No, that doesn't solve the problem at all!
AES-GCM was not designed to be used with random nonces - otherwise the nonce space would need to be larger than 96 bits. It was only designed to be safe with a unique counter nonce. That does not always become a problem, but it will in Zoom's case.
Zoom is encrypting a video stream, which means you cannot use AES-GCM wholesale, but have to use it to encrypt chunks of data.
The problem is that 12 bytes (96 bits) of nonce is just not enough, and after encrypting a certain amount of data with the same key, the chance of repeating the nonce becomes rather high. And if you have a long video conference call with many participants using the same key, you'll sooner or later generate enough data that the nonce will be repeated. Once the nonce is repeated, GCM loses its security guarantees.
It's hard for me to estimate how bad it would be, since I'm not familiar enough with the plaintext data characteristics, but in this case it could even be worse than using ECB.
AES-GCM is a cryptographic primitive that is meant for sequential whole-message encryption. The moment you're using it for streaming you are rolling your own crypto. Even if you've used a cipher that supports larger nonces like XChaCha20-Poly1305, you can still not be sure that you're absolutely free from mistakes if you also want authentication, for instance.
Zoom was negligent for just going ahead with AES-ECB, but finding a solution for this problem is not that simple. When you need to stream encrypted data, encrypting it directly with a safe AEAD construction is not always going to make you safe. That's why it's generally safer to use TLS, even considering how historically problematic TLS is. Of course Zoom could not use TLS for streaming video, since this would preclude them from using UDP and allowing for packet loss. I've never encrypted TLS traffic and I'm not familiar enough with other protocols like dTLS and [Noise](https://noiseprotocol.org/) to know if they will be useful in this case, so I won't be making any claims to how easy this is.