We’re Testing the Wrong People
theatlantic.com
theatlantic.com
Why don't we have the capacity? Well the complete lack of coordination and leadership at the federal level means that each individual entity, whether it be state level government or a private entity, is having to do everything from scratch. That means developing SOPs, procuring supplies, and validating both the processes and reagents. This is being done on emergency orders as well, so some of the standards are relaxed to quickly get things up and running.
There's also a shortage of reagents and kits because we didn't have or need this testing just a few months ago. There's also international competition for these resources, and because the US has decided it doesn't want to actually work with or coordinate with other countries, it's a free for all.
Because everyone's frantically working on the same thing, but looking out for themselves it also means that true high throughput solutions are slow to develop as well.
I could go on and on, but it's a clusterfuck and no one at the federal level either A) seems to care or B) thinks that it's their responsibility.
Source: wife is currently in charge of starting up Covid testing
>That doesn't stop the American press making it sound like not achieving those 500,000 tests a day is the result of some uniquely American political failing though.
I don't think we're unique in where we are in comparison with other countries as far as testing, but we are in a unique position in regards to being able to put some strong leverage on getting other countries to work together to respond to this pandemic. We're not doing that and as a result, other countries are having to "roll their own" response to this pandemic just like we are. The lack of coordination within our country is putting us at a unique disadvantage, even if we had better coordination world wide.
This pandemic is a exceptional global crisis in a way we've never seen before, and thus should've led to a addressing it at a global scale in a way we had never seen before. Instead the global response has been crippled in numerous ways at various different points in time.
The American political failing is in not being the true world leaders, and the world is, IMHO, worse off for it.
But in order to try to generate the political will and get the backing to make this happen, it helps to get the word out about the big picture of exactly why having so many tests is important.
New legislation is coming that provides some funding for testing, but out of $484 billion that it authorizes, only $25 billion in it for testing[0]. Meanwhile, a report from Harvard estimates that $50 to $300 billion will be needed[1]. So the amount of money made available so far is 1/2 to 1/12 of what one source has estimated that we need.
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[0] https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/21/coronavirus-senate-passes-48...
[1] See Appendix B starting on p. 42 of this PDF: https://ethics.harvard.edu/files/center-for-ethics/files/roa...
I also don't think we need to get the word out about how testing is important. People are cooped up in their homes precisely because we don't know who has it and who doesn't. Testing could resolve that.
I have little faith in the legislation from Washington for many reasons. The primary one being that before the crisis, during it, and at this very moment there is a lack of acknowledgment of the actual scale of this pandemic. Even worse a large part of the legislature fails to take this seriously, thus making the scale of the issue a secondary problem. What's been passed so far has already missed the mark as far as funding testing and properly ensuring that those who need the money get it. Instead, big business gets "relief" with little oversight, which given the past actions of this administration clearly isn't just by accident.
The reality is that testing is still significantly behind and efforts to increase testing won't make the news cycles. I strongly doubt that we'd be able to scale up quickly enough to make a meaningful dent in this anymore than strictly following stay at home orders. Unfortunately even that is too much to ask us to do as a society it seems.
See Fomsgaard and Rosenstierne’s preprint on medrxiv here:
https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.03.27.20044495v...
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/coronavirus/
accurate? Because according to that, adding up the number of tests done by Italy, Spain, France, the UK, and Germany (a combined population roughly the same as the US), they've done about 5.6 million tests vs the USA's 4.4 million tests.
And we've done more tests per capita than South Korea.
Which really doesn't sound like we're doing that badly.
Once you have that under control, and we are not nearly there yet, you have to get every first responder tested regularly so you can prevent them from spreading the disease and give them some assurance that coming to work isn’t a death sentence.
Next we have to focus on getting a baseline of the population regularly tested to estimate the spread of the disease. This should be randomized and geographically distributed so we can start to obtain reliable data about the spread of the disease and deploy resources proactively.
I agree,, especially as you included the word “somewhat”. We have pretty good numbers on people who died in hospitals, but people who died at home appear to be seriously under counted.
Additionally, consequential deaths are currently invisible. These are people who died, say, ecause the coronavirus crowded out their access to hospitals. There’s been a drop in ER visits for things like heart conditions. Some of those people would have recovered fine anyway but some may have arterial blockage that will kill them. You don’t Want these numbers in the primary statistics (as they say nothing about control of the pandemic) but you do want these very hard to track numbers to understating future capacity planning, ethical procedures, and long term economic consequences.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/21/world/coronav...
Not sure it was a good idea to test and attribute all the deaths to COVID.
This seems to be what we're relying on in the UK. Hospital admissions for Covid show a good/relatively quick estimate of how measures are working and then a few weeks later a reflection of that trend in deaths confirms it.
Even looking back at monthly 2020 deaths in comparison to earlier years might not truly reveal the final impact of covid-19.
Also it seems that 98% of covid19 deaths have at least one comorbidity, 75% at least two. So I would expect that in many cases the virus may have just accelerated something that would have happened within a few months anyway. So you kind of need to look at how the full year death rate evolved to have an idea of the net impact of the virus.
> just accelerated something that would have happened within a few months anyway
That's absolutely not what this means. Asthma is a comorbidity. Are asthmatics just a few months from death? I have hypertension, am I about to kick the bucket? Sixty percent of the US population (no doubt including many of the posters on this very thread) are overweight, yet somehow we keep coming back.
Almost nothing kills "by itself". Everything adds up, and eventually the body stops working. Other diseases work this way too, yet you don't complain that yearly influenza deaths are inflated. Would you have argued that AIDS deaths were "really" due to the final infection and not HIV?
In fact, please cite me any of those factors which will reasonable by expected to kill you in months. Even heart failure and cancer patients tend to live years to decades with treatment.
A lot of people fall into those categories.
Here's one document from the UK that mentions the kind of testing they do to arrive at "deaths to flu" figures. They have international programmes to see what respiratory diseases are circulating, they test people who arrive in hospital for those, they know roughly how many people in the population they expect to die (because RTAs, cancer, heart disease, etc all stay sort of stable from one year to the next). They also do survey work to see if people have flu symptoms but haven't seen a doctor, and they can see how many people attend various healthcare settings for flu.
It's all a lot more complicated than "did someone write flu on a death certificate".
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/...
This works best with really intrusive surveillance of mobile phone locations :(
Well, it took a global pandemic, but we finally found a use for bloom filters!
What is surprising is that group testing tells us that we can actually do better: the specific construction you pinpoint the people who come up positive, without needing to have a test for each person [1] and this result is optimal in the expected number of tests. I'm surprised that most labs haven't already been doing this (but I would suspect some have).
Wootters has wonderful notes on the mathematical background for this—I really recommend them. [2]
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[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_testing
[1] Of course, we require an upper bound on the total prevalence, but even a weak upper bound yields fairly good savings in testing.
[2] Page 3 on of http://web.stanford.edu/~marykw/classes/CS250_W18/lectureNot...
> the specific construction lets you pinpoint the people who come up positive
A bottle neck seems to be that it's not really possible to pool more than at most 32 patients at a time.
It's an early work in progress but have a look: https://www.pcr-pooling.com
I have a link on my notes below. I'll add your site to the reference list at the top tonight.
I don't understand why we haven't focused all of our testing on people that aren't sick so we can catch the asymptomatic cases that are out in the world spreading it to everyone.
If I was in a Governor's or Mayor's shoes right now and I know there aren't enough resources to test everyone, I'd want some data like that to work with to make policy decisions.
While you are in the process of opening things back up, you keep a close eye on your daily/weekly representative sample numbers to see if anything needs to be dialed back. It gives you much closer to immediate feedback.
I suppose the immediate problem is getting a hold of a representative sample of people willing to be tested, but that feels solvable. I'm sure I'm not the first one to think of it, just curious why it isn't being done, as it feels immensely useful (maybe this is just the 538 political nerd in me wanting virus polls?).
So what are they looking at? Basically, if they have any evidence of community transmission, they need to issue the order or keep it in place. That means that if there are too many symptomatic people to even attempt contact tracing, you're not even close. Once you're low enough you can do contact tracing, you wait until you have a handful at most of symptomatic people you can't trace back to a known case. Until then, all you can do is keep the stay at home order in place, buy/beg/borrow/steal ventilators and PPE, and build testing and contact tracing capacity.
We don't treat Covid patients any differently than any other patients that develop pneumonia
I don't understand how this misconception persists. That is not what the WHO statement said.
The statement was that the outbreak was not being sustained by community transmission, and that they believed (this was very early on) that the cases from the Wuhan market were all due to exposure to a single case or pathogen.
This was, obviously, wrong. But at the time it wasn't unreasonable to believe. That's the way most outbreaks work when you catch them early.
At no point did anyone say that a respiratory coronavirus was not contagious, which is how people insist on treating that statement. Of course these things are contagious, that's how they spread.
> Preliminary investigations conducted by the Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel #coronavirus (2019-nCoV) identified in #Wuhan, #China🇨🇳.
Edit: by default we should ASSUME community transmission
But the HN title is actionable: if we can change our testing policy and deploy our tests more usefully, that's great to know and eminently achievable.
But "not testing enough" isn't really actionable. There's a shortage of tests because there's a shortage of the raw materials that goes into making the tests. The U.S. already has tested far and away more people than anyone else, and is second only behind Italy in tests per capita, and has a "positive test to test" rate roughly in line with (as low of a rate as) any other country's rate. See [0] and related charts.
"Just test more" isn't really useful at this point.
[0] https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/full-list-total-tests-for...
Where are you getting those numbers? I don't think that's correct. The Worldometer data may not be the best, but they have the US well down in the middle of the pack at ~13k tests/Mpop.
Lots of large developed nations have the US beat by quite a bit, in fact. And Iceland is literally a full order of magnitude higher!
In fact US testing policy has been largely a disaster. It's not the only disaster, but this is an area (large scale PCR laboratory work) where the US is supposed to be good at stuff. And yet there's been almost no attention paid to the problem at the highest levels of government.
[0] https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/full-list-cumulative-tota...
Let's say your key metric you're trying to maintain or improve is P50 request latency. Its relatively easy to exhibit an acceptable P50 to 10 users, from 1 VM. Its actually harder to deliver the same P50 to 100 users, from 10 VMs. Even harder for 1000 users and 100 VMs, snd so on. You run into previously fine bottlenecks you didn't know existed. Issues which were invisible at ten users become cascading failures at thousands.
It just keeps getting harder the more users you add, even though you're adding proportionally more underlying VMs. There is no end to how difficult it gets, until eventually, it becomes impossible.
Testing is a problem with difficulty that scales with population size. Of the top ten countries by population size, there are only two countries that have higher testing per capita than the US: Russia and China. Those three countries are pretty close; no one else, anywhere in the top ten, is remotely close to the US, Russia, and China.
(Kind of funny how the top two testers in the top 10 countries by population are dictatorships, who have every reason to maintain a strong, powerful image. Funny how it works out like that, isn't it? Do you believe their numbers?)
I run the fastest website on the planet. No one but my mom visits it, but its still the fastest. Lithuania (the world's top daily tester per capita yesterday) is that website. The US is, uh, lets say Google. Should you bemoan Google for taking longer to load?
> P50 request latency
I for one don't even know what P50 means.
That requires that you compare the US to Iceland, Faeroe Islands, Falkland Islands, UAE, Malta, Gibraltar, Luxembourg, Bahrain, Estonia, San Marino, Cyprus, Isle of Man, Lithuania, Brunei, Qatar, Liechtenstein, Ireland, Latvia, Andorra, Channel Islands, Bermuda, Aruba.
Nice try.
Back on planet earth, here's the list of actual sane comparables that are in front of the US, in order:
Italy, Germany, Spain, Australia, Russia, Canada
And Russia is fake. They haven't tested much at all.
The US has tested at a higher rate than South Korea (which is behind all of those tiny nations also).
The US testing rate is just behind Belgium, a nation 1/29th the size of the US. And it's not very far behind Singapore at this point, either.
Many of the countries testing "more per capita" have a lower population than cities that many here on hacker news wouldn't even consider "real cities". Scaling testing in the Isle of Man above the US only takes a total of 1100 tests. Of course they are testing more per-capita than we are.
Rich Condit: Garrett writes: The CDC guidelines are to test hospitalized patients and symptomatic health care workers first, and the symptomatic general public last. This seems backwards to me.
Alan Dove: Yeah. I just had this conversation with my wife after she had some, I mentioned this before, she had some coughing and shortness of breath, got immediately sent to the ER in the hospital where she works, and they did a chest x-ray, it was clear, and they said, "Ok, you don't meet criteria for testing. Go back to work." And she's been fine since then, and she, we were talking about it and she said, "Well, isn't that exactly who they should test, because then I could go and infect patients?" and I said, "Well, if they had enough tests, yes. But if you expand the testing to the people who are less sick, you don't have enough tests. Whereas if you restrict the testing to the people who are sickest, you do have enough tests." So it's a.. it's not the right way to do it, but it's the way that you actually can do it.
Vincent Racaniello: Yeah, we're in this position because we don't have enough tests. We didn't ramp up...
Dove: Because we don't have enough tests. We didn't prepare fast enough.
Racaniello: If we had, we could test a lot of people and get an idea of how many actual infections there were, which would be very useful. But... we can't. So we're stuck with this current policy.
[1]- http://www.microbe.tv/twiv/twiv-595/ about 1 hour and 19 minutes in to the program
People with bad symptoms aren't the one's going out into the world spreading the virus and the difference in treatment between a Covid and non-Covid patient (from what I've heard) is minimal.
B) If you know that someone with bad symptoms has the virus, then you can go test everyone they contacted. You'll find more people who currently have mild or no symptoms.
The PPE required for some COVID-19 symptoms in the absence of clear indication of a droplet/airborne transmissible condition are different than for COVID-19. You don't usually use droplet, much less airborne, protections for every patient presenting with a fever, or GI symptoms, or several of the other ways COVID-19 can present, but you must with the prevalence of COVID-19 until you can rule it out.
And it's even more critical to identify COVID-19 or it's absence in sick patients when part of your containment strategy involves segregating ftreatment facilities (part of the capacity surge has been in establishing either new COVID-19 specific facilities or new facilities to handle non-COVID-19 cases while existing capacity is dedicated to COVID-19.)
[1] https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/04/21/8387942...
It's also quite likely that a positive test on an asymptomatic person is also false -- depending on how prevalent it is in the general population.
I don't think we've reached the point where COVID-19 is the leading cause of fever, much less GI symptoms, so unless you define “symptomatic” extremely narrowly (like, “in need of a ventilator”) that's probably not true in this pandemic at this time in the US.
There are places with single-digit positive test rates, that would require a 90%+ false negative rate, which, as far as we know, is not the case.
the USAF wanted to armor planes where the bullet holes were. statistician abe wald recommended armoring where the bullet holes weren't on the theory that those were the non-survivable hits
can't interpret a statistic until you think about what's excluded from the sample
It wasn't quite that simple, but the story has a gem of truth. As this article quotes Stephen Stigler (son of George Stigler who worked with Abraham Wald):
>..."The military was inclined to provide protection for those parts that on returning planes showed the most hits. Wald assumed, on good evidence, that hits in combat were uniformly distributed over the planes. It follows that hits on the more vulnerable parts were less likely to be found on returning planes than hits on the less vulnerable parts, since planes receiving hits on the more vulnerable parts were less likely to return to provide data. From these premises, he devised methods for estimating vulnerability of various parts."
http://www.ams.org/publicoutreach/feature-column/fc-2016-06
This paper goes into detail for those interested in statistics:
It certainly makes for a good drama though.
there's an american math society article about this -- it evaluates the fun version of the story in the context of wald's actual paper and a journal entry by another scientist named wallis
("A Massively Parallel COVID-19 Diagnostic Assay for Simultaneous Testing of 19200 Patient Samples")
I think Figure 1b is the diagram you want.
But we don't have nearly enough testing capacity (either tests or the organized infrastructure to administer them, though both problems are being worked on) to meaningfully test the general population, whether or not we focussed our entire effort on the most important subset for reopening, so it would be extraordinarily stupidly premature to shift our current testing priority in that direction. This also means that general reopening is, a fortiori, extraordinarily stupidly premature.
Now, with all this in place, isn't the best we can do to alert people after they have already been exposed to the virus?
It feels a bit like the safe sex crusaders switching to say everybody can have unprotected sex now, we'll let you know if you catch something, hopefully before you infect your next partner. Which I suppose is more reasonable for the group, but ... as the individual who is expected to actually go out in the world to consume or whatever, this doesn't feel like a viable solution. What am I missing?
Each infected person will come into contact with some other people. Testing allows three things—
- first, we can tell this person to stay at home and so stop them from infecting more people;
- second, we can tell the people they have seen to stay at home with good contact-tracing, so that even if they get it they don’t spread it further; and
- third, with enough tests and contact tracing, those who were exposed but not infected don’t have to stay at home.
We are winning so long as R<1, even if there is some chance the infection spreads; we do not need R=0.
The other way of reducing R requiring much less testing and contact tracing is a lockdown. This has obvious downsides. The point of a programme of testing and conyact tracing is that we can turn the cost of avoiding disaster from a lockdown to sticking some things up people’s noses.
edit: typo in first para
But suppose A starts showing symptoms, tests positive. We can immediately notify B1, B2 and B3 that they need to quarantine, immediately. Before they start showing symptoms. And therefore we're cutting down on the time that they were infectious and spreading. Therefore generation C is only a couple of people instead of dozens. We can notify C generation as well, immediately if we wish. This causes a large quarantine - there are a lot of false positives who are quarantining without being infected - but it would massively reduce the spread. If you can immediately test all of generation B and C, you can perhaps avoid some of the quarantining (assuming a negative is reliable).
Maybe contact tracing misses some, maybe some new infected come from other countries, maybe some people don't quarantine when told. All these things keep the infection going. But it can be held down to a manageable level.
The trick is to NOT stop testing once your case count starts going down, instead give the test to everybody that wants one.
A few million spent on 99.9% negative tests daily > a few billion spent on the economy being shut off daily
So I think the word manageable is doing a lot of work here. Specifically, manageable to the hospitals, which is what I believe most people mean when they say this, does not do anything to manage consumer confidence. Which my entire question is about. How do I, as an individual consumer, feel confident enough in the systems set up to go back to some semblance of normal? Learning that my chance of getting infected from going to the grocery store has dropped from 20%? to... 5%? 1%? Whatever the risk is, it needs to be multiplied by the average number of places a normal consumer went to over a week before this outbreak. Which means that I'm still gonna get it eventually, just I might not block somebody else from getting a hospital bed. Which is obviously better than nothing! But I really think people are missing the human aspect of precisely what this entails.
Consider user stories. As a single mother do you still feel confident going out to get groceries knowing there's an n% chance of getting it and bringing it home to your kids? If you die there's no one else to look after them.
No, the best we can do in that case is treat COVID-19 like a dangerous communicable disease that isn't too widespread for surveillance and do specific quarantines of the infected and exposed, which then vastly limits the possibility that anyone else gets exposed, while not requiring shelter-in-place restrictions for those not already infected/exposed.
That's the whole point of disease surveillance with widespread testing and extensive contact tracing, and why it is key for a general reopening of the economy in the absence of an effective cure/vaccine.
The goal isn't to "alert" infectious cases, it's to quarantine them so they don't create new infections. Even baring a legal order, someone who knows they are covid-positive is much more likely to stay home and away from others. That reduces the rate of spread, which is ultimate goal.
> but ... as the individual
It's not an individual level solution. There are no individual level solutions (except complete and total isolation I guess). Outbreaks are community events.
The way to think about this is: who do we need to test so we can start un-quarantining people.
The goal is not to find out who has it because right now, we are essentially behaving as if the entire US population is infected. The goal is to efficiently determine who is very unlikely to have it so that those people can start incrementally returning to normal life.
It's not worth testing symptomatic people: they've already "failed" one test in that we at least know they have symptoms. Simply continue to treat them as infected.
One difference is if a business re-opens and expects people to come in to work, the US probably needs legal protections so quarantined workers don't get fired or forced to come in illegally.
Maybe we need to use the tools we already have, such as flu surveillance and data from hospitals, to detect excess non-flu infections. We seem to be able to do flu tests, are they more scalable so that at least flu can be ruled out in many cases?
If widespread testing can not happen because we can't build factories to make reagents/swabs/tubes/PCR array machines/etc. fast enough, we need to start thinking of alternatives. We don't actually seem to understand yet how the virus spreads, too many clinicians trained in handling infectious disease are getting sick despite PPE. If the new small antibody test results are right, then the virus is spreading much faster than can be accounted for via droplet spread as the main mechanism; we may have to consider birds, mosquitoes, surfaces, skin touching, and other methods as possible common spreading mechanisms. If we understood transmission better then it might be possible to tell people how to truly protect themselves, and then they could go back to work. So understanding transmission better is something that could be used in addition to whatever testing is available in order to prevent deaths and economic damage. But people may not follow the new rules based on that understanding, so get the social scientists involved to get the message across. Get OSHA involved to set best practices for workplaces. It seems like there is probably a lot that can be done, even without testing, and at present we may have to assume testing will not be sufficient in the near term (3-6 months).
But someone has to start thinking about these things and doing them, and I'm not seeing any evidence of this in the news. Given that contact tracing is not already ramping up (I've seen only Massachusetts as having a plan to scale it up but I tend to only see East Coast news) I have to wonder if anyone is even thinking about alternatives to testing if testing at scale is not possible.
This requires a huge leap of faith, which frankly, under surveillance capitalism you would be a fool to accept at face value.
Austria developed such an app, but only 3% of people could be convinced to install it which makes it completely useless even if it would have worked (which I believe it would not for technical reasons).