. Illegal in much of the world. Opec cuts would mean North American profits, because we obviously don't participate.
It is, as the author writes, now much more likely for some of these oil states to fail completely. Revolutions, civil wars, regional wars. States which had leverage over the US because of oil are seeing that evaporate with this oversupply and price crash.
And longer term, but not that far out is both some of these countries running out of oil and oil demand worldwide tending much much much lower as oil is phased out as an energy source. These oil countries see the impending permanent decline in oil demand and the immediate future is their chance to extract as much as they can out of their natural resource which each year will become less valuable and less relevant.
Basically, OPEC needs a situation where they can reduce supply by 10% and get more than 10% increase in price. Otherwise they may increase the price, but still lose revenue overall. Over the past two decades they've tried this many times, but it hasn't worked. Russia and the US always increase production enough in response to keep the rise in prices relatively low.
As oil is generally an inelastic commodity, they may be able to reduce their production by something appalling, like 2/3rds reduction. Then they would need, and probably actually get, a global oil price 3 times what it was previously in order to maintain revenue. However, previously that meant an oil price of $180-300/bbl which would in turn cause a global recession and reduce demand. Even if oil is very inelastic, at some point people would stop driving/flying/using energy.
So really, there was no longer any way for OPEC to function as a cartel. The US effectively broke the cartel when it succeeded at being the new "swing producer" able to ramp up and down production in <6 months to meet global needs. This was all due to fracking and horizontal drilling.
OPEC has been trying to work with Russia to establish a new "OPEC+" that might control enough market, but it's incredibly difficult to keep all players honest. And impossible in a coronavirus market where demand is down so much (no one is flying even with nearly free oil).
Lastly, the US is starting to consider joining OPEC+. It's not something I previously thought was possible, because there's not one national petroleum company in the USA to negotiate with, there's thousands or tens of thousands of oil companies to negotiate with (some are just mom+pop oil companies which own two wells on an old plot in Pennsylvania, for example).
However, just as we sometimes pay farmers not to farm, or pay dairy farmers not to produce milk, we are considering paying oil companies to leave oil in the ground: https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/493187-trump-a...
This would effectively be the US joining OPEC+ to artificially prop up the price of oil (and thus, subsidize the government budgets of Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other oil producing nations with American consumer's wallets). It does not seem to be a policy in serious contention, however. I don't expect the USA to follow through on these ideas.
That would only be true if you had a zero cost of production (and OK in Saudi Arabia's case, they nearly do). A decrease in volume decreases both your costs and revenue, but an increase in price goes all to revenue.
So if, for example, at the current oil price you had a margin of 25% (eg. $15/barrel cost of production and $20/barrel price), you only need a 2.8% increase in price to balance a 10% drop in volume. Even SA's ~$5 production & transport costs still means an 8.3% increase in price balances a 10% drop in volume.
This was all just before the Pandemic hit.
a strong dollar creates problems for the entire rest of the world. this is how the king of the throne applies coercive force to the 'developing world'. because their own currencies are even that much shittier, so they CHOOSE to rely on the dollar. because...it's far more useful than trying bilateral trade ( oil for food) , which isn't so easy, using a currency is far better, and if you think it's not, try bilateral trade, see what happens. in the rare cases that it may work, you'll have the u.s. navy knocking at your door too!
I am curious how exactly Putin/Russia are demonizing the US?
Why do you think Trump phoned Saudis with such a strong threat when:
1. He previously showed no regard for how US oil industry fares, beside taking credit for it doing well
2. US oil industry is screwed below $40 except for the most productive wells in Texas. US shale is screwed below $60.
If his actions can't do a thing to really positively affect US oil industry, why he even tries?
Answer: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8232865/amp/Donald-...
So, Trump does 4 phone calls with Putin, then a single one with a right away direct threat to Saudis.
You don't need to think for long what it means.
How? Use the sun, wind, tide, nuclear, geothermal, space-solar, anything, to produce electricity, in order to crack hydrogen from water, and jumpstart the hydrogen economy. And will also need to begin mass production of fuel cells to get it cheaper.
This proves that the world does not need oil, if an alternative energy source can be harvested.
And along the way, it can possibly topple the biggest superpower on the planet. As well as effectively neutering the major countries with massive petroleum reserves.
I can only think of one player that can achieve such a monumental task. And even then, I doubt that they are that bold.
I am not clever enough to know which elephant you are fixated on.